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Showing papers on "Westernization published in 1997"


Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: In this paper, Narayan examines ways in which the flow of information across national contexts affects our understanding of issues, and the underlying problems which "culture" poses for the respect of difference and cross-cultural understanding.
Abstract: Dislocating Cultures takes aim at the related notions of nation, identity, and tradition to show how Western and Third World scholars have misrepresented Third World cultures and feminist agendas. Drawing attention to the political forces that have spawned, shaped, and perpetuated these misrepresentations since colonial times, Uma Narayan inspects the underlying problems which "culture" poses for the respect of difference and cross-cultural understanding.Questioning the problematic roles assigned to Third World subjects within multiculturalism, Narayan examines ways in which the flow of information across national contexts affects our understanding of issues. Dislocating Cultures contributes a philosophical perspective on areas of ongoing interest such as nationalism, post-colonial studies, and the cultural politics of debates over tradition and "westernization" in Third World contexts.

709 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Gocek as discussed by the authors argues that social change precedes and contributes to the process of Westernization and social change during the 18th and 19th centuries in the Ottoman Empire using empirical analysis of archival documents and historical chronicles.
Abstract: BLExamines the process of Westernization and social change during the 18th and 19th centuries in the Ottoman Empire Using empirical analysis of archival documents and historical chronicles, Gocek questions the prevailing scholarly interpretation that Westernization leads to social change. Rather, she argues that social change precedes and contributes to the process of Westernization.

67 citations


Book
01 Aug 1997
TL;DR: In this article, the authors ask if the nobility could lead the Westernization of Russia in early modern times, and their yardstick is Humanism and the Latin Classics, which dominated education in Europe, but with which Russia's government only flirted, and most in society rejected.
Abstract: This book asks if the nobility could lead the Westernization of Russia in early modern times. Its yardstick is Humanism and the Latin Classics, which dominated education in Europe, but with which Russia's government only flirted, and most in society rejected.

61 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: Gocek as discussed by the authors argues that the rise of a Westernized Ottoman bourgeoisie in the 18th and 19th centuries caused the decline or demise of the Ottoman Empire, and argues that this hypothesis would seem to clash with the current output of Ottomanist historians, notably Linda T. Darling, who challenge the very assumption of decline.
Abstract: Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change, by Fatma Muge Gocek. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. vi + 141 pages. Append. to p. 143. Notes to p. 184. Bibl. to p. 208. Index to p. 220. $45. Reviewed by Jane Hathaway Fatma Muge Gocek's second book is an example of the continuing contribution of social scientists to historical writing on the Ottoman Empire; at the same time, it reinforces and amplifies her earlier work, East Encounters West.' In Rise of the Bourgeoisie, the author argues that the rise of a Westernized Ottoman bourgeoisie in the 18th and 19th centuries caused the decline, or demise, of the empire. This hypothesis would seem to clash with the current output of Ottomanist historians, notably Linda T. Darling, who challenge the very assumption of decline. In the course of her narrative, the author switches to the less historiographically charged term "demise," without, however, directly addressing the issue of terminology. The body of Gocek's book demonstrates that the Ottoman elite's adoption of Western, particularly French, merchandise during the 18th and l9th centuries generated a "bifurcated bourgeoisie." Military and civil service academies on the Western European model turned out an administrative bourgeoisie of primarily Muslim bureaucrats whose principal loyalty was not to the Sultan's household, as the Sultan had expected, but to the ideals inculcated in the bureaucrats by their Western education: motherland, state, and, increasingly, liberal democracy. During the 18th century, or even slightly earlier, Christian and Jewish merchants under Ottoman rule took advantage of European commercial penetration of the empire to form a commercial bourgeoisie that mediated between the Western European economies and their Ottoman clients. By the early 20th century, the administrative bourgeoisie had largely displaced the commercial bourgeoisie, paving the way for the emergence of a Muslim Turkish nation-state. Gocek portrays these two segments of the bourgeoisie as challenging the Sultan's authority by constructing and reproducing an institutional framework that transcended the Sultan's household, source of all previous political legitimacy. This paradigm seems to assume a static, unchanging sultanate desperately trying to preserve its traditional base against modernity. In fact, Sultan `Abd al-Hamid II (1876-1909) exploited Western technology to implement a modem police state uniquely able to monitor and control the alleged subversive activities of the new political bourgeoisie. Gocek's emphasis on the household as the key structure of pre-modern Ottoman society is laudable, albeit her view of household politics is highly centrist. Her narrative gives the impression that the Sultan's household somehow subsumed all subsidiary households within the empire, even though she acknowledges the challenge to the sultanic household offered by the "office-households" of Ottoman officials. …

