Westernization

About: Westernization is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1154 publications have been published within this topic receiving 15791 citations. The topic is also known as: occidentalization.

Counseling in Turkey: An Evolving Field

Abstract: Most people who have never visited Turkey think of it as a country located somewhere in the Middle East. In fact, Turkey has a unique geographic location that bridges Europe and Asia, sharing borders with countries in Europe (Greece and Bulgaria) andAsia (Armenia and Georgia), as well as the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, and Syria). The modern secular republic of Turkey was established in 1923 following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which had reigned for more than 600 years. The leader of the secular and progressive Turkish government, Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, laid the groundwork for the Westernization of Turkey and its entry into the modern technological age. Some of the initial attempts at modernization included replacing the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet, adopting the Western calendar, encouraging men and women to adopt a Western style of dress, replacing sharia (Islamic law) with a secular legal system adapted from Switzerland, granting equal rights to women (including the right to vote and to be elected to government) and encouraging the education of girls. According to Go1e (2004), granting rights to women and transforming them into "public citizens" (p. 12) can be considered "the backbone of Turkish modernism" (p. 12). Today, Turkey has a population of more than 70 million. It shares many common characteristics with other developing countries, such as low per capita income; low levels of education (Raney & Cmarbas, 2005); a large urban--rural divide; a high fertility rate; and the simultaneous existence of modem and traditional economies, lifestyles, and values (Sumer, 1998). In discussing the coexistence of modern and traditional lifestyles and values in Turkey, Surner (1998) stated, "Turkish culture ... is fundamentally collectivistic in the sense that the family retains priority, but this collectivism coexists with highly individualistic trends in the systems of education and economy, where market rules necessitate and justify competition" (p. 126). According to Mocan-Aydm (2000), differences in attitudes, values, and lifestyles among people in different geographic regions and groups make it difficult to provide an answer to the question, "Who is the average Turk?" However, Mocan-Aydln concluded, "If we consider a continuum of collectivism versus individualism, Turkish people still seem to be close to the collectivistic end while at the same time striving for individualism" (p. 282). Recent research (Karakitapoglu Aygun & Imamoglu, 2002) concerning the role of age and value orientation among Turkish university students and adults indicated that compared with university students, adults attribute more significance to traditional values (e.g., showing respect to others, following social norms, sustaining concordance in relationships). As with many other developing countries, Turkey has quickly and readily absorbed many aspects of Western culture, adopted many modern tenets, and mirrored many of the same patterns in attempting to adopt the social sciences. As stated by Adair and Kagitcibasi (1995), "a serious problem facing many social science disciplines in developing countries is their lack of application to the local culture and to the solutions of national social problems stemming from rapid change and development" (p. 634). Thus, counseling as a field has been confronted with many of the same struggles as other social sciences in developing countries. In line with Adair and Kagitcibasi, Demir and Aydin (1996) concluded that although Turkish universities have been responsive in terms of keeping up with advances in academic fields, they have not been very responsive to the needs of society and, as a result, have turned out well-educated elites who perceive their social status to be above that of the general public. In short, many fields within the social sciences, including counseling, have had difficulties in perceiving the different social realities that exist in a country with a wide and continually changing spectrum of beliefs between the traditional and the modem. …

Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia

Abstract: Following his inauguration as Russian president in May 2000, Vladimir Putin walked the short distance across the Kremlin grounds to the Cathedral of the Annunciation for a thanksgiving service. At this brief service, Patriarch Aleksii II praised the new president for his "thoughtful and responsible style of leadership" and suggested that like never before Russia needed "the restoration of the spiritual powers of the nation and a rebirth of its commitment to genuine moral values ... Vladimir Vladimirovich, help us to disclose the soul of the nation." (1) If the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church was using this opportunity to present church and state in perfect harmony, one might also note that the president too was making a point in keeping separate the civil and religious celebrations of his electoral success. In the immediate aftermath of Putin's appearance as heir apparent, there had been considerable speculation as to what this might mean for church-state relations. This resulted from the fact that he did little to hide his personal commitment to Orthodoxy and that his participation in religious services clearly went beyond the lip service paid by the first generation of post- and ex-communist politicians. Liberal critics feared the advent of a more religious based politics in which pre-Soviet church-state links were restored and the church hierarchy largely appointed during the Soviet era returned to a familiar role of subservience to the state. Though sometimes associated with the Byzantine era, it was Peter the Great who effectively turned the Orthodox Church into a department of state, abolishing the Patriarchate and placing a state appointed bureaucrat at the head of the church. In consequence the Orthodox Church came to be seen as a pillar of the state and, though it enjoyed a very limited political role, its bishops were important dignitaries who could use their position to pursue church ends, such as supporting tight restrictions on religious minorities until 1905. Yet this close association with the state, which included the obligation to report on any political matters heard in the confessional, along with the scandals associated with Rasputin, was to have bitter consequences for the Orthodox after 1917 despite the emergence of a significant reform movement within the church at the turn of the century. (2) If liberals were perhaps pessimistic about a revival of a state church, conservatives had more reasons to be optimistic that Putin's stated commitment to order and patriotism might lead to a renewed focus on Orthodox values in public life. Yet, as this article suggests, Putin's period in office has not been characterized by a serious state-led attempt to restore the political authority of the Russian Orthodox Church and religious matters are clearly very much secondary affairs for the Kremlin, except where they impinge on security or social harmony. Church leaders are treated with respect, clerics are present at public occasions and, where it does not conflict with other priorities, Putin is likely to favor the Orthodox Church's agenda. We illustrate this through discussion of four areas where there are what might be called shared orientations or affinities between the interests of church and state: the issue of liberalization and Westernization, the notion of "managed pluralism," security and religious education. In all of these areas, the policies of Putin largely suit the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, though in some there are differences of emphasis. But this is very much a matter of church preferences reinforcing, not determining, the policies of the president and even where there are differences, the church's preference for a close relationship with state power has meant that major church-state clashes have been avoided. THE MAN AND THE INHERITANCE Very much a child of the Soviet Union, Putin inherited a religion-politics relationship that had undergone significant changes during his lifetime. …

Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 1840–95

Abstract: Chinese views of Western relations kept changing during the 1840-95 period, with a quickened tempo after 1860. Generally, foreign policy views changed from a 'closed door' policy in the forties to the 'good faith' policy based on the Confucian principle of sincerity during the sixties. Modern diplomatic skills, especially the idea of international law, were stressed during the ensuing two decades. Power politics, particularly the concepts of balance of power and alliance with strong countries, prevailed during the eighties and nineties. In spite of all these changes, the power of conservatism remained strong. Success in the introduction of things Western into China depended in large measure on the extent to which they were compatible with this tradition. China's inertia can also be seen in the views held by some political leaders towards the West. In addition to the conservatives, many literati-officials who championed Western learning were at the same time anti-Christian. Modernization in some senses meant Westernization.

Language Reform in Turkey and Iran

Abstract: Of all man's cultural badges, that of language is perhaps the most intimately felt and tenaciously defended. Even chauvinists who are prepared to concede under pressure that language, race, and culture are not the same thing—that their national ethnicity may be mixed, their religion imported, their culture synthetic to a degree—will still cling to the national language as the last bastion of irrational totemic pride. Hence, one of the most controversial features of the programs of westernization and modernization fostered by Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran was that of state-sponsored language reform, characterized chiefly by attempts to “purify” Turkish and Persian of their centuries-old accretion of Arabic loanwords. A case study of this process also affords some insight into the differing attitudes to national social reforms in Turkey and in Iran, and among the respective regimes, intelligentsia, and masses, which might help to explain why on balance one “succeeded” while the other “failed.”

The world revolution of Westernization : the twentieth century in global perspective

Abstract: The author argues that the global violence and warfare of this century are the consequence of the world revolution of westernization which has characterized it. The ascendance of Europe had, by the turn of the century, brought all parts of the world under its influence and control. Westerners have seen such global emulation as a 'civilizing' process. The author argues, however, that the globe's attempt to catch up with the West militarily, economically, and politically has been a traumatic experience as societies have been forced to undergo in a few decades changes that Europeans underwent in many centuries, causing many countries to fall prey to totalitarian regimes and warfare. Modern historians, political scientists.