Showing papers on "Vertical mobility published in 2000"

Redistribution, Occupational Choice and Intergenerational Mobility: Does Wage Equality Nail the Cobbler to His Last?

Abstract: The classical Roy-model of selection on the labor market is extended in order to analyze intergenerational mobility. This is done by linking ability uncertainty to family background. I derive implications for the allocation of talent and for background dependent earnings patterns within occupations and show that a very compressed wage structure can cause negative sorting of people with family background in the occupation with low returns to ability. I also study the effects of income redistribution on mobility and talent allocation. It is found that a redistributive welfare system either reduces vertical mobility or enhances it at the cost of a shrinking proportion of people choosing the occupation with high returns.

Money or Power

Abstract: An important characteristic of Soviet society was rigorous control over the channels of vertical mobility. While allowing a certain freedom of movement in the initial stages of a career, the system of control became more rigorous as the "careerist" advanced toward positions of high status. This advancement was contingent on the decision of "controlling agencies at a higher level." A system of mobility of the Soviet type contained no internal regulatory mechanisms: social movement was triggered only when outside tension caused a reshuffling of elite groups. In this sense, repression was a necessary element in the functioning of the mobility system as a whole. When Soviet society entered the phase of "peaceful life," vertical mobility practically stopped. The little word "stagnation" is very apropos in this regard.