Showing papers on "Value (ethics) published in 1988"

The Social Life of Things

Abstract: The meaning that people attribute to things necessarily derives from human transactions and motivations, particularly from how those things are used and circulated. The contributors to this volume examine how things are sold and traded in a variety of social and cultural settings, both present and past. Focusing on culturally defined aspects of exchange and socially regulated processes of circulation, the essays illuminate the ways in which people find value in things and things give value to social relations. By looking at things as if they lead social lives, the authors provide a new way to understand how value is externalized and sought after. They discuss a wide range of goods - from oriental carpets to human relics - to reveal both that the underlying logic of everyday economic life is not so far removed from that which explains the circulation of exotica, and that the distinction between contemporary economics and simpler, more distant ones is less obvious than has been thought. As the editor argues in his introduction, beneath the seeming infinitude of human wants, and the apparent multiplicity of material forms, there in fact lie complex, but specific, social and political mechanisms that regulate taste, trade, and desire. Containing contributions from American and British social anthropologists and historians, the volume bridges the disciplines of social history, cultural anthropology, and economics, and marks a major step in our understanding of the cultural basis of economic life and the sociology of culture. It will appeal to anthropologists, social historians, economists, archaeologists, and historians of art.

The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment

Abstract: Acknowledgments 1. Introduction 2. At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or why political questions are not all economic 3. The allocation and distribution of resources 4. Frigile prices and shadow values 5. Values and preferences 6. Nature and the national idea 7. Can environmentalists be liberals? 8. Property and the value of land 9. Where Ickes went right or, Reason and rationality in environmental law Notes Index.

You Owe Yourself a Drunk: An Ethnography of Urban Nomads

Abstract: An account of the experiences of men who are repeatedly arrested for public drunkenness. This book challenges the idea that these men are simply rejects from society, who cannot organize their behavior by cultural traditions. Using the recently discovered methods of formal ethnographic analysis, the author presents this urban sub-culture as it relates to law enforcement agencies. Life in one jail is described in detail, showing how it changes the men's personal identities, teaching them the skills of this sub-culture and motivating them to adopt a nomadic way of life where drinking is a great social value. Originally published by Little, Brown and Company in 1970.

What Is Art For

Abstract: Every human society displays some form of behavior that can be called "art," and in most societies other than our own the arts play an integral part in social life. Those who wish to understand art in its broadest sense, as a universal human endowment, need to go beyond modern Western elitist notions that disregard other cultures and ignore the human species' four-million-year evolutionary history. This book offers a new and unprecedentedly comprehensive theory of the evolutionary significance of art. Art, meaning not only visual art, but music, poetic language, dance, and performance, is for the first time regarded from a biobehavioral or ethical viewpoint. It is shown to be a biological necessity in human existence and fundamental characteristic of the human species. In this provocative study, Ellen Dissanayake examines art along with play and ritual as human behaviors that "make special," and proposes that making special is an inherited tendency as intrinsic to the human species as speech and toolmaking. She claims that the arts evolved as means of making socially important activities memorable and pleasurable, and thus have been essential to human survival. Avoiding simplism and reductionism, this original synthetic approach permits a fresh look at old questions about the origins, nature, purpose, and value of art. It crosses disciplinary boundaries and integrates a number of divers fields: human ethology; evolutionary biology; the psychology and philosophy of art; physical and cultural anthropology; "primitive" and prehistoric art; Western cultural history; and children's art. The final chapter, "From Tradition to Aestheticism," explores some of the ways in which modern Western society has diverged from other societies--particularly the type of society in which human beings evolved--and considers the effects of the aberrance on our art and our attitudes toward art. This book is addressed to readers who have a concerned interest in the arts or in human nature and the state of modern society.