53 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the last 150-200 years, Turkey has undergone far-reaching changes in collective as well as individual self-perception due to the emergence among the Turks of a European-inspired nationalist movement, based on a newly conceived separate ethnic (or racial) entity as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The process of westernization which Turkey has undergone in the last 150-200 years has entailed far-reaching changes in collective as well as individual self-perception. This in turn has had to do with the emergence among the Turks of a European-inspired nationalist movement, based on a newly conceived separate ethnic (or racial) entity. Ottoman Turks, at least members of the educated elite, had two main foci of loyalty and identity during most of their recorded history.1 One was Islam, the religion adopted by the ancient Turks upon their contact with the spreading Muslim Empire and civilization. The other was the Ottoman dynasty and state, loyalty to which rested not only on the traditional loyalty among Turks to their tribal or political chief, but also on the position of the Ottomans as the champions of Islam in the world. In time the dynasty acquired the sanctity which kept it in power for centuries. An Ottoman gentleman, until well into the nineteenth century, would therefore identify himself as a Muslim and an Ottoman, never as a Turk, a term which was used either to differentiate between Turks and non-Turks, or as a derogatory reference to the ignorant peasant or nomad of Anatolia. Turkish history was written basically as Islamic or Ottoman history, and, perhaps a perfect example of Turkish assimilation in Islamic civilization the Turkish language became so loaded with Persian and Arabic words and forms that it almost lost its original character. Interestingly, in the nineteenth century, both foci of identity and loyalty were reinforced rather than weakened by the changing political and social circumstances. The alienation and separatism of the non-Muslim elements in the state, culminating in a series of rebellions, drove the Turkish reformist elite to try to bring about the integration of all communities into a single Ottoman 'nation' (millet). This doctrine of Ottomanism (Osmanlilik) was in essence a 'patriotic' kind of nationalism, borrowed from Europe, and based on allegiance to dynasty, state and homeland. It went along with the adoption of the principle of the legal equality of all religious communities in the Empire leading to many of the steps toward secularization and modernization which were part of the comprehensive reform movement known as the Tanzimat. As the century progressed and separatism made headway among non-Turkish Muslim citizens as well, however, it became important to re-emphasize the old

51 citations



Journal Article
TL;DR: A remarkable book about which American readers know little and cannot even imagine-the world of Saudi women writers was published by Saddeka Arebi as discussed by the authors, who revealed in compelling narrative the turbulent and at times precarious, literary politics challenging women writers in Saudi Arabia.
Abstract: Women and Words in Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Literary Discourse, by Saddeka Arebi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. xii + 299 pages. Notes to p. 329. Bibl. to p. 346. Index to p. 357. $49.50 cloth; $17.50 paper. In this remarkable book, a gifted author and anthropologist introduces a world about which American readers know little and cannot even imagine-the world of Saudi women writers. Saddeka Arebi, herself a writer in her native Arabic, discloses in compelling narrative the turbulent, and at times precarious, literary politics challenging Saudi women writers. It is exciting to read how Saudi women, those suffering most from cultural restrictions among Arab women, have brought about transformations in their own situations and in gender discourse by joining peacefully into the battle of words about themselves! Within only a few decades women in Saudi Arabia have become their own voice of the voiceless. Debate about women in Saudi Arabia can never be the same again, one would imagine, as the subjects of discourse have joined the ranks of those discoursing. The monopoly of control over women and words by men has been broken through women's own actions in the "publication" of themselves and their words. The very fact that the `ulama (religious scholars) have issued fatwas (Islamic decrees) in response to women's writings is an indication of how seriously men have taken women's contributions to the dialogue about themselves and their place in society! On the Saudi scene, literary discourse is a battlefield where conflicting forces wield words as weapons to promote their own interests and policies. Women are at the center of this war. The Saudi `ulama, state and those pressuring for modernization, in their struggles for power and legitimacy, wield women as symbols, endlessly defining them and pronouncing on how their modesty and behavior demonstrate Saudi identity and Islamic commitment. Women are seen as "a gateway of Westernization" (p. 18). Thus, by controlling women and their words it is thought that men and all of society can be controlled as well. Since the 1960s, however, with the spread of education for females, women's voices have entered the literary fray. Women have become not only subjects of discourse, but active agents in defining history, society and gender by sending their words out into the public while remaining appropriately invisible themselves. The potential pitfalls for women of this active role are many. With sex segregation required, women cannot interact with non-related males and must avoid actions and topics which might threaten their reputation and family honor. The authorities would see publications advocating Western-style women's liberation as dangerous to the nation's welfare and reason for further restrictions on women. Arebi analyzes the work of nine main authors who represent a variety of literary genres and political stances in order to investigate how Saudi women writers cautiously resist dominant discourses. …

