Value (ethics)

About: Value (ethics) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 21347 publications have been published within this topic receiving 461372 citations.

“Mistresses of Their Own Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit*

Abstract: Many recent arguments for rights or exemptions for religious or other cultural groups that may not themselves be liberal are based on liberal premises—whether the central liberal value be individual autonomy or tolerance for diversity of ways of life. Any consistent defense of group rights or exemptions that is based on liberal premises has to ensure that at least one individual right—the right to exit one’s group of origin—trumps any group right. What this entails will be explored later, but for several reasons, the claim itself seems prima facie incontrovert-

The Relevance and Value of Confucianism in Contemporary Business Ethics

Abstract: This article examines the relevance and value of Confucian Ethics to contemporary Business Ethics by comparing their respective perspectives and approaches towards business activities within the modern capitalist framework, the principle of reciprocity and the concept of human virtues. Confucian Ethics provides interesting parallels with contemporary Western-oriented Business Ethics. At the same, it diverges from contemporary Business Ethics in some significant ways. Upon an examination of philosophical texts as well as empirical studies, it is argued that Confucian Ethics is able to provide some unique philosophical and intellectual perspectives in order to forge a richer understanding and analysis of the field of contemporary Business Ethics.

Holism and Hermeneutics

Abstract: In this paper I will argue first that there is an essential difference between theoretical and practical holism and thus there is an essential difference between the natural and human sciences. I will then argue that, if one holds that there is no crucial difference between things and people one must embrace some form of nihilism?a way of life in which all values have the same value, everything is equal, or, to put it another way, there are no meaningful differences. Richard Rorty's view that how we treat people depends solely upon what sort of lives we happen to prefer, is one form such nihilism can take. However, if there is a crucial difference between self-interpreting human beings and other sorts of entities, one can counter the nihilis tic possibility of what Rorty calls "conversations" between those who have opposed "preferences" with the possibility of genuine conflicts of interpretation as to the serious issues worth conversing about. Such conflicts cannot be settled by traditional philosophical or empirical argument since traditional debates operate within a taken for granted understanding of what considerations can be taken seriously. In conflicts of interpretation, moreover, the question is not which view of what is important corresponds to the way things are in themselves, but rather, which is the better account of our con dition, i.e., which allows a deeper appreciation of the cultural commit ments we cannot help sharing because they make us what we are.

Happiness, freedom and control

Abstract: How do people value freedom of choice ? Drawing on economics and psychology the paper provides an hypothesis and empirical evidence on how individuals may value freedom of choice and derive utility from it. It is argued that the degree of perceived control that individuals have over choice – a construct known as the locus of control in psychology – regulates how we value freedom of choice. People who believe that the outcome of their actions depends on internal factors such as effort and skills (the ‘internals’) have a greater appreciation of freedom of choice than people who believe that the outcome of their actions depends on external factors such as fate or destiny (the ‘externals’). We find some evidence in support of this hypothesis using a combination of all rounds of the World and European Values Surveys. A variable that measures freedom of choice and the locus of control is found to predict life satisfaction better than any other known factor such as health, employment, income, marriage or religion, across countries and within countries. We show that this variable is not a proxy of happiness and measures well both freedom of choice and the locus of control. ‘Internals’ are found to appreciate freedom of choice more than ‘externals’ and to be happier. These findings have important implications for individual utility, social welfare and public policies.

The ethic of care: leisure possibilities and constraints for women.

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to provide a review and an interpretive framework for examining the “ethic of care” (i.e., the activity of relationships) as it offers possibilities and constraints for the leisure of women. The explanatory implications of the ethic of care are useful in further understanding antecedent and intervening constraints to leisure as well as understanding the empowering possibilities of leisure for women. The paper uses a feminist framework to address the concept of an ethic of care, the ways that the ethic has been embodied in leisure behavior for women primarily within the family, the link between an ethic of care and constraints to leisure for women, and the possibilities for the value of an ethic of care in the leisure of all individuals. In describing the experiences of women, the ethic of care is not meant to further dichotomize males and females in leisure but to offer an explanation of women's leisure and to provide some ideas that require further empirical research.