Knowing what you want: measuring labile values

Abstract: An article of faith among students of value, choice, and attitude judgments is that people have reasonably well-defined opinions regarding the desirability of various events. Although these opinions may not be intuitively formulated in numerical (or even verbal) form, careful questioning can elicit judgments representing people's underlying values. From this stance, elicitation procedures are neutral tools, bias-free channels that translate subjective feelings into scientifically usable expressions. They impose no views on respondents beyond focusing attention on those value issues of interest to the investigator. What happens, however, in cases where people do not know, or have difficulty appraising, what they want? Under such circumstances, elicitation procedures may become major forces in shaping the values expressed, or apparently expressed, in the judgments they require. They can induce random error (by confusing the respondent), systematic error (by hinting at what the “correct” response is), or unduly extreme judgments (by suggesting clarity and coherence of opinion that are not warranted). In such cases, the method becomes the message. If elicited values are used as guides for future behavior, they may lead to decisions not in the decision maker's best interest, to action when caution is desirable (or the opposite), or to the obfuscation of poorly formulated views needing careful development and clarification. The topic of this chapter is the confrontation between those who hold (possibly inchoate) values and those who elicit values.

Program for a Sociology of Sport

Abstract: One of the obstacles to a scientific sociology of sport is due to the fact that sociologists of sport are in a way doubly dominated, both in the world of sociologists and in the world of sport. Since it would take too long to develop this somewhat blunt proposition, I will proceed, in the manner of the prophets, by way of a parable. In a recent discussion with one of my American sociologist friends, Aaron Cicourel, I learned that the great black athletes, who, in the United States, are often enrolled in such prestigious universities as Stanford, live in a sort of golden ghetto, because right-wing people do not talk very willingly with blacks while left-wing people do not talk very willingly with athletes. If one reflects on this and develops this paradigm, one might find in it the principle of the special difficulties that the sociology of sport encounters: scorned by sociologists, it is despised by sportspersons. The logic of the social division of labor tends to reproduce itself in the division of scientific labor. Thus there are, on the one hand, those who know sport very well on a practical level but do not know how to talk about it and, on the other hand, those who know sport very poorly on a practical level and who could talk about it, but disdain doing so, or do so without rhyme or reason. In order to be able to constitute a sociology of sport, one must first realize that a particular sport cannot be analyzed independently of the totality of sporting practices; one must conceptualize the space of sporting practices as a system within which each element receives its distinctive value. In other words, to understand a sport, whatever it may be, one must locate its position in the space of sports. The latter can be constructed by using sets of indicators such as, on the one hand, the distribution of practitioners according to their position in social space, the distribution of the different federations according to their number of members, their assets, the social characteristics of their directors, etc., or, on the other hand, the type of relation to the body that each sport favors or demands, whether it involves direct contact, body-to-body struggle, as in wrestling or Ameri-

The Primacy of Experience and the Politics of Method

Abstract: Knowledge is rooted in experience and requires a form for its representation. Since all forms of representation constrain what can be represented, they can only partially represent what we know. Forms of representation not only constrain representation, they limit what we seek. As a result, socialization in method is a process that shapes what we can know and influences what we value. At base it is a political undertaking. This article addresses the politics of method and its effects on the character of educational research.

The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders And the Philosophy of Locke

Abstract: "The Spirit of Modern Republicanism" sets forth a radical reinterpretation of the foundations on which the American regime was constructed. Thomas L. Pangle argues that the Founders had a dramatically new vision of civic virtue, religious faith, and intellectual life, rooted in an unprecedented commitment to private and economic liberties. It is in the thought of John Locke that Pangle finds the fullest elaboration of the principles supporting the Founders' moral vision. "A work of extraordinary ambition, written with great intensity. . . . [Pangle offers] a trenchant analysis of Locke's writings, designed to demonstrate their remarkable originality and to clarify by doing so as much as the objective predicament as the conscious intentions of the Founding Fathers themselves."-John Dunn, "Times Higher Education Supplement" "A forcefully argued study of the Founding Fathers' debt to Locke. . . . What distinguishes Pangle's study from the dozens of books which have challenged or elaborated upon the republican revision is the sharpness with which he exposes the errors of the revisionists while at the same time leaving something of substantive value for the reader to consider."-Joyce Appleby, "Canadian Journal of History" "Breathtaking in its daring and novelty. . . . Pangle's book is tense and tenacious, a stunning meditation on America's political culture."-John Patrick Diggins, "Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society "

