Westernization

About: Westernization is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1154 publications have been published within this topic receiving 15791 citations. The topic is also known as: occidentalization.

Zera Yacob’s Hatata and the vitality of an Indigenous Ethiopian Philosophy

Abstract: In today’s globalized world, indigenous knowledge is seen as a way of mediating the gap between foreign and local forms of knowledge, envisioning a holistic and sustainable form of development and exploring the wisdom of indigenous cultures. To this extent, it develops a severe critique of programs of modernization and westernization, in return emphasizing the value of artistic, literary, environmental and ethical systems of thought extracted from local communities. Some of the contending labels through which the quest for indigenous knowledge finds expression include indigenous culture, art, environmental ethics, governance, conflict resolution and philosophy. This paper explores primarily the possibility of an indigenous Ethiopian philosophy through an analysis of the ideas of a modern Ethiopian philosopher, Zera Yacob. Animated by the religious controversies and disputes over the nature of true faith in modern Ethiopia, Zera Yacob developed a unique indigenous philosophy in his work- the Hatata. In this work, he grappled with questions of religious disputes and mutual coexistence, the relation between ethics and rationality, the laws of man, reason and God, and social and political issues amongst others. Through an interrogation of Zera Yacob’s Hatata, this paper argues that, (1) Zera Yacob’s philosophy, by developing a system of philosophy guided by the light of reason challenges Western conceptions of Africa and Africans as pre-logical, barbaric and uncivilized, (2) the Hatata introduced a rational foundation for ethics that could be used to analyze everyday moral dilemmas, and (3) the Hatata emphasized the notion of religious pluralism which could be used to settle religious disputes and controversies at this point in time.

이스탄불여성의 폐면문화 연구

Abstract: This study will covered socio-cultural background and characteristic of the face-concealing culture of Istanbul which has liberal and westernized clothes culture for women even if it`s an city in an Islamic country. This study depended on literatures related to religion, culture and costumes of the Ottoman Empire, especially costumic data on miniature of turkey, which was famous from 16th to 19th century. Since the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire has been gradually influenced by European countries but the change of women`s clothes was not considerable. In the 18th century, women`s clothes were influenced by foreign fashions. A veil to cover the face was gradually disappeared and traditional Turkish headdresses were replaced by European hats. Through face-concealing culture of Istanbul, we can see some socio-cultural features like Islamic religious character, one`s social position, economic situation, westernization and renovation, beauty and completion of costume, duality for the reason of regional difference.

After the failure of westernization

Abstract: Russia's 'Westernization' Stage Is Seen as Over ... LEONTYEV: PRO-WESTERN STAGE OF REFORM, ENDING IN EARLY 1992, BROUGHT DISAPPOINTMENT; IN NEW NATIONAL STAGE, RUSSIA WILL GET OUT OF CRISIS ON ITS OWN; HOMEGROWN LIBERALISM, FREE ECONOMY WILL DEVELOP WITHOUT NATIONAL-PATRIOTS OR NATIONAL-SOCIALISTS; A PARTNER'S ROLE FOR WEST ... AFTER THE FAILURE OF WESTERNIZATION. (By Mikhail Leontyev. Sevodnya, Nov. 24, p. 1. Condensed text:) The time has come to tally some results. One stage of the transformation of post-Communist Russia has ended, and a fundamentally new one is beginning. The first period was marked by a course aimed at rapid Westernization and "entry into Europe" and by a completely pro-Western orientation in foreign and domestic policy, with enormous hopes for decisive Western economic assistance and Western solidarity with a country that had thrown off communism; had set everyone free, heedless even of its own losses and interests; had voluntarily and happily capitulated in the cold war; and had voluntarily taken on the burden of reparations for that defeat. ... This period began under Gorbachev and peaked in the first quarter of 1992, when Yegor Gaidar said: "We have an opportunity to use for our reform resources that significantly exceed our domestic possibilities." These hopes on the part of political leaders did not just fall from the sky; they were grounded in a very optimistic public mood that was fully commensurate with them. This period ended in defeat and disappointment a defeat for the West, which for all practical purposes totally missed the opportunity to bring about Russia's "soft" integration into the "Western world," leaving those political forces in Russia that had been counting on a Western future in the position of undoubted political outsiders. Now objectively thinking pro-Western democrats who understand the hopelessness of political mimicry are very much aware of the modesty of their immediate prospects. They hope only for one thing: that they will not pass on the cause of post-Communist evolution, which they began, into the worst possible hands. Incidentally, this is what is giving impetus (at least some impetus) to the dreary idea that they themselves might personally nurture some sort of "social democratic future." . . . ... The stage of transformation that is beginning today is a national stage. We must get it into our heads that Russia is going to emerge from its very grave and very inevitable crisis on its own, with no support from outside. No one is going to help us, although some can hinder us a great deal. We need foreign investments, and we will get them if all goes well, but investments are not aid. We will get them on very tough market terms. ... In this situation, the range of possibilities is much broader than it is under the "pro-Western" vector, which posits a specific ideal model and has patented external inspectors to track and evaluate the parameters of movement toward this model. This new unpredictability gives rise to fear, perhaps fully justified fear, among democrats both our domestic "Westerners" and the actual foreign ones. National development with an inevitable measure of autarky, first of all a cultural/values autarky, is fraught with the danger of very exotic forms of originality that are not limited by civilization and common sense. At the same time, all national-patriotic constructs imply, in one way or another, the restoration of state management of the economy, something that is hardly possible to accomplish even at the cost of considerable bloodshed when the state itself is breaking up. One can console oneself with the thought that no national-socialist prospect for Russia exists, that it is simply a road to disaster, but this is poor consolation, especially for the Russian population. ... However, national development creates previously unknown prospects for Russian liberalism and for the building of a truly free economy and an organic societal structure grounded in natural traditions and possibilities and in national cultural values. In building state, public and economic institutions virtually from scratch and ridding itself of social constructivists who seek to impose on Russia their own "models" (from American to Chinese), Russia will be able to realize advantages that virtually no other country has at present. ... There is another undoubted plus in all this, especially as concerns the choice of political solutions: We will no longer have to keep looking slavishly over our shoulder at the West, fearing that we will get a grade of "poor" in "democracy" or in "foreign-policy behavior." The period of "training for life" has ended, and everything that can be comprehended has been comprehended. We need partners, but we do not need mentors. In light of the discussions, which have been drawn out to indecent lengths, on admitting Russia even to the Council of Europe, for example, one can assume that when the West finally gets around to admitting us, there simply will be no one left in Russia with whom to discuss the matter.

Finance and Technology Transfer

Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter highlights finance and technology transfer in late 19th and early 20th centuries. The lack of historical perspective is a striking feature of all studies on technology transfer to developing countries. Yet a comparison between technology transfer in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and technology transfer will reveal strong similarities. This is particularly true with reference to the financial burden assumed by developing countries that import technology from Western industrialized countries. In the past, technology transfer was referred to as westernization or, more recently, modernization. In the 19th century, most countries in Latin America, Asia, and North Africa were striving to promote their development and to narrow the widening gap with the West by importing arms, machinery, and technical assistance in almost every field, also granting concessions to Western firms to develop local services and exploit natural resources. In North Africa and Ottoman Asia, the first attempts at modernization can be traced back to the early nineteenth century with Muhammad Ali's experience in Egypt, Khaireddine in Tunis, and the Tanzimat movement in the Ottoman Empire.