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Value (ethics)

About: Value (ethics) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 21347 publications have been published within this topic receiving 461372 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This work proposes a value-based conceptualization of partnership, defining partnership as relationships between community psychologists, oppressed groups, and other stakeholders, which strive to achieve key community psychology values.
Abstract: We propose a value-based conceptualization of partnership, defining partnership as relationships between community psychologists, oppressed groups, and other stakeholders, which strive to achieve key community psychology values (caring, compassion, community, health, self-determination, participation, power-sharing, human diversity, and social justice). These values guide partnership work related to the development of services or supports, coalitions and social action, and community research and program evaluation. We prescribe guidelines for building such partnerships and conclude by considering some of the challenges in implementing value-based partnerships.

145 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a vision of discourse ethics can be reconciled with many of the concerns of diversity whose demands for recognition are rooted in liberal values, but it underestimates the challenge that diversity poses to collective identity and the fundamental nature of value conflict.
Abstract: Habermas's vision of discourse ethics can be reconciled with many of the concerns of proponents of diversity whose demands for recognition are rooted in liberal values. However, his account underestimates the challenge that diversity poses to collective identity and the fundamental nature of value conflict. If discursive approaches to justice are to accommodate such claims, they must abandon the Habermasian search for consensus in favour of a vision of liberalism which acknowledges the plurality and incommensurability of fundamental values and which consequently accepts the pervasiveness of value conflict. Whereas Habermas fears that such a perspective will reduce political disputes to purely strategic struggles for power, such worries can be addressed through innovative forms of joint governance.

145 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the classic philosophical qualms in the light of recent empirical research on life-satisfaction and show that public policy should aim at greater happiness for a greater number of people.
Abstract: Utilitarian philosophy holds that public policy should aim at greater happiness for a greater number of people. This moral tenet meets many objections, on pragmatic grounds it is denounced as unfeasible and on ideological grounds as undesirable. As a result the principle is marginal in policy making. In this paper I consider these classic philosophical qualms in the light of recent empirical research on life-satisfaction. The data show first of all that the principle is feasible; happiness of a great number is possible in contemporary conditions and it is also possible to create more of it. The data also show that the promotion of happiness fits well with other ideals; happiness requires conditions that we value, such as freedom, and happiness fosters matters that we value, such as good health and civil behaviour. Though happiness can conflict with these values in theory, it appears to match them in practice.

145 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the relative importance of business ethics and social responsibility in determining brand attitudes has been discussed, and the authors conclude that although CSR attitudes remain important, customers value business ethics as a critical behavior in their perceptions of brand attitudes.

144 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined individuals' reactions to performance feedback and found that persons high in concern for others were less contingent than those of persons low in concern on the personal costs and benefits of accepting and responding to feedback.
Abstract: On the basis of H. A. Simon (1990), the value of concern for others is proposed to derive from a process whereby individuals accept social information without carefully weighing its personal consequences. This value may thus reflect a sensitivity to social information that is unrelated to helping others. In 3 studies examining individuals' reactions to performance feedback, the reactions of persons high in concern for others were less contingent than those of persons low in concern for others on the personal costs and benefits of accepting and responding to feedback. In contrast, persons low in concern for others were likely to reject feedback that did not result in valued personal outcomes. Because many models of organizational behavior maintain that individuals act on the basis of their evaluation of personal consequences, this value may relate to a wide range of organizational phenomena.

144 citations


Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202212
2021864
2020886
2019898
2018824
2017977