Contingencies of value

Abstract: It is a curious feature of literary studies in America that one of the most venerable, central, theoretically significant, and pragmatically inescapable set of problems relating to literature has not been a subject of serious inquiry for the past fifty years. I refer here to the fact not merely that the study of literary evaluation has been, as we might say, "neglected," but that the entire problematic of value and evaluation has been evaded and explicitly exiled by the literary academy. It is clear, for example, that there has been no broad and sustained investigation of literary evaluation that could compare to the constant and recently intensified attention devoted to every aspect of literary interpretation. The past decades have witnessed an extraordinary proliferation of theories, approaches, movements, and entire disciplines focused on interpretive criticism, among them (to recite a familiar litany) New Criticism, structuralism, psychoanalytic criticism, reader-response criticism, reception aesthetics, speech-act theory, deconstructionism, communications theory, semiotics, and hermeneutics. At the same time, however, aside from a number of scattered and secondary essays by theorists and critics who are usually otherwise occupied,' no one in particular has been concerned with questions of literacy value and evaluation, and such questions regularly go begging-and, of course, begged-even among those whose inquiries into other matters are most rigorous, substantial, and sophisticated. Reasons for the specific disparity of attention are not hard to locate. One is the obvious attachment of problems of interpretation and meaning

Ethics and values in applied social research

Abstract: Introduction An Overview of Ethical Problems in Social Research Ethical Standards and Guidelines for Social Research Methodological Issues and Dilemmas Confidentiality and the Right to Privacy Special Problems in Applied Settings Attitudes and Value Commitments Conclusions and Recommendations

The Influence of College on Humanitarian/Civic Involvement Values

Abstract: In his massive national study of nearly one hundred thousand undergraduates, Levine [20] portrays the values of American college students as reflective of a cynical, "me first" view of society and culture. His findings suggest that college students place value on activities and life goals which are inward, personal, and individualistic rather than humanitarian, social, or civic. To the extent that this trend reflects the influence of the collegiate experience, it runs counter to a strong historical tradition in American postsecondary education. A college education in America has typically had among its primary goals not only the development of the individual intellect but also the fostering of a sense of one's moral and civic responsibility [28, 29, 30, 31]. College has been regarded as one among a number of fundamental social/cultural institutions which prepares the young adult for concerned and involved citizenship in a democracy [21]. Consequently, the fostering of humanitarian and civic values has been regarded as an important national benefit of a college education [22]. Given this emphasis on value development as an outcome of higher education, it is not particularly surprising that the impact of college on student values has been the focus of considerable research [2, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 35]. The landmark works of Jacob [ 1 8] and Eddy [ 10] were generally pessimistic about the influence of college on values. Feldman and Newcomb [II], however, had the more advantageous

The Illness Narrative: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition

Abstract: This book should be of value to anyone dealing with the problem of chronic illness; and who in the practice of medicine these days does not? Kleinman, a psychiatrist with considerable skill in ethnography, has artfully defined the dilemmas and issues in chronicity—in illness, disease, and sickness. By "illness" Kleinman refers to the "innately human experience of symptoms and suffering" (p 3); "disease," to the practitioner's concern with biologic structure and functioning (p 5); and "sickness," to "the understanding of a disorder in its generic sense across a population in relation to macrosocial (economic, political, institutional) forces" (p 6). The distinctions among these definitions as well as the significant themes in chronicity are built up by the writer in an easy and understandable style around case presentations drawn from a wide variety of clinical settings in the United States and China. The health care system is increasingly preoccupied with long-term

Lesbian ethics: Beginning remarks

Abstract: While we have questioned patriarchal politics, we have not questioned patriachal ethics. This paper comes from the introduction of my forthcoming book, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (Institute of Lesbian Studies, P.O. Box 60242, Palo Alto, CA 94306, U.S.A.), and lays the groundwork for the challenge to patriarchal ethics I pose: I argue that the concept ‘lesbian’ is connected in important ways to the idea of female agency. I suggest the function of traditional ethics is social control and that we might instead focus on the development of individual moral agency and integrity. I discuss the use of language in structuring reality and trapping us in oppression. And finally I discuss the directions my work takes.

