Topic
Venture capital
About: Venture capital is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 12246 publications have been published within this topic receiving 383275 citations. The topic is also known as: VC & risk capital.
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TL;DR: This paper argued that the average quality is likely to be low, with the consequence that even projects which are known (by the entrepreneur) to merit financing cannot be undertaken because of the high cost of capital resulting from low average project quality.
Abstract: NUMEROUS MARKETS ARE characterized by informational differences between buyers and sellers. In financial markets, informational asymmetries are particularly pronounced. Borrowers typically know their collateral, industriousness, and moral rectitude better than do lenders; entrepreneurs possess "inside" information about their own projects for which they seek financing. Lenders would benefit from knowing the true characteristics of borrowers. But moral hazard hampers the direct transfer of information between market participants. Borrowers cannot be expected to be entirely straightforward about their characteristics, nor entrepreneurs about their projects, since there may be substantial rewards for exaggerating positive qualities. And verification of true characteristics by outside parties may be costly or impossible. Without information transfer, markets may perform poorly. Consider the financing of projects whose quality is highly variable. While entrepreneurs know the quality of their own projects, lenders cannot distinguish among them. Market value, therefore, must reflect average project quality. If the market were to place an average value greater than average cost on projects, the potential supply of low quality projects may be very large, since entrepreneurs could foist these upon an uninformed market (retaining little or no equity) and make a sure profit. But this argues that the average quality is likely to be low, with the consequence that even projects which are known (by the entrepreneur) to merit financing cannot be undertaken because of the high cost of capital resulting from low average project quality. Thus, where substantial information asymmetries exist and where the supply of poor projects is large relative to the supply of good projects, venture capital markets may fail to exist. For projects of good quality to be financed, information transfer must occur. We have argued that moral hazard prevents direct information transfer. Nonetheless, information on project quality may be transferred if the actions of entrepreneurs ("which speak louder than words") can be observed. One such action, observable because of disclosure rules, is the willingness of the person(s) with inside information to invest in the project or firm. This willingness to invest may serve as a signal to the lending market of the true quality of the project; lenders will place a value
5,639 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare two intention-based models in terms of their ability to predict entrepreneurial intentions: Ajzen's theory of planned behavior (TPB) and Shapero's model of the entrepreneurial event (SEE).
4,632 citations
TL;DR: The authors describes and analyzes the structure of VC organizations, focusing on the relationship between investors and venture capitalists and between venture-capital firms and the ventures in which they invest, and contrasts VC organizations with large, publicly traded corporations and with leveraged buyout organizations.
2,686 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors survey the literature examining the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the types of privatization, if and by how much privatization has improved the performance of former SOEs in nontransition and transition countries, how investors in privatizations have fared, and the impact of privatization on the development of capital markets and corporate governance.
Abstract: This study surveys the literature examining the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) We review the history of privatization, the theoretical and empirical evidence on the relative performance of state owned and privately owned firms, the types of privatization, if and by how much privatization has improved the performance of former SOEs in non-transition and transition countries, how investors in privatizations have fared, and the impact of privatization on the development of capital markets and corporate governance. In most settings privatization "works" in that the firms become more efficient, more profitable, and financially healthier, and reward investors.
2,557 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined whether the presence of venture capitalists, as investors in a firm going public, can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside information.
Abstract: This paper provides support for the certification role of venture capitalists in initial public offerings. Consistent with the certification hypothesis, a comparison of venture capital backed IPOs with a control sample of nonventure capital backed IPOs from 1983 through 1987 matched as closely as possible by industry and offering size indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads. In effect, the presence of venture capitalists in the issuing firms serves to lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the offering firm. In addition, we document that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings in the firm after the IPO. THE ABILITY OF THIRD-PARTY specialists to certify the value of securities issued by relatively unknown firms in capital markets that are characterized by asymmetric information between corporate insiders and public investors has attracted much academic interest in recent years. Several authors, including James (1990), Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990), and Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1991) have developed and tested models based at least in part on the formal certification hypothesis presented in Booth and Smith (1986). A related body of work, represented by DeAngelo (1981), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), Johnson and Miller (1988), Carter (1990), Simon (1990), and Carter and Manaster (1990) has examined how investment bankers and auditors help resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the initial public offering (IPO) process. In this paper we examine whether the presence of venture capitalists, as investors in a firm going public, can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside information. We hypothesize that venture capitalists can perform this function; that it will be an economically
2,490 citations