Topic
Verifiable secret sharing
About: Verifiable secret sharing is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 4241 publications have been published within this topic receiving 99569 citations.
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TL;DR: A probabilistic (2,n) scheme for binary images and a deterministic (n,n), which provides a better contrast and significantly smaller recognized areas than other methods and gives an exact reconstruction.
240 citations
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31 May 1998TL;DR: In this article, the authors constructed a universally verifiable mix-net, where the amount of work done by a verifier is independent of the number of mix-servers.
Abstract: In this paper we construct a universally verifiable Mix-net where the amount of work done by a verifier is independent of the number of mix-servers. Furthermore, the computational task of each mix-server is constant against the number of mix-servers except for some negligible tasks like addition. The scheme is robust, too.
240 citations
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TL;DR: A protocol of multiparty secret sharing of quantum information based on entanglement swapping is analyzed and it is convenient to realize the quantum secret sharing among the members of any subset of users.
235 citations
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TL;DR: A perfect secret sharing scheme for threshold secret sharing in groups with hierarchical structure that uses Birkhoff interpolation, i.e., the construction of a polynomial according to an unstructured set of point and derivative values.
Abstract: We consider the problem of threshold secret sharing in groups with hierarchical structure. In such settings, the secret is shared among a group of participants that is partitioned into levels. The access structure is then determined by a sequence of threshold requirements: a subset of participants is authorized if it has at least k0 0 members from the highest level, as well as at least k1 > k0 members from the two highest levels and so forth. Such problems may occur in settings where the participants differ in their authority or level of confidence and the presence of higher level participants is imperative to allow the recovery of the common secret. Even though secret sharing in hierarchical groups has been studied extensively in the past, none of the existing solutions addresses the simple setting where, say, a bank transfer should be signed by three employees, at least one of whom must be a department manager. We present a perfect secret sharing scheme for this problem that, unlike most secret sharing schemes that are suitable for hierarchical structures, is ideal. As in Shamir's scheme, the secret is represented as the free coefficient of some polynomial. The novelty of our scheme is the usage of polynomial derivatives in order to generate lesser shares for participants of lower levels. Consequently, our scheme uses Birkhoff interpolation, i.e., the construction of a polynomial according to an unstructured set of point and derivative values. A substantial part of our discussion is dedicated to the question of how to assign identities to the participants from the underlying finite field so that the resulting Birkhoff interpolation problem will be well posed. In addition, we devise an ideal and efficient secret sharing scheme for the closely related hierarchical threshold access structures that were studied by Simmons and Brickell.
233 citations
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23 Oct 2010
TL;DR: This work constructs public-key encryption schemes, digital signatures, and identity-based encryption schemes that remain secure even if an attacker can leak a constant fraction of the secret memory in each time period between key updates.
Abstract: In recent years, there has been a major effort to design cryptographic schemes that remain secure even when arbitrary information about the secret key is leaked (e.g., via side-channel attacks). We explore the possibility of achieving security under \emph{continual} leakage from the \emph{entire} secret key by designing schemes in which the secret key is updated over time. In this model, we construct public-key encryption schemes, digital signatures, and identity-based encryption schemes that remain secure even if an attacker can leak a constant fraction of the secret memory (including the secret key) in each time period between key updates. We also consider attackers who may probe the secret memory during the updates themselves. We stress that we allow unrestricted leakage, without the assumption that ``only computation leaks information''. Prior to this work, constructions of public-key encryption schemes secure under continual leakage were not known even under this assumption.
224 citations