Reflections on political identity

Abstract: "Norton powerfully defends the inevitability and value of `those particular, concrete traits and actions whereby men differentiate themselves from one another.'"--'Ethics.'

Why Put a Value on Biodiversity

Abstract: In this chapter, I express a point of view in absolute terms to make it more vivid and understandable. There are exceptions to what I have written, but I will let others find them. That it was considered necessary to have a section in this volume devoted to the value of biological diversity tells us a great deal about why biological diversity is in trouble. Two to three decades ago, the topic would not have been thought worth discussing, because few scientists and fewer laymen believed that biological diversity was-or could be-endangered in its totality Three or four decades before that, a discussion of the value of biological diversity would probably have been scorned for a different reason. In the early part of this century, that value would have been taken for granted; the diversity of life was considered an integral part of life, and one of the nicest parts at that. Valuing diversity would, I suspect, have been thought both presumptuous and a terrible waste of time. Now, in the last part of the twentieth century, we have meetings, papers, and entire books devoted to the subject of the value of biological diversity It has become a kind of academic cottage industry with dozens of us sitting at home at our word processors churning out economic, philosophical, and scientific reasons for or against keeping diversity. Why? There are probably many explanations of why we feel compelled to place a value on diversity One, for example, is that our ability to destroy diversity appears to place us on a plane above it, obliging us to judge and evaluate that which is in our power. A more straightforward explanation is that the dominant economic realities of our time — technological development, consumerism, the increasing size of governmental, industrial, and agricultural enterprises, and the growth of human populations — are responsible for most of the loss of biological diversity. Our lives and futures are dominated by the economic manifestations of these often hidden processes, and survival itself is viewed as a matter of economics (we speak of tax shelters and safety nets), so it is hardly surprising that even we conservationists have begun to justify our efforts on behalf of diversity in economic terms. It does not occur to us that nothing forces us to confront the process of destruction by using its own uncouth and self-destructive premises and terminology It does not occur to us that by assigning value to diversity we merely legitimize the process that is wiping it out, the process that says, “The first thing that matters in any important decision is the tangible magnitude of the dollar costs and benefits.” People are afraid that if they do not express their fears and concerns in this language they will be laughed at, they will not be listened to. This may be true (although having philosophies that differ from the established ones is not necessarily inconsistent with political power). But true or not, it is certain that if we persist in this crusade to determine value where value ought to be evident, we will be, left with nothing but our greed when the dust finally settles. I should make it clear that I am referring not just to the effort to put an actual price on biological diversity but also to the attempt to rephrase the price in terms of a nebulous survival value. Two concrete examples that call into question this evaluating process come immediately to mind. The first is one that I first noticed a number of years ago: it was a paper written in the Journal of Political Economy by Clark (1973)--an applied mathematician at the University of British Columbia. That paper, which everyone who seeks to put a dollar value on biological diversity ought to read, is about the economics of killing blue whales. The question was whether it was economically advisable to halt the Japanese whaling of this species in order to give blue whales time to recover to the point where they could become a sustained economic resource. Clark demonstrated that in fact it was economically preferable to kill every blue whale left in the

