Value (ethics)

About: Value (ethics) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 21347 publications have been published within this topic receiving 461372 citations.

The Moral Significance of Class

Abstract: The Moral Significance of Class, first published in 2005, analyses the moral aspects of people's experience of class inequalities. Class affects not only our material wealth but our access to things, relationships, and practices which we have reason to value, including the esteem or respect of others and hence our sense of self-worth. It shapes the kind of people we become and our chances of living a fulfilling life. Yet contemporary culture is increasingly 'in denial' about class, finding it embarrassing to acknowledge, even though it can often be blatantly obvious. By drawing upon concepts from moral philosophy and social theory and applying them to empirical studies of class, this fascinating and accessible study shows how people are valued in a context in which their life-chances and achievements are objectively affected by the lottery of birth class, and by forces which have little to do with their moral qualities or other merits.

The Knowledge-Based View, Nested Heterogeneity, and New Value Creation: Philosophical Considerations on the Locus of Knowledge

Abstract: At what level is new value created, or, put differently, what is the locus of knowledge? While knowledge and capabilities-based researchers argue that the locus of new value and knowledge lies at the firm level, we challenge this conceptualization and theoretically build toward more individualist foundations. We explicate the underlying philosophical assumptions of extant knowledge and capabilities-based work and discuss attributional problems. Nested (individual-level, a priori) heterogeneity may provide a better explanation of collective heterogeneity.

Creating the Kingdom of Ends

Abstract: Part I. Kant's Moral Philosophy: 1. An introduction to the ethical, political, and religious thought of Kant 2. Kant's analysis of obligation: the argument of Groundwork I 3. Kant's formula of universal law 4. Kant's formula of humanity 5. The right to lie: Kant on dealing with evil 6. Morality as freedom 7. Creating the kingdom of ends: reciprocity and responsibility in personal relations Part II. Comparative Essays: 8. Aristotle and Kant on the source of value 9. Two distinctions in goodness 10. The reasons we can share: an attack on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values 11. Skepticism about practical reason 12. Two arguments against lying 13. Personal identity and the unity of agency: a Kantian response to Parfit.

Social Exchange Theory: A Critical Review with Theoretical Remedies

Abstract: Social exchange theory is one of the most prominent conceptual perspectives in management, as well as related fields like sociology and social psychology. An important criticism of social exchange theory; however, is that it lacks sufficient theoretical precision, and thus has limited utility. Scholars who apply social exchange theory are able to explain many social phenomena in post hoc manner but are severely limited in their ability to make useful a priori predictions regarding workplace behavior. In this review, we discuss social exchange theory as it exists today and identify four critical issues within the social exchange paradigm that warrant additional consideration. The four concerns, around which we center this review, include the following: (1) overlapping constructs that need to be more clearly distinguished; (2) insufficient appreciation to the positive or negative hedonic value of these various constructs; (3) an assumption of bipolarity, which treats negative constructs (e.g., abuse) as the absence of positive constructs (e.g., support); and, following from the prior three issues, (4) theoretically imprecise behavioral predictions. Given that these problems are inherent in the current unidimensional framework for social exchange theory, we suggest an additional dimension–activity. We explain how conceptualizing social exchange within a two-dimensional space, while giving equal consideration to both hedonic value and activity, creates new opportunities for future research.

Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology

Abstract: ECONOMISTS generally take tastes as "given" and work out the consequences of changes in prices, incomes, and other variables under the assumption that tastes do not change. When pressed, either they engage in ad hoc theorizing or they explicitly delegate the discussion of tastes to the sociologist, psychologist, or anthropologist. Unfortunately, these disciplines have not developed much in the way of systematic usable knowledge about tastes. Although economists have been reluctant to discuss systematically changes in the structure of tastes, they have long relied on assumptions about the basic and enduring properties of tastes. Self-interest is assumed to dominate all other motives,' with a prominent place also assigned to benevolence toward children2 (and occasionally others), and with self-interest partly dependent on distinction and other aspects of one's position in society.3 The dominance of self-interest and the persistence of some benevolence have usually been explained by "human nature," or an equivalent evasion of the problem. The development of modern biology since the mid-nineteenth century and of population genetics in the twentieth century made clear that "human nature" is only the beginning, not the end of the answer. The enduring traits of human (and animal) nature presumably were genetically selected under very different physical environments and social arrangements as life on earth evolved during millions of years. It is not difficult to understand why self-interest has high survival value under very different circumstances,4 but why should altruistic behavior, sometimes observed among animals as well as human beings, also survive? This kind of question has been asked by some geneticists and other biologists especially during the last two decades. Their work has recently been christened "sociI For example, Adam Smith said, "We are not ready to suspect any person of being defective in selfishness" [9, 1969, p. 446], and "it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" [10, 1937, p. 14]. 2According to Alfred Marshall, ". . . men labor and save chiefly for the sake of their families and not for themselves" [6, 1920, p. 228]. 3Nassau Senior said, "the desire for distinction . . . may be pronounced to be the most powerful of human passions" [8, 1938, p. 12]. 4Ronald Coase argues convincingly that Adam Smith, especially in his Moral Sentiments, was groping toward an explanation of the importance of selfinterest in terms of its contribution to viable social and economic arrangements (see Coase [5, 1976]).