29 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The medical profession in modern China comprised two radically different schools, modern (Western) medicine and native medicine as mentioned in this paper, which made a conflict between the two schools almost inevitable, and the conflict was intensified by the modernization process that was quickened during the Republican period.
Abstract: The medical profession in modern China comprised two radically different schools—modern (Western) medicine and native medicine. The difference in philosophy, theory, and technique made a conflict between the two schools almost inevitable, and the conflict was intensified by the modernization process that was quickened during the Republican period. Western-trained or modern doctors advocated national salvation through science and denounced native medicine as superstitious, unscientific, and an impediment to the development of medical science in China. On the other hand, native medical practitioners insisted that what they learned and practiced was part of the national essence (guocui) and should be protected against the cultural invasion of imperialism (diguo zhuyi wenhua qinlue) including Western medicine. To be sure, both sides used such rhetoric to camouflage the business competition between them, but this rivalry and its implications did point to a profound cultural conflict between Chinese tradition and Western influence in China's modernization. It epitomized a burning issue of the day: whether or not China's modernization meant Westernization and whether a respectable position for China in the modern world was to be achieved through Westernization or preservation of what was regarded or claimed as national heritage.

22 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argued that the accelerating sense of time reflected Japan's desperate efforts to catch up with the western level of industry in the shortest possible time, where time was equated with profit.
Abstract: Over the past century, Japanese society has undergone a radical change in its temporal experience, moving from one following the rhythms of nature to one of mathematical precision, namely, the western time system. Why did Japan westernize its time? This paper argues that it was for the sake of industrialization, where time was equated with profit. The accelerating sense of time reflected Japan's desperate efforts to catch up with the western level of industry in the shortest possible time.

21 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Salmon et al. as discussed by the authors presented a detailed study of the Chinese community of Surabaya whose historical development appears to be specific to East Java, and discussed the sources concerning the beginnings of the community and briefly allude to an early Islamisation process which allowed the settlers to intermingle with local society.
Abstract: Claudine Salmon Although a large body of literature has been produced on the Chinese of Java, there are very few studies of the history of their various settlements. We present here a detailed study of the Chinese community of Surabaya whose historical development appears to be specific to East Java. In the first part, we discuss the sources concerning the beginnings of the community and briefly allude to an early Islamisation process which allowed the settlers to intermingle with local society. In the second part, we single out three big Peranakan families (the Han, the Tjoa and the The), whose history (which lasts from the end of the 17th or the beginning of the 18th century to the early 1930s) may be regarded as representative of the different ways the Chinese and their descendants adapted themselves to the host society. In the third part, we put the attempts of the community to re-establish its Chinese roots into relation with political issues on the Mainland and in Java. The first attempt started in Surabaya in 1864 with the foundation of the Hokkien Kong Tik Soe or "Temple of the Merits of Fujian", which was aimed at reviving Chinese funeral and marriage customs and curbing the process of Islamisation. The second attempt, much broader in scope, was aimed at promoting Chinese education by the foundation of various private schools (one of them, the Hoo Tjiong Hak Tong, 1903, was closely linked with Mainland revolutionnaries), reviving Confucianism as a reaction against Westernization (foundation of a temple dedicated to Confucius in 1898), establishment of a Chinese Chamber of Commerce (1906) intended to help the local Chinese merchants to promote their enterprises both in the South Seas and in China. Since the last decades of the 19th century there has been a continuous stream of migrations from the Mainland that gradually modified the social and economic structure of the Chinese community and finally caused it to split up. In the fourth part we deal with the Totok (or newcomers) who started to organise themselves into a great number of smaller associations (on the basis of geography, profession or lineal descent) ; we also pay attention to the Peranakan who resented the competition of the newcomers decided to struggle separately. This restructuration was disrupted by the recession of the 1920s, the depression of 1930, which affected the Chinese of Java and especially of Surabaya, and was finally stopped with the occupation of the Dutch Indies by the Japanese. The conclusion suggests that since Independence, the history of the Indonesians of Chinese descent in Surabaya cannot be dissociated from that of the city as a whole.