Constructing the Inner Citadel: Recent Work on the Concept of Autonomy

Abstract: The metaphor of an "inner citadel" was not used approvingly when Isaiah Berlin invoked it as part of his attack on the notion of positive liberty (Berlin 1969, pp. 135 ff.). And although he scoffed at the idea that there loomed within us all an inner structure representing our "true" selves, he was moved to admit that the idea of self-government that positive liberty is meant to capture is a value to be counted among the various elements of a free society. After all, can a person be said to be free or acting freely if the desires which produce those actions do not bear the pedigree of authenticity-the person's "true desires"? What account can we give of the self-critical and self-mastering capacities of a person utilized to form the desires which motivate free action? What such an account would amount to, then, is a theory of individual autonomy. And while a great deal of attention has been paid recently to this notion, much of the work done on the ideas of self-government and autonomy avoids the use of the term 'autonomy.' Nevertheless, what I wish to do in this survey is to touch on the various attempts at constructing such theories of autonomy (or what amounts to autonomy), and the resulting controversies that these have spawned. After asking whether it makes sense to talk of a single or central notion of individual autonomy at all, I will discuss some of the most influential recent theories of autonomy and the criticisms that these have faced. In Section II, I will touch on the relation of autonomy to other values (in particular utility and rights) and turn finally to the question of the value of autonomy itself.

Chicago studies in political economy

Abstract: "There is no question that a well-defined 'Chicago School' of political economy has emerged, built largely around the work of George J. Stigler and his colleagues. "Chicago Studies in Political Economy" brings together the key works in this field, works that have been extremely influential among economists who study political processes. It is a collection of enormous value."-Roger G. Noll

The Additive Fallacy

Abstract: Much moral philosophy is concerned with defending or attacking the moral relevance of various distinctions. Thus consequentialists disagree with deontologists, and deontologists disagree among themselves, over whether any moral weight should be given to such distinctions as that between what one does and what one merely allows, or to the distinction between what one intends as a means, and what one merely foresees as a side-effect, and so on. Similarly, there is disagreement over the moral relevance of such factors as the motive of the agent, the consequences of a given act, or the guilt of those who may be harmed. (On some matters, perhaps, there is widespread agreement: there seems to be a contemporary consensus, e.g., that skin color is of no intrinsic moral importance.) Such discussions, of course, are of intrinsic theoretical interest, for as moral philosophers we would like to have adequate beliefs about which factors (and which distinctions) are morally relevant.' They are also, furthermore, of some practical importance, for we appeal to such factors in assessing the moral status of actions in difficult and controversial cases, and in order to explain and defend our judgments. Obviously, however, such practical applications are of limited value until we have determined whether or not a given distinction actually merits being given moral weight. But how are we to settle this? How can we defend, or attack, claims involving the moral relevance of different distinctions? A very common form of argument proceeds by offering a pair of cases that differ only in terms of the factor in question.2 If we judge the

Nation Into State: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American Nationalism

Abstract: A UNC Press Enduring Edition - UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

Value self-confrontation as a method to aid in weight loss.

Abstract: The impact on weight loss of an adaptation of the Rokeach(1973) value self-confrontation method was investigated in a field experiment. This method confronts people who have ranked their own values with information about the value priorities that discriminate between a positive and a negative reference group. A preliminary study revealed that successful weight losers differ from unsuccessful weight losers in valuing "wisdom" more than "happiness." Eighty-seven overweight adults were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: value self-confrontation, group discussion, or nontreatment control. Value self-confrontation subjects lost more weight than the other subjects over 2 months, and this weight loss persisted for an additional year. Changes in value priorities during the first 2 months suggest that weight loss was mediated by an increase in the importance attributed to wisdom relative to happiness. Implications for the theory of value-behavior relations and for practical application in weight loss programs are discussed. The method of value self-confrontation (VSC) developed by Rokeach (1973) seeks to change people's behavior by changing the value priorities underlying that behavior. This method has been applied successfully to influence such behaviors as joining the NAACP, making eye contact with Blacks, contributing money to programs fostering gender or minority group equality, supporting antipollution measures, consulting about career planning, smoking cigarettes, and classroom teaching (summarized in Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, & Grube, 1984; Schwartz, in press). Our first aim is to report an application of the Rokeach method to a new behavior: dieting and persistent weight loss. The VSC method has produced significant behavior change in half of its 16 published applications. Surprisingly, however, there has been little research on whether the key theoretical process presumed to underlie the behavior change is indeed the mediator of that change. More specifically, does the behavior change in fact follow from a change in those particular value priorities brought to the subjects' attention by VSC? Evidence from the two studies that did address this question (Greenstein. 1982; Grube, Greenstein, Rankin. & Kearney. 1977) fails to support the theoretical mediating process. Our second aim is to examine this question in a more adequate manner.

