Topic
Value (ethics)
About: Value (ethics) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 21347 publications have been published within this topic receiving 461372 citations.
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01 Oct 2013
TL;DR: Religion without God as mentioned in this paper is inspired by remarks Einstein made that if religion consists of awe toward mysteries which "manifest themselves in the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty, and which our dull faculties can comprehend only in the most primitive forms," then, he, Einstein, was a religious person.
Abstract: In his last book, Ronald Dworkin addresses questions that men and women have asked through the ages: What is religion and what is God's place in it? What is death and what is immortality? Based on the 2011 Einstein Lectures, "Religion without God "is inspired by remarks Einstein made that if religion consists of awe toward mysteries which "manifest themselves in the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty, and which our dull faculties can comprehend only in the most primitive forms," then, he, Einstein, was a religious person.Dworkin joins Einstein's sense of cosmic mystery and beauty to the claim that value is objective, independent of mind, and immanent in the world. He rejects the metaphysics of naturalism--that nothing is real except what can be studied by the natural sciences. Belief in God is one manifestation of this deeper worldview, but not the only one. The conviction that God underwrites value presupposes a prior commitment to the independent reality of that value--a commitment that is available to nonbelievers as well. So theists share a commitment with some atheists that is more fundamental than what divides them. Freedom of religion should flow not from a respect for belief in God but from the right to ethical independence.Dworkin hoped that this short book would contribute to rational conversation and the softening of religious fear and hatred. "Religion without God "is the work of a humanist who recognized both the possibilities and limitations of humanity.
118 citations
TL;DR: The authors track the new career of the old buzzword culture (wenhua) in post-1992 China and find that Deng Xiaoping's 1992 Southern Excursion Talks marked a turning point, as portentous as the 1989 crackdown, on the calendar of China's market reform and cultural transformation.
Abstract: My goal in this essay is to track the new career of the old buzzword culture (wenhua) in post-1992 China. Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 Southern Excursion Talks marked a turning point, as portentous as the 1989 crackdown, on the calendar of China’s market reform and cultural transformation. What do economists and humanist elites mean when they talk about this historical “transition” (zhuangui) inChina, in celebratory or condemning rhetoric, and each in their own disciplinary perspective? Can such a transition be characterized as China’s “progressive” movement from socialist state-planned economy to capitalist market economy, or in terms of a cultural transformation, from elitist to popular? Neither of those cliched formulas is of much explanatory value. Old dichotomous paradigms, steeped in cold war ideology (i.e., socialism versus capitalism) and imbued with culturalist aesthetics (i.e., high versus low culture), are inadequate conceptual tools for our task of capturing the
118 citations
TL;DR: Both moral and reputational concerns are commonly involved in moral behaviour and cannot be pried apart without understanding their intricate relationships.
Abstract: From an evolutionary point of view, the function of moral behaviour may be to secure a good reputation as a co-operator. The best way to do so may be to obey genuine moral motivations. Still, one's moral reputation maybe something too important to be entrusted just to one's moral sense. A robust concern for one's reputation is likely to have evolved too. Here we explore some of the complex relationships between morality and reputation both from an evolutionary and a cognitive point of view. People may behave morally because they intrinsically value doing so—a genuine moral reason—or in order to gain the approval of others—an instrumental reason. Both moral and reputational concerns are commonly involved in moral behaviour and cannot be pried apart without understanding their intricate relationships. Here we aim at contributing to such an understanding by investigating the role, content, and mechanisms of moral reputation. 1. Function and Motivation of Moral Behaviour
118 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the Africanist perspective faces various problems and makes substantial errors: political, moral, epistemic and educational, and they question the uniqueness of ubuntu and its value and efficiency as a practical guide to action and policy.
Abstract: Some proponents of Africanism argue that African traditional education and the principles of ubuntu should provide the framework for citizenship education. While conceding that understandable concerns lie behind defences of ubuntu as underpinning African democracy, we argue that the Africanist perspective faces various problems and makes substantial errors: political, moral, epistemic and educational. While democracy and democratic citizenship necessarily involve sensitivity to local context, their fundamental principles and tenets are universal. Failure to acknowledge this comes at a substantial price. Taking as its initial focus an analysis and critical evaluation of Malegapuru William Makgoba's critique of liberal democracy, the paper questions the purported uniqueness of ubuntu and its value and efficiency as a practical guide to action and policy, as well as its capacity to indicate how conflict between its associate principles and values might be resolved, insofar as these principles and values are ...
118 citations
Book•
11 Aug 2000
TL;DR: Owens as discussed by the authors argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief, and argues that our responsibility for beliefs is profoundly different from our rationality and agency, and that memory and testimony can preserve justified belief without preserving the evidence which might be used to justify it.
Abstract: We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume - the founders of epistemology - and presents a critical discussion of the current trends in contemporary epistemology. He proposes that the problems we confront today - scepticism, the analysis of knowlege, and debates on epistemic justification - can be tackled only once we have understood the moral psychology of belief. This can be resolved when we realise that our responsibility for beliefs is profoundly different from our rationality and agency, and that memory and testimony can preserve justified belief without preserving the evidence which might be used to justify it. Reason Without Freedom should be of value to those interested in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, ethics, and the history of 17th and 18th century.
118 citations