Showing papers on "Vulnerability (computing) published in 1995"

Using the domain name system for system break-ins

Abstract: The DARPA Internet uses the Domain Name System (DNS), a distributed database, to map host names to network addresses, and vice-versa. Using a vulnerability first noticed by P.V. Mockapetris, we demonstrate how the DNS can be abused to subvert system security. We also show what tools are useful to the attacker. Possible defenses against this attack, including one implemented by Berkeley in response to our reports of this problem, are discussed, and the limitations on their applicability are demonstrated. This paper was written in 1990, and was withheld from publication by the author. The body of the paper is unchanged, even to the extreme of giving the size of the Internet as 200,000 hosts. An epilogue has been added that discusses why it was held back, and why it is now being released.

Cryptographic key escrow system having reduced vulnerability to harvesting attacks

Abstract: A public key escrow system is adapted to have a proof of knowledge protocol for a certificate. The certificate is signed with RSA and is proved using a protocol based on the Guillou-Quisquater proof of knowledge scheme, or other proof of knowledge protocol. Interactive and non-interactive protocols are disclosed.

UNICORN: Misuse Detection for UNICOS™

Abstract: An effective method for detecting computer misuse is the automatic auditing and analysis of on-line user activity. This activity is reflected in the system audit record, by changes in the vulnerability posture of the system configuration, and in other evidence found through active testing of the system. In 1989 we started developing an automatic misuse detection system for the Integrated Computing Network (ICN) at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Since 1990 this system has been operational, monitoring a variety of network systems and services. We call it the Network Anomaly Detection and Intrusion Reporter, or NADIR. During the last year and a half, we expanded NADIR to include processing of audit and activity records for the Cray UNICOS operating system. This new component is called the UNICOS Real-time NADIR, or UNICORN. UNICORN summarizes user activity and system configuration information in statistical profiles. In near real-time, it can compare current activity to historical profiles and test activity against expert rules that express our security policy and define improper or suspicious behavior. It reports suspicious behavior to security auditors and provides tools to aid in follow-up investigations. UNICORN is currently operational on four Crays in Los Alamos' main computing network, the ICN.

Practical Computer Network Security

Abstract: From the Publisher: This practical guide to network security shows how many threats can be countered with good procedures, simple technology and easily available hardware and software. It identifies potential weaknesses in and threats to your network, and describes and evaluates the range of available tools that can secure it. Clearly written and concise, the book helps you focus on key areas of vulnerability; aids you in the selection of the right tools for the job; assists you to design, develop and manage your network in a more secure way; and guides you when making decisions about commercially available security products.

Misuse and intrusion detection at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Abstract: An effective method for detecting computer misuse is the automatic auditing and analysis of on-line user activity. This activity is reflected in system audit records, in system vulnerability postures, and in other evidence found through active system testing. Since 1989 we have implemented a misuse and intrusion detection system at Los Alamos. This is the Network Anomaly Detection and Intrusion Reporter, or NADIR. NADIR currently audits a Kerberos distributed authentication system, file activity on a mass, storage system, and four Cray supercomputers that run the UNICOS operating system. NADIR summarizes user activity and system configuration in statistical profiles. It compares these profiles to expert rules that define security policy and improper or suspicious behavior. It reports suspicious behavior to security auditors and provides tools to aid in follow-up investigations, As NADIR is constantly evolving, this paper reports its development to date.

Safeguarding databases: basic concepts revisited

Abstract: The thrust of management information system (MIS) operations is to keep an information system running smoothly and to ensure services are delivered in an uninterrupted, reliable and secure fashion. This poses a special challenge in today′s environment of computer misuses. Focuses on four main areas normally addressed when protecting a company′s most vital asset – its database. These are: information system vulnerability; computer crime; employee access; and personnel policies. Examines research pertaining to safeguarding data, software and hardware from deliberate computer‐based information security breaches.