MonographDOI
01 Feb 1997
TL;DR: In this paper, a series of essays published over a space of twenty-five years but extensively rewritten and updated, probes into the forever problematic relationship between the Middle East and Western Europe, between a revitalizing Islamic and a post-Christian civilization.
Abstract: Is the Middle East "the mother of all conflicts"? This volume, consisting of essays published over a space of twenty-five years but extensively rewritten and updated, probes into the forever problematic relationship between the Middle East and Western Europe, between a revitalizing Islamic and a post-Christian civilization. It treats, firstly, the dynamics of the Middle Eastern civilization, building up a kaleidoscopic picture of the Middle Eastern perception of change and development; modern science in a non-Western context; the ambiguity of westernization in Middle Eastern revitalization; politico-religious resurgence; the matter of means and ends. The second part concentrates on the intercultural relations between the Middle East and Europe, while the third part considers implications for oriental and development studies: the new demands arising and the perceptual and methodological retooling needed to meet them. In singling out the intercultural nature of events and clashes, this important volume advances an innovative, interactive style of scholarship.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In most Muslim countries, the first few decades of this century witnessed rapid modernisation; the seventies and the eighties, however, have brought about a marked retum to traditionalism as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Since the tum of the century, conflict between modernisation and traditionalism has dominated life in the political, social and legal spheres of most Muslim countries. Modemisation refers to the adoption of Western concepts, values, laws and institutions; traditionalism, on the other hand, means the preservation of all the concepts, values and institutions of Islam, including its law. In most Muslim countries, the first few decades of this century witnessed rapid modernisation; the seventies and the eighties, however, have brought about a marked retum to traditionalism. In Arab Middle Eastem countries, the process of modernisation started ir the first half of this century with de adoption of the Westem concept of the nationstate and the wholesale adoption of Western laws and institutions. The modernisation process also involved a complete abolition of the sovereignty of Islac law (Shari'a), considered for over a millennium as the highest law of Islam. Most of the adopted Western laws go against the indigenous socio-cultural norms and rules, especially those norllls and rules relating to Islam and to the Shari'. For this reason de trend towards Westernisation was from the outset vehemently rejected by many Muslims, scholars as well as ordinary citizens, who instead sought the abandomnent of Westernisaiion in favour of a return to Islarn. Seeking a resoluiion to such socio-political unrest and to the conflict between

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article argued that the West assumed a double identity of enemy and teacher to the Chinese, which complicated and confused the relationship between modernization and nationalism, and the double identity complicated modernization and nationalistic sentiments in China were mainly triggered by the aggression carried out by the Western powers.
Abstract: Nationalist sentiments in China were chiefly triggered by the aggression carried out against it by the Western powers. Modernization at the time was tantamount to Westernization. Thus, to the Chinese, the West assumed a double identity— that of enemy and teacher. This double identity complicated and confused the relationship between modernization and nationalism.


Journal Article
TL;DR: Dessouki et al. as mentioned in this paper conducted a comparative study of Islamic resurgence in the Arab world, synthesizing the key arguments of the crises theses and presents them in the form of five propositions: Proposition 1: Ruling elites in Muslim countries may encourage Islamic groups as a legitimacy device, a diversionary tactic to divert public attention from other issues and to discredit their opponents, especially those of the Left.
Abstract: Islamic societies are experiencing the resurgence of religious activism and discourse in their social, political, and economic life. While the Islamic heritage has always served as a form of cultural identification in predominantly Muslim communities, Islam as a political force has markedly increased since the 1970s. Following long periods of nationalist/socialist projects, many in the Muslim world began to demand a "return to Islam." The manifestations of Islamic resurgence, however, vary from country to country. In some countries, the Islamic revival is an expression of political discontent and opposition. In others, it is an expression of political legitimation by the state elite. Yet in others, both manifestations of Islam are observed. What factors help explain the resurgence of Islam in its multiple manifestations? Many scholars of Islamic revivalism attempt to explain the multiple expressions of political Islam by adhering to what may be termed the "crises theses." They hold that the reassertion of Islam is related to social and political crises: lack of social justice, lack of political legitimacy, or/and decline of long held traditional value systems. How these variables interact with extant Islamic identities, it is argued, helps explain the various manifestations of Islamic resurgence in different countries. Yet despite the ubiquitous use of the crises theses by scholars of political Islam, I am unaware of any study that seeks to explicitly test their persuasiveness via structured cross-country comparisons. Although many studies compare Islamic movements (e.g. Piscatori 1983; Esposito 1987; Stowasser 1987; Marty et al. 1991, 1993; Ruedy 1996), these comparative studies rarely seek to isolate the posited causal variables from possible alternative explanations or apply the same indicators of the posited causal variables across cases. Thus the analysis remains unstructured, casting doubt on the overall validity of the crises theses. Therefore, in this paper, I aim to test the validity of the crises theses by way of a structured, focused comparison of Islamic revivalism in Egypt and Indonesia since the 1970s. II. The "Crises Theses" as an Explanatory Framework Proponents of the crises theses treat the resurgence of political Islam as a product of sociological and political factors interacting with deeply rooted Islamic ethos. These factors include, inter alia, "identity conflict, legitimacy crises, political conflict, class conflict, culture crises, and military impotence" (Dekmejian 1988, 7; 1995). More specifically, proponents of the crises theses argue that the inability of ruling regimes in predominantly Muslim countries to meet demands for social justice, political participation, and economic welfare leads many to turn to Islam as a form of political opposition and, on the part of the state elite, as a form of political legitimation (Davis 1984; Ibrahim 1987; Ayubi 1991). Others emphasize the crises of identity which results from rapid modernization, Westernization, and urbanization or from excessive reliance on Western models of development (Hourani 1983; Esposito 1988). Dessouki, in an introduction to a comparative study of Islamic resurgence in the Arab world, synthesizes the key arguments of the crises theses and presents them in the form of five propositions: Proposition 1: Ruling elites in Muslim countries may encourage Islamic groups as a legitimacy device, a diversionary tactic to divert public attention from other issues and to discredit their opponents, especially those of the Left. Generally, the more a political elite in a Muslim country lacks legitimacy, or is on the defensive, the more it will resort to Islamic symbolism and religious legitimation. Proposition 2: At the level of the masses, Islam provides a frame of reference for their collective identity, a symbol of self-assertion, and a consciousness that is rooted in their own history and tradition as opposed to foreign penetration and cultural domination. …

