Value (ethics)

About: Value (ethics) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 21347 publications have been published within this topic receiving 461372 citations.

Caring theory as an ethical guide to administrative and clinical practices.

Abstract: This article explores the conventional relationship between caring, economics, and administrative practices that no longer serve patients, practitioners, or systems. A shift toward human caring values and an ethic of authentic healing relationships is required as systems now have to value human resources and life purposes, inner meanings, and processes for workers and patients alike, not just economics alone. This shift requires a professional ethos with renewed attention to practice that is ethics/values-based and theory-guided, alongside evidence and economics. Emergent professional, caring-theory-guided practice options are presented, which are grounded on this deeper ethical moral and theoretical foundation for transforming the practitioners and the system.

Self-Control as Value-Based Choice.

Abstract: Self-control is often conceived as a battle between “hot” impulsive processes and “cold” deliberative ones. Heeding the angel on one shoulder leads to success; following the demon on the other leads to failure. Self-control feels like a duality. What if that sensation is misleading, and despite how they feel, self-control decisions are just like any other choice? We argue that self-control is a form of value-based choice wherein options are assigned a subjective value and a decision is made through a dynamic integration process. We articulate how a value-based choice model of self-control can capture its phenomenology and account for relevant behavioral and neuroscientific data. This conceptualization of self-control links divergent scientific approaches, allows for more robust and precise hypothesis testing, and suggests novel pathways to improve self-control.

Fairness and Envy

Abstract: Standard neoclassical economic analysis is typically concerned with individual utility maximization In this paper we shall consider a problem of constrained social welfare maximization Our criterion of social welfare is "fairness," and we shall discuss how this may be maximized by a move from an initial allocation to a final fairer allocation, subject to the constraint that no one be made worse off by the move We think the goal of fairness maximization characterizes, albeit in a simplistic way, the goals pursued by "enlightened" governments in their redistributional policies We shall also discuss a concept of complete fairness and illustrate some of its weaknesses The fairness problem is ancient and dates back at least to classical Greece It has been treated recently by mathematicians who typically are concerned with the existence of a "fair division" of a nonuniform object among n persons; that is, a division with the property that each party thinks he is getting at least t/nth of the value of the object (See, for example, Lester Dubins and Edwin Spanier, Harold Kuhn, and Hugo Steinhaus) This is not the approach we will take, since we will assume a world of homogeneous infinitely divisible goods in which the mathematical fair division problem becomes trivial The concept of fairness has also been treated extensively by philosophers The most recent philosophical approach is that of John Rawls, who argues at length for a social contract theory of justice: a society which maximizes the welfare of its worst off members is most just and that is the sort of society people will, from an initial position of ignorance about their endowments and interests, contract to enter Rawls' approach has been extended to a theory of taxation by Edmund Phelps Again, Rawlsian fairness, or "justice," is not the fairness we are interested in; we do not assume a precontractual state of ignorance, we do assume that knowledge of wealth and tastes is given In fact, knowledge about one's own and others' bundles of goods is crucial in our discussion What then is our notion of fairness? It is fairness in the sense of non-envy A completely fair social state is one in which no citizen would prefer what another has to what he himself has; a relatively fair social state is one in which few citizens would prefer what others have to what they themselves have; a totally unfair state is one in which every citizen finds his position to be inferior to that of everyone else This concept of fairness is appealing because it only depends, like other economic concepts, on individual tastes and endowments Fairness in the non-envy sense has been discussed in several recent papers by economists Serge Christophe Kolm considers allocative fairness, and shows that there exist allocations which are both completely fair and efficient' David Schmeidler and Karl Vind define fair trades as

Teenagers and their virtual possessions: design opportunities and issues

Abstract: Over the past several years, people have increasingly acquired virtual possessions. We consider these things to include artifacts that are increasingly becoming immaterial (e.g. books, photos, music, movies) and things that have never traditionally had a lasting material form (e.g. SMS archives, social networking profiles, personal behavior logs). To date, little research exists about how people value and form attachments to virtual possessions. To investigate, we conducted a study with 21 teenagers exploring the perceived value of their virtual possessions, and the comparative similarities and differences with their material things. Findings are interpreted to detail design and research opportunities and issues in this emerging space.

Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying

Abstract: We examine the determinants and value effects of corporate lobbying, controlling for corporate political action committee (PAC) campaign contributions. We find evidence that firms with greater potential payoffs from favorable policy and regulations lobby most actively, and that managers often utilize both lobbying and campaign contribution channels to influence the political climate affecting the firm. We also find that shareholders value the lobbying activities pursued by management on their behalf, particularly if the firm does not have a PAC that contributed to an election campaign. The results are robust to a number of tests designed to mitigate potential omitted-variable and self-selection bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]