The state of the union

Perception and misperception in international politics: Robert Jervis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976 445 pages $25.00 (cloth); $11.50 (paper)

Preface Table of cases List of abbreviations Part I. Recognition of States: 1. Introductory 2. The legal nature of recognition and the practice of states 3. The legal duty of recognition and the conditions of statehood 4. The declaratory and constitutive views of recognition 5. The declaratory and constitutive views of recognition (continued) 6. The procedure of recognition Appendix to chapters 1-6 Part II. Recognition of Governments: 7. International law and revolutionary changes of governments 8. The tests of recognition of governments 9. The principle of effectiveness and the consent of the governed 10. The legal effects of non-recognition of governments 11. The legal nature of recognition and the duