Value (ethics)

About: Value (ethics) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 21347 publications have been published within this topic receiving 461372 citations.

Information systems as a reference discipline

Abstract: The conventional wisdom amongst information systems (IS) researchers is that information systems is an applied discipline drawing upon other, more fundamental, reference disciplines. These reference disciplines are seen as having foundational value for IS. We believe that it is time to question the conventional wisdom. We agree that many disciplines are relevant for IS researchers, but we suggest a re-think of the idea of "reference disciplines" for IS. In a sense, IS has come of age. Perhaps the time has come for IS to become a reference discipline for others.

Marketing and Firm Value: Metrics, Methods, Findings, and Future Directions

Abstract: The marketing profession is being challenged to assess and communicate the value created by its actions on shareholder value. These demands create a need to translate marketing resource allocations and their performance consequences into financial and firm value effects. The objective of this article is to integrate the existing knowledge on the impact of marketing on firm value. The authors first frame the important research questions on marketing and firm value and review the important investor response metrics and relevant analytical models as they relate to marketing. Next, they summarize the empirical findings to date on how marketing creates shareholder value, including the impact of brand equity, customer equity, customer satisfaction, research and development and product quality, and specific marketing-mix actions. Then, the authors review emerging findings on biases in investor response to marketing actions. They conclude by formulating an agenda for future research challenges in this emerging area.

The Corporeal Politics of Quality ( Suzhi )

Abstract: The phantom-like nature of value—what could be a more compelling topic in the wake of the bursting of the 1990s economic bubble, when the value of the new economy seemed suddenly to dissipate overnight? Where did value go? And how can it be that, in the midst of a global restructuring of capitalism, certain things that formerly seemed to have so much value are now deemed to be what society (or something called that) can no longer afford? The topic of value is particularly compelling in light of the momentous social transformations taking place in China during the last quarter of the twentieth century. In the movement from a planned to a market economy, the representation of value has undergone a reorganization in the realm of the biopolitical in which human life becomes a new frontier for capital accumulation. This changing rela-

Endogenous formation of coalitions

Abstract: THE FORMATION OF COALITIONS is a fundamental problem in game theory. By a "coalition" is meant a group of "players" (e.g., economic or political agents) which decide to act together, as one unit, relative to the rest of the players. This includes the instances of syndicates, unions, cartels, blocks, political parties, parliamentary coalitions, etc. We would like to emphasize that forming a coalition does not eliminate the individual players as decision makers. In all interactions with the other players, coalition members act as one unit (it may be useful to think of a "representative agent" taking their place);2 however, this arrangement will continue only as long as each player finds it desirable to act this way. Further bargaining occurs among the members of each coalition on how to divide what they obtained together. Thus, the existence of coalitions implies that the interactions among the players will be conducted on two levels: first, among the coalitions, and second, within each coalition. Most of the existing models in economics and game theory assume that the coalition structure is given exogenously; instead, we try here to obtain it as an endogenous outcome of our model. Namely, we want to be able to predict which coalitions will in fact form in each given situation.3 Our theory combines two kinds of game theoretic concepts: value and stability. The basic idea is, first, to evaluate the players' prospects in the various coalition structures, and then, based on these "values," to find which ones are stable. We will call this value "coalition structure value," or "CS-value" for short. The reason we are considering "coalition structures" (i.e., partitions of the set of players into disjoint coalitions) rather than just "coalitions" is that, in general, players may find it to their advantage to join forces in some situations, and to act separately in others-all depending on the way the other participants are organized. This implies that both the value and the stability concepts should depend on the entire coalition structure. The CS-value we analyze in this paper was first developed by Owen [7].

The Possibility of Practical Reason

Abstract: 1. INTRODUCTION 2. EPISTEMIC FREEDOM 3. WELL-BEING AND TIME 4. IS MOTIVATION INTERNAL TO VALUE? 5. THE GUISE OF THE GOOD 6. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SOMEONE ACTS? 7. THE STORY OF RATIONAL ACTION 8. THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL REASON 9. HOW TO SHARE AN INTENTION 10. DECIDING HOW TO DECIDE 11. ON THE AIM OF BELIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX