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Value (ethics)

About: Value (ethics) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 21347 publications have been published within this topic receiving 461372 citations.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jul 2003-Ethics
TL;DR: In recent work in political philosophy and normative economics, there has been a growing interest in using concepts of opportunity to evaluate economic and social arrangements as mentioned in this paper, a reaction against the previous orthodoxy of welfarism, which evaluates states of affairs in terms of the extent to which individuals' preferences are satisfied.
Abstract: In recent work in political philosophy and normative economics, there has been a growing interest in using concepts of opportunity to evaluate economic and social arrangements. This new emphasis is a reaction against the previous orthodoxy of welfarism, which evaluates states of affairs in terms of the extent to which individuals’ preferences are satisfied. Opportunity-based approaches differ from welfarism, and indeed from all forms of consequentialism, in taking an ex ante rather than an ex post viewpoint: they consider what each individual has the opportunity to achieve, rather than what he or she actually achieves. In most current theories of opportunity, opportunity is treated as a good that is distributed among individuals; ensuring that this distribution satisfies principles of equality or fairness is taken to be a proper concern of public policy. This idea is clearly expressed in John Rawls’s claim that opportunity is one of the “social values” that should be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution is to everyone’s advantage. Amartya Sen voices a similar idea when he suggests that opportunity (or “capability”) might be the right answer to his question, “Equality of what?” So, too, does G. A. Cohen, when he advocates equality of “access to advantage,” and John Roemer, in his work on equality of opportunity.

91 citations

Proceedings Article
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: If openness is complemented with resource governance, capabilities in society and technical connectivity, use of OGD will stimulate the generation of economic and social value through four different archetypical mechanisms: Efficiency, Innovation, Transparency and Participation.
Abstract: A driving force for change in society is the trend towards Open Government Data (OGD). While the value generated by OGD has been widely discussed by public bodies and other stakeholders, little attention has been paid to this phenomenon in the academic literature. Hence, we developed a conceptual model portraying how data as a resource can be transformed to value. We show the causal relationships between four contextual, enabling factors, four types of value generation mechanisms and value. We use empirical data from 61 countries to test these relationships, using the PLS method. The results mostly support the hypothesized relationships. Our conclusion is that if openness is complemented with resource governance, capabilities in society and technical connectivity, use of OGD will stimulate the generation of economic and social value through four different archetypical mechanisms: Efficiency, Innovation, Transparency and Participation.

91 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors review current research about the social and economic benefits associated with a well-designed built environment, put the case for new methods that enable these sorts of benefits to be adequately captured, and speculate about what these new methods might look like, and, finally, put forward an agenda outlining where new research is needed.
Abstract: The objectives of this paper are to review current research about the social and economic benefits associated with a well-designed built environment, to put the case for new methods that enable these sorts of benefits to be adequately captured, to speculate about what these new methods might look like, and, finally, to put forward an agenda outlining where new research is needed. Many reviews, primarily from the UK and US literature, are examined to illustrate the nature and diversity of recent, largely descriptive, research into the impact of good design on social and economic outcomes. It is argued that the likelihood of the research being taken up is limited because of the difficulty in capturing the value intangible benefits. The results from three workshops identified the types of value delivered by the built environment, the stakeholders to whom value accrues, the possibilities for new valuation methods and their implementation, and what new research is needed. Five groups of stakeholders emerged be...

91 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The problem is not that impartiality is too closely or centrally identified with morality, but that morality as a whole is being expected to do too much as discussed by the authors, which is the problem of moderate impartiality, i.e., the idea of acting from a position that acknowledges and appreciates the fact that all persons (or even, on some views, all sentient beings) are in an important sense equal.
Abstract: The great moral theories that have dominated moral philosophy for at least the last forty years have taken impartiality to be a core defining feature of morality. That is, they have identified morality with the idea of acting from a position that acknowledges and appreciates the fact that all persons (or even, on some views, all sentient beings) are in an important sense equal, and that, correspondingly, all are equally entitled to fundamental conditions of wellbeing and respect. Recently, however, many have called attention to the fact that relationships of friendship and love seem to call for the very opposite of an impartial perspective. Since such relationships unquestionably rank among the greatest goods of life, a conception of morality that is in tension with their maintenance and promotion is unacceptable. Thus a debate has arisen between, as we may call them, the impartialists and the partialists. In defense of their position, the impartialists note that someone' s being your friend or relative does not make her more morally deserving than anyone else, and they point to the grave moral dangers of moving that acknowledgment from the center of moral thought. Rather than allow our personal affections to compromise our commitments to justice and equality, they argue, we must shape our ideals of friendship and love to fit the demands of impartial morality. The partialists reply that this denigrates the value of special relationships to friends and loved ones, at best according them the status of acceptable extracurricular activities and at worst regarding them as a consequence of human nature to be warily tolerated. For my own part, I am quite sympathetic to the partialists' concerns. But I think that they locate the problem in the wrong theoretical place. The problem is not that impartiality is too closely or centrally identified with morality, but that morality as a whole is being expected to do too much. I shall, then, defend a conception of morality that, in the context of the debate sketched above, might be labelled a moderate impartialism. But at least as

90 citations

Book
27 Nov 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, Quassim Cassam develops an account of self-knowledge which tries to do justice to these and other respects in which humans aren't model epistemic citizens.
Abstract: Human beings are not model epistemic citizens. Our reasoning can be careless and uncritical, and our beliefs, desires, and other attitudes aren't always as they ought rationally to be. Our beliefs can be eccentric, our desires irrational and our hopes hopelessly unrealistic. Our attitudes are influenced by a wide range of non-epistemic or non-rational factors, including our character, our emotions and powerful unconscious biases. Yet we are rarely conscious of such influences. Self-ignorance is not something to which human beings are immune. In this book Quassim Cassam develops an account of self-knowledge which tries to do justice to these and other respects in which humans aren't model epistemic citizens. He rejects rationalist and other mainstream philosophical accounts of self-knowledge on the grounds that, in more than one sense, they aren't accounts of self-knowledge for humans. Instead he defends the view that inferences from behavioural and psychological evidence are a basic source of human self-knowledge. On this account, self-knowledge is a genuine cognitive achievement and self-ignorance is almost always on the cards. As well as explaining knowledge of our own states of mind, Cassam also accounts for what he calls 'substantial' self-knowledge, including knowledge of our values, emotions, and character. He criticizes philosophical accounts of self-knowledge for neglecting substantial self-knowledge, and concludes with a discussion of the value of self-knowledge. This book tries to do for philosophy what behavioural economics tries to do for economics. Just as behavioural economics is the economics of homo sapiens, as distinct from the economics of an ideally rational homo economicus, so Cassam argues that philosophy should focus on the human predicament rather on the reasoning and self-knowledge of an idealized homo philosophicus.

90 citations


Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202212
2021864
2020886
2019898
2018824
2017977