Topic
Verifiable secret sharing
About: Verifiable secret sharing is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 4241 publications have been published within this topic receiving 99569 citations.
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01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: A proof that the compiler is correct must show that interpretation of the object code is at least good as the corresponding source program, and the method is possible to add new programming constructs without affecting existing development work.
29 citations
TL;DR: This paper presents several threshold schemes that are generalizations of Shamir's secret sharing scheme such that only authorized people can reconstruct the secret from their shares.
Abstract: A secret sharing scheme is a system designed to share a piece of information or the secret among a group of people such that only authorized people can reconstruct the secret from their shares. Since Blakley and Shamir proposed threshold secret sharing schemes in 1979 independently, many secret sharing schemes have been constructed. In this paper, we present several threshold schemes that are generalizations of Shamir's secret sharing scheme.
29 citations
06 Mar 2016
TL;DR: This work gives the first unbounded VDS constructions in the standard model and gives two constructions with different trade-offs, which achieves constant size proofs by combining a signature scheme with cryptographic accumulators, but requires computational costs on the server-side linear in the number of update-operations.
Abstract: The problem of verifiable data streaming VDS considers the setting in which a client outsources a large dataset to an untrusted server and the integrity of this dataset is publicly verifiable. A special property of VDS is that the client can append additional elements to the dataset without changing the public verification key. Furthermore, the client may also update elements in the dataset. All previous VDS constructions follow a hash-tree-based approach, but either have an upper bound on the size of the database or are only provably secure in the random oracle model. In this work, we give the first unbounded VDS constructions in the standard model. We give two constructions with different trade-offs. The first scheme follows the line of hash-tree-constructions and is based on a new cryptographic primitive called Chameleon Vector Commitment CVC, that may be of independent interest. A CVC is a trapdoor commitment scheme to a vector of messages where both commitments and openings have constant size. Due to the tree-based approach, integrity proofs are logarithmic in the size of the dataset. The second scheme achieves constant size proofs by combining a signature scheme with cryptographic accumulators, but requires computational costs on the server-side linear in the number of update-operations.
29 citations
TL;DR: The power of Partitioned Encryption is demonstrated: combining it with the partitioning of the user set gives a solution scheme for ‘Verifiable Secret Sharing’ and ‘Simultaneous Broadcast in the Presence of Faults’, which are important primitives of fault-tolerant distributed computing introduced by Chor, Goldwasser, Micali and Awerbuch (1985).
28 citations
Patent•
08 Apr 1998
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a system and method for publicly verifying that a session key determined according to a Diffie-Hellman key exchange can be recovered from information associated with a communication encrypted with the session key.
Abstract: The present invention is a system and method for publicly verifying that a session key determined according to a Diffie-Hellman key exchange can be recovered from information associated with a communication encrypted with the session key. More particularly, the present invention provides recovery information and verification information with the encrypted communication. A recovery agent is able to recover the session key using the recovery information. A verifier, using the verification information, is able to verify that the session key can, in fact, be recovered from the recovery information. Neither the recovery information nor the verification information alone reveal any secret or private information. Furthermore, only the recovery agent is able to recover the session key, and he does so without revealing any other private information. Thus, the verification can be performed by any member of the public.
28 citations