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the role of cities as key actors in the global economy, municipal policies from a North American perspective, and the spatial impact of globalization in urban environments.
Abstract: critical issues related to the urban growth-global economy nexus, including urban social polarization, the role of cities as key actors in the global economy, municipal policies from a North American perspective and the spatial impact of globalization. Geographers, urban planners and students of urban economies will benefit measurably from reading this volume, particularly on the issue of how globalizing economies shape, and are shaped by, urban environments. One of the keys to understanding the urban±global economy relationship is the dynamic of economic competitiveness. Fry argues (p. 25) that North American municipalities must develop `intermestic' policies that recognize the growing overlap of international and domestic concerns. Ample evidence is presented in many of the essays of the myriad ways in which cities and regions are competing, sometimes desperately, for industrial jobs and direct foreign investment in order to secure their link to the global economy. Yet global integration, argues Kincaid (p. 83), is `highly corrosive of the cultural glue' cementing urban societies together. Civic fragmentation in global cities can be a potential negative consequence of increased international economic integration. More discussion on the ramifications of the homogenization of both urban and world culture would have strengthened considerably many of the essays in this volume. One of the most powerful essays is Hiernaux's analysis of the Mexican situation. A critical problem that often is overlooked in analyses of the internationalization of cities is the fact that huge portions of the territory and population of a city are often incapable of participating in the globalization process. Moreover, globalization of the economy is having a differential impact on cities and regions not only in Mexico but also throughout North America. Thus, a complete reliance on laissez-faire economic policies could be disastrous for Mexico's urban system. Unfortunately, elsewhere in this book and in other works on globalization's impact on Latin American cities in general, there is little explicit discussion of the weaknesses inherent in the prevailing free-market global economic model. The inclusion of Shachar's essay on the European context puzzled me. Although he provides an excellent discussion of the relevant aspects of the world-city concept from a European perspective, there is little explicit theoretical or methodological linkage here to the North American context. Surely an essay applying the world city paradigm to the North American urban milieu would have been far more appropriate and productive. Only passing mention is made in other essays of the key world city command and control functions of New York City, Washington, Los Angeles, Chicago and Vancouver. Moreover, of the three cases studied in part four, two overlapped each other. Artibise's discussion on Cascadia and Cohn and Smith's analysis of Vancouver and Seattle covered many of the same issues. In terms of spatial and methodological balance, a case study from the northeast would have proved much more useful and informative. Although this volume breaks no new theoretical or methodological ground, it does summarize the key issues quite nicely and it suggests several critical areas for fruitful research. The overall production quality of the book is excellent. Particularly useful is Gregory's selected bibliography on cities and globalization at the end of the book. I highly recommend North American cities, particularly to urban geographers, as an extremely useful overview of the urban±global economy nexus and as an important source of key concerns and research themes about the future of urban environments.