A Puzzle Even the Codebreakers Have Trouble Solving: A Clash of Interests over the Electronic Encryption Standard

Abstract: I Introduction On February 9 1994, when National Institute of Standards and Technology, (NIST) announced the federal Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES),(1) the simmering debate over encryption policy in the United States bolied over Public interest groups argued that the standard would jeopardize an individual's right to privacy US multinationals voiced concerns that the government would undercut private encryption technology, and limit their choice of encryption products for sensitive transmissions Computer software groups claimed that EES lacked commercial appeal and would adversely affect their ability to compete Pitted against these concerns were those of the law enforcement and national security communities, which countered that the interests of national security required the adoption of EES A quick study(2) of EES reveals little that would explain this uproar The NIST issued EES as an encryption methodology for use in its government information processing(3) pursuant to the Computer Security Act of 1987(4) The EES is intended to supersede the existing government standard, Data Encryption Standard (DES), which has been in US since 1977 and is very popular(5) The new standard's methodology is classified, but the government has stated that it represents the state of the art in- security protection The catch in this positive scenario is that the government keeps a backdoor key that will allow it to decrypt encrypted messages So why did an obscure and seemingly insignificant announcement cause so much commotion? Upon closer examination, one discovers that encryption, though still obscure to many, is a hot commodity, in the information age It is the sliver shield that protects personal, financial, trade, and national security information And, until recently, the government has enjoyed a monopoly over its development and use Viewed from this perspective, the NIST announcement was seen by many, as a government attempt to maintain its monopoly to the detriment of potential users and private developers The ensuing clash of interests has created an impasse Encryption users and privacy advocates refuse to accept the government's EES standard For its part, the government maintains stringent export controls to undermine the development of feasible alternative standards and to deny software producers economics of scale This Note will undertake a number of examinations First, it will review the government's role in cryptography Second, it will study EES in detail Third, it will explore how the EES scheme works with other aspects of the government's encryption policies to trigger legal, economic, and political concerns Fourth, it will survey the alternatives to EES Finally, it will suggest how the interests in the current policy debate may achieve an accommodation that would sufficiently address privacy and competitiveness concerns, on the one hand, while meeting national security and law enforcement concerns on the other II A Quick Ccrypography Primer A What is Cryptography? Before proceeding further into this complex area, it may be useful to go over some fundamentals At its base, cryptography is the practice of transforming a message into gibberish (encryption), transmitting it, and transforming it back into "plaintext" (decryption) at the other end(6) Though once the province of spies, diplomats, and generals as a device to protect sensitive communications, encryption has moved gradually into the mainstream With the increasing prevalence of networked computing(7) and its increasing vulnerability to tampering,(8) cryptography has become a valued tool both for businesses and consumers in the protection of proprietary and personal information Properly employed, cryptography can perform three distinct functions: (1) authenticate the sender by means of a unique "signature"; (2) protect the confidentiality of the message during transmission and in storage; and (3) assure the integrity of the message through encrypting a digest …

A Means for Incorporating Time-Dependent Phenomena in Existing Vulnerability Analysis Methods.

Abstract: : There are many phenomena addressed by the vulnerability analysis community which are, in truth, time dependent. However, due to computational constraints, whether actual or historical, most such phenomena are treated in a manner that ignores or, at best, crudely approximates this time dependency. This report describes a method which could allow such dependencies to be added to existing vulnerability analysis software in a more physically realistic manner. It also describes a possible implementation of these ideas within a vulnerability analysis code. (AN)

Development and implementation of new york state's comprehensive bridge safety assurance program

Abstract: Since 1990 the New York State Department of Transportation has been proactively involved in the planning, development, and implementation of its long-range comprehensive bridge safety assurance program. This program will be integrated into the department's bridge management system to provide important safety-based bridge information for capital and maintenance program planning. The development and implementation of procedures used to assess the vulnerability of existing bridges to six potential causes or modes of failure--hydraulic, structural steel detail deficiencies, collision, overload, structural concrete detail deficiencies, and earthquake--are discussed. Furthermore, the development and implementation of an overall bridge safety assurance policy aimed at the design and construction of new bridges, retrofitting bridges during their planned rehabilitation, and programming the remaining bridges for necessary actions to eliminate or reduce their vulnerability to catastrophic failure are also discussed.