Existential counselling in practice

Abstract: "An excellent 'primer.' This is the type of text that I would have liked to have read when I was first introduced to the existential-phenomenological approach within psychology. It is clearly written and jargon-free. . . . I highly recommend this book as a very good introduction." --Mufid James Hannush in Journal of Phenomenological Psychology Are psychological problems brought on by social pressure, biology, culture, or personal pathology? Or are they the by-product of the essential paradoxes of human existence? This volume offers the practicing therapist a concrete framework for understanding both the role of the counselor and the concept of anxiety in contemporary society. But more importantly, the author demonstrates practical methods for applying an existential approach to counseling. Counseling is not presented as a problem-solving or skill-building exercise; rather, it is seen as a process enabling the client to come to terms with living life as it is, with all its inherent contradictions. Through an abundant use of case illustrations, the author clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of existential counseling in many different areas of therapy, from crisis intervention to work with chronic unhappiness. Written in a simple, elegant style by a leading authority on therapy techniques, this volume will prove an indispensable guide to the existential approach for all counselors and students of counseling. "Offers a very readable account of counselling from an existential perspective. Numerous case histories are used to illustrate common dilemmas in people's lives. . . . The book flows in a sensitive narrative on the problems of living and neurotic ways of denying and dealing withconflict. . . . It reads more like a commentary on people's lives, rather than a structured and informative introduction to Existential Counselling. . . .I enjoyed the book immensely and it is well recommended as a balance to the technically loaded manuals of today." --British Journal of Medical Psychology "This is a book worthy of wide acclaim as it fills a missing philosophical gap in therapy in Western civilization. The author writes clearly and simply in plain English. She presents existential thought as an easily accessible coherent body of work. The book is full of case histories where seemingly meaningless psychotic episodes are later explained. Also there are cases of despair, depression and meaninglessness quoted which is what makes this book so necessary for our times of mass production, mass media and mass alienation." --Suggestions: The Newsletter of the Association of Professional Therapists "A process of continuous questioning and clarification helps clients to examine their natural, public, private, and ideal worlds; to discover and explore their basic assumptions and view of the world; and thereby to learn what it means to be true to themselves. The book is intended for counselors and psychotherapists but can be enjoyed by anyone with an interest in existentialism, providing a coherent, readable, and easily understood description of existentialism and its use as a treatment form. It makes a strong case for the value of fostering independence and authenticity in clients through the use of the Socratic method rather than empathy. . . . This author emphasizes the role of the counselor as an educator. She cites many case histories, some of whose outcomes seem almostmiraculous. the book is worth reading." --Readings: A Journal of Reviews and Commentary in Mental Health "A lucid, highly readable, and solid introduction to this school of thought in the helping professions. . . . An existential approach is appealing, particularly to helping professionals who concern themselves with their clients' spiritual needs." --Review and Expositor "This book provides an excellent source from which to examine the extent to which cognitive therapy is informed by existentialism. The reader is promised a logical application of the ideas of existential philosophy that translate into practical counselling methods. This promise is fulfilled. The book is full of succinct case examples which illustrate the principles clearly." --British Journal of Guidance and Counselling

Managing Human Resource Development

Abstract: "Provides specific managerial guidelines to help direct the day-to-day activities of the HRD unit...Its how-to approach would be of value to current or aspiring HRD managers, human resources specialists, and line managers asked to take on HRD activities."--Choice

Development of an instrument for assessing educational value orientations

Abstract: The concept of values as persistent universal beliefs has been developed extensively in the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, anthropology and psychology. 1 According to Kerlinger, the interest in the under-standing and measurement of beliefs is predicated on the assumption that value differences constitute the essence of major human choices and conflicts. 2 In curriculum, the question, 'What knowledge is of most worth?', 3 is critical to the selection of curriculum content, The rationale for content selection is embedded in the belief systems of individuals involved in the curriculum development process. These belief systems, frequently termed 'educational value orientations', have been described in the curriculum literature, 4 While there is logical and anecdotal evidence to support value orientations, empirical efforts to document specific teacher beliefs have been limited to categorizations within major philosophical schools of thought. 5

Values and the foundations of strategic management

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of values in strategic management. We discuss recent criticisms of the concept of strategy and argue that the concept of value helps reconcile these criticisms with traditional models of strategy. We show that Andrews' model of corporate strategy rightly takes morally significant values to be essential to effective management. We show how the notion of value can be clarified and used in research into various conceptions of corporate morality.

Justifying attitudes by appealing to values: A functional perspective

Abstract: This study examined the ‘value‐justification hypothesis’. Derived from accentuation theory (Eiser, 1987), this hypothesis states that people with different attitudes will appeal to different values to justify, or account for, their attitudes. Subjects completed measures of their attitudes towards abortion and nuclear weapons, ranked the importance of 18 values (Rokeach, 1967) and ranked the relevance of these values to each attitude issue. Multivariate analyses revealed that subjects with negative and positive attitudes differed in the values which they regarded as relevant to each issue. For example, subjects who favoured nuclear weapons regarded ‘national security’ as more relevant in comparison to subjects opposed to nuclear weapons who viewed ‘wisdom’ as a more relevant value consideration. Further, these effects occurred over and above differences in value importance. Finally, the results suggested that these value‐justification effects were stronger among low, relative to high, self‐monitors (Snyder, 1974). The latter finding is consistent with the notion that value‐justification effects are more likely to occur when attitudes fulfil a value‐expressive function. The relation of these findings to the functional approach to the study of attitudes and Tetlock's (1986) value pluralism model is also discussed. 1988 The British Psychological Society

The Value of a Fixed Methodology

Abstract: Larry Laudan's latest book focusses on disagreements in science and on how such disagreements are resolved. Very briefly, Laudan holds that there is more disagreement in science then can be coped with by the accounts of scientific change given by such philosophers as the logical positivists, Reichenbach, Hempel and Popper (and by such sociologists of science as Merton); but that the fact that such disagreements are 'often' 'definitively' resolved is incompatible with the newer 'holist' or 'big picture' view associated with Kuhn and others. Laudan therefore sets out to develop his own explanatory model of scientific change which will allow both for the possibility of wide-ranging (and rational) disagreement and will explain how such disagreement might eventually be definitively resolved. He sees the recent history of science studies in something like the following terms. The 40s and 50s were dominated by the 'consensual view'. On this view scientists standardly agree (about more or less everything and more or less all the time)--disagreements about theories do occasionally break out, but are quickly resolved by appeal to shared methods and goals. Then came Kuhn. His principal role was to overturn the consensual view by showing that disagreement is endemic in the scientific enterprise: scientists' disagreements about factual matters are standardly deeper and longer lasting than had generally been supposed and, more importantly, they need not be readily resolvable, because disagreement often extends beyond the factual to the methodological level, and even to the level of the appropriate aims and goals for science. Kuhn thus ushered in the '"new wave" preoccupation with dissensus'.

Energy and Energetics in Economic Theory: A Review Essay

Abstract: One of the most striking and least noticed aspects of the history of anti-neoclassical thought in the twentieth century is the sheer volume of scientists-that is, research workers trained in physics, chemistry and biology-who have been under the impression that they were the first to believe that the only "true" economic value is energy. In fact, the variants on this theme are more luxuriant than the biological metaphors with which they are sometimes entwined. Since there are more varieties of proto-scientific economic theory that you can shake a stick at, we shall proceed by erecting some basic taxonomies that will help to guide us through the underworld of unorthodox economcs, which are represented by the two books here under review. The first distinction to be made is between those who literally believe that energy is identical to economic value, and those who regard the physics merely as a metaphorical resource and a cornucopia of ready-made mathematical models. We shall dub the former group the neo-energeticists, and the latter group the neo-simulators. The neoenergeticists may then be sub-divided into three separate categories: (1) those who never venture beyond the postulation of a crude identity of

INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR: From Policy to Practice.

