This paper develops techniques for empirically analyzing demand and supply in differentiated products markets and then applies these techniques to analyze equilibrium in the U.S. automobile industry. Our primary goal is to present a framework which enables one to obtain estimates of demand and cost parameters for a class of oligopolistic differentiated products markets. These estimates can be obtained using only widely available product-level and aggregate consumer-level data, and they are consistent with a structural model of equilibrium in an oligopolistic industry. When we apply the tech- niques developed here to the U.S. automobile market, we obtain cost and demand parameters for (essentially) all models marketed over a twenty year period.

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Automobile prices in market equilibrium

This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget. This new role is essential for controlling incentives and suggests that firms in which ownership and labor are partly separated will have an advantage over partnerships in which output is distributed among agents. A new characterization of informative (hence valuable) monitoring is derived and applied to analyze the value of relative performance evaluation. It is shown that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally. Competition per se is worthless. The role of aggregate measures in relative performance evaluation is also explored, and the implications for investment rules are discussed.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Moral Hazard in Teams

This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget. This new role is essential for controlling incentives and suggests that firms in which ownership and labor are partly separated will have an advantage over partnerships in which output is distributed among agents. A new characterization of informative (hence valuable) monitoring is derived and applied to analyze the value of relative performance evaluation. It is shown that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally. Competition per se is worthless. The role of aggregate measures in relative performance evaluation is also explored, and the implications for investment rules are discussed.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/220831/1/cmsems-dp0471.pdf

I NCENTIVES ARE the essence of economics. Despite many wide-ranging claims about their supposed importance, there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers. The purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives. Since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned, a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm's interest. This literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers. These include piece rates, options, discretionary bonuses, promotions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, deferred compensation, and so on. My objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation. Where possible, I will address the literature from two perspectives. First, an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance. Accordingly, I consider whether agents behave in this way, and whether these responses are always in the firm's interest. Second, I address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind. In other words, do contracts look like the predictions of the theory? Incentives are provided to workers

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The Provision of Incentives in Firms

Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management

This article analyzes the role of competitive compensation schemes (in which pay depends on relative performance) in economies and imperfect information. These compensation schemes have desirable risk, incentive, and flexibility properties; they provide for an automatic adjustment of rewards and incentives in response to common changes in the environment. When environmental uncertainty is large, such schemes are shown to be preferable to individualistic reward structures; in the limit, as the number of contestants becomes large, expected utility may approach the first-best (perfect information) level. We study the design of contests, including the optimal use of prizes versus punishments and absolute versus relative performance standards. The analysis can also be viewed as a contribution to the multiagent, single-principal problem.

/pdf/prizes-and-incentives-towards-a-general-theory-of-37etbxyjga.pdf

Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition

We present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products. The central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure-strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products. This includes products with multi-dimen- sional attributes. In addition to the proof of existence, we provide conditions for uniqueness. Our analysis covers location models, the characteristics approach, and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework. To prove existence, we employ aggregation theorems due to Prekopa (1971) and Borell (1975). Our companion paper (Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)) introduces these theorems and develops the application to super-majority voting rules. WE PRESENT A NEW APPROACH to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products. The central result is that there exists a pure-strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products. In addition to the proof of existence, we provide conditions for uniqueness. Our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis. In particular, we expand the traditional one-dimensional framework to allow for multi-dimen- sional product differentiation. Our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences: one on individuals' preferences, the other on the distribution of preferences across society. These are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64%-majority rule presented in Caplin and Nalebuff (1988). To prove existence, we apply a new technique of aggregation. This technique is valuable in a variety of other problems. In the companion paper, we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64%-majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income (Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)). There are additional applications in statistics and in search theory. We begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition, describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions. Section 3 presents our twin assumptions, and shows that they cover many standard cases. In Section 4, we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions. The proof of existence of equilibrium is in Section

/pdf/aggregation-and-imperfect-competition-on-the-existence-of-4bwuq5o83q.pdf

Aggregation and imperfect competition: on the existence of equilibrium

In this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment. We show that bundling is a particularly effective entry-deterrent strategy. A company that has market power in two goods, A and B, can, by bundling them together, make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market. Bundling allows an incumbent to credibly defend both products without having to price low in each. The traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist. Although price discrimination provides a reason to bundle, the gains are small compared with the gains from the entry-deterrent effect. I. INTRODUCTION In this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment. We show that bundling is a particularly effective entry-deterrent strategy. A company that has market power in two goods, A and B, can, by bundling them together, make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market. Bundling allows an incumbent to defend both products without having to price low in each. While it is still possible to compete by offering a rival bundle, a monopolist can significantly lower the potential profits of a one-product entrant without having to engage in limit pricing prior to entry. We also show that bundling continues to be an effective pricing tool even if entry deterrence fails (or if there is already an existing one-product rival). A company with a monopoly in product A and a duopoly in product B makes higher profits by selling an A‐B bundle than by selling A and B independently. Leveraging market power from A into B and accepting some one-product competition against the bundle is better than using the monopoly power in good A all by itself. Since bundling mitigates the impact of competition on the incumbent, an entrant can expect the bundling strategy to persist, even without any commitment. The traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist (see Stigler [1968], Adams and Yellen

Bundling as an Entry Barrier

Since 1922, "Harvard Business Review" has been a leading source of breakthrough management ideas - many of which still speak to and influence us today. "The Harvard Business Review Classics" series now offers readers the opportunity to make these seminal pieces a part of your permanent management library. Each highly readable volume contains a groundbreaking idea that continues to shape best practices and inspire countless managers around the world-and will have a direct impact on you today and for years to come. Business is like war: The best combatant wins while the worst loses, right? Not necessarily. Companies can succeed spectacularly without destroying others. And they can lose miserably after competing well. Exceptional businesses win by actively shaping the game they're playing, not playing the game they find. "The Right Game" shows you how to do this - by altering who's competing, what value each player brings to the table, and which rules and tactics players use.

The right game : use game theory to shape strategy

This paper examines an auditor's incentives to take actions that lead to objective financial statements. Our results challenge the common perception that auditors are conservative. Under Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, the literal claim is that financial statements are the representations of management. Our view of the auditing process, however, focuses on its negotiated character. Financial statements should be read as a joint statement from the auditor and manager. The statement becomes a joint venture if the auditor is unwilling to provide an unqualified opinion on management's stated representations. At that point, the auditor and client begin negotiations in which the auditor may offer a revised statement. The client may threaten to dismiss him and find one more accepting of its views. Or they may decide to extend the audit to obtain more facts. In the end, compromises are usually found, statements are revised, and the auditor issues an unqualified opinion on the revised statements.'

Barry Nalebuff

Papers

Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition

Aggregation and imperfect competition: on the existence of equilibrium

Bundling as an Entry Barrier

The right game : use game theory to shape strategy

Conservatism and Auditor-Client Negotiations