Topic
Value (ethics)
About: Value (ethics) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 21347 publications have been published within this topic receiving 461372 citations.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors chart the emergence since the 1950s of a new value category, staging value, which arises when capitalism moves from addressing people's needs to exploiting their desires.
Abstract: This article charts the emergence since the 1950s of a new value category, staging value, which arises when capitalism moves from addressing people's needs to exploiting their desires. Staging valu...
99 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that practices of customer co-production raise a serious challenge to established theories of value, and they make one argument and one suggestion, namely that customers should be required to be involved in the production process.
Abstract: This article will make one argument and one suggestion. The first part will argue that practices of customer co-production raise a serious challenge to established theories of value. The second par...
99 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that Sen's recent emphasis on freedom as the dominant value in judging individual well-being and societal development also contains risks, not least for feminist analysis, and characterized the risks as an underelaboration and overextension of the concept of freedom.
Abstract: To what extent can Amartya Sen's ideas on freedom, especially his conceptualization of development as freedom, enrich feminist economics? Sen's notion of freedom (as the capability to achieve valued ends) has many attractions and provides important opportunities to analyze gender inequalities. At the same time, Sen's recent emphasis on freedom as the dominant value in judging individual well-being and societal development also contains risks, not least for feminist analysis. We characterize the risks as an underelaboration and overextension of the concept of freedom. Drawing on Sen's earlier work and various feminist theorists, we suggest instead a more emphatically pluralist characterization of capability, well-being, and value, highlighting the distinct and substantive aspects of freedom, as well as of values besides freedom, in the lives of women and men. We illustrate this with reference to women's economic role as caregivers.
99 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that even if we grant the truth of the convergence hypothesis, there are still good reasons to worry about anthropocentric ethics and that anthropocentrism has very different practical implications from non-anthropocentricism; it undermines some of the common attitudes people think it appropriate to take toward the natural world.
Abstract: Many recent critical discussions of anthropocentrism have focused on Bryan Nortonʼs ʻconvergence hypothesisʼ: the claim that both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric ethics will recommend the same environmentally responsible behaviours and policies. I argue that even if we grant the truth of Nortonʼs convergence hypothesis, there are still good reasons to worry about anthropocentric ethics. Ethics legitimately raises questions about how to feel, not just about which actions to take or which policies to adopt. From the point of view of norms for feeling, anthropocentrism has very different practical implications from nonanthropocentrism; it undermines some of the common attitudes – love, respect, awe – that people think it appropriate to take toward the natural world.
99 citations
TL;DR: Weber is widely regarded as one of the founders of twentieth-century social science and probably its greatest practitioner as discussed by the authors, and he is quintessentially an author of political presuppositions.
Abstract: AX WEBER IS widely regarded as one of the founders of twentieth-century social science and probably its greatest practitioner. Modern and ancient theorists commonly believed that founding-or giving a form or constitution to collective life-was reckoned to be the most notable action of which political man is capable. It is superior to other types of political acts because it aims to shape the lives of citizens by designing the structure or "dwelling" which they and their posterity will inhabit. In describing this extraordinary action, political theorists often had recourse to architectural metaphors: the founder "lays foundations." No such images were invoked to explain the routine acts that occur in the daily life of a polity. Ordinary action is commonly described as "doing," "effecting," or "bringing something about." If political actors are to bring something about, they presuppose conditions that make possible the action in questicn and the means for doing it. They also presuppose a context that permits the action to be understood and interpreted. The founder is quintessentially an author of political presuppositions. By analogy, to found a form of social science entails an act of demarcation that indicates the subject-matter peculiar to the science, the kind of activities that are appropriate (e.g., empirical inquiry), and the norms that are to be invoked injudging the value of the results produced by the activities. These demarcations beconme presuppositions of subsequent practice. Weber was engaged in founding when he wrote the following:
99 citations