Abstract: The Influence of Culture on Management Behaviour Introduction The Impact of Culture on Management Applications of the Framework A Final Caveat: The Reality of Culture Shock Looking to the Future: The Global Manager Putting Policy into Practice: Selected Operating Issues Value Conflicts: Selected Ethical and Legal Issues.

Integrating the Study of Race, Gender, and Class: Some Preliminary Observations.

Abstract: The value of examining the ways in which race, class, and gender intersect in the construction of reality has not always been obvious. For some the fear was that comparisons would be used to invalidate or subordinate the oppres sion of one or more groups to some single and absolute paradigm of op pression or exploitation. For others there was the well intentioned in sistence that they were leaving out race or class or gender in their study of one of the other two, not because it wasn't important but simply because it wasn't "relevant" at that moment. It has taken us a long time, but we find ourselves in a period when people are open to integrating the study of race, class, and gender. This is no accident. Where the 70s were charac terized by separation and suspicion and spawned autonomous movements for racial and gender liberation, the 80s appear to be a period for collaborations and connections.2 At one time it seemed as if our ability to obtain resources for our particular struggle had an inverse ratio to the same ability on the part of others. There was a lot to go around, but each group wanted exclusive rights to the pie. Now in a period of relative scarcity many of us involved in progressive struggles have come to believe that our survival may well depend upon a combined struggle to oppose cuts and cutbacks. And our approach to theory now reflects the connections we have begun to forge in practice. Many of us have come to understand that talking about gender without talking about race and class or talking about race without bringing in class and gender is imply another way of obscuring reality instead of coming to terms with it. Many of us have come to believe that using race, class, and gender simultaneously as categories for analyzing reality provides us, at least at this historical moment, with the most adequate and comprehensive under standing of why things occur and whose interests they serve. During the past six years I have been engaged in several teaching projects designed to integrate this perspective into the curriculum. Drawing on the insights gained from each of them and focusing on my experience teaching an introductory required course called "Racism and Sexism in a Changing America," I will examine some of the problems that arise from teaching about the intersection of race, class, and gender.3 In particular, I will talk about why it is often so difficult to persuade students that racism and sexism continue to be fundamental forces in our society?forces which, along with class, play a primary role in shaping the kinds of lives people live. I speak from the perspective of a middle class, white woman who tries to guard against the danger of equating her reality with the reality but who never theless will more than likely do just that at least several times in the course of the discussion which follows. For that reason it is probably best to set aside the persona of universal theo retician and begin speaking in my own voice.4 Adopting this voice is essential for talking with students and others about racism and sexism. They are le gitimately hostile when confronted with abstract lecture-sermons from re mote authorities who claim some spe cial ability to recognize and then cri ticize racist or sexist behavior. If we expect others to talk openly about deeply felt beliefs and experiences we must make clear our own willingness to do the same. I grew up in a white, upper middle class, urban, orthodox jewish family. From the start, I knew I was a girl. The distinction between males and females in orthodox Judaism is clear and in escapable. Fortunately for me, I was an only child for the first six years of my life, and my place as first-born and only child compensated somewhat for the limitations on opportunity that would otherwise have been imposed unre lentingly by my gender. The first people of color I ever knew were large, loving Black women who came to take care of me, or clean our apartment, or wash our clothes. Later, as our family became more successful, they were replaced by slender young women from the West Indies and later still by young white "girls" from Ire land, France and Canada. Each of them treated my mother with varying de grees of respect or tolerance, but all of them treated my father with absolute regard. My parents were liberal Re publicans with Democratic tendencies. They taught my brother and me the standard liberal rhetoric about equality and justice at the same time that their conversation reflected stereotypical views of people of color and working people. They called Black people "Chvartsas" and meant no disrespect. Towards the end of her life my mother still spoke on the phone regularly with V., a middle class Black woman who came to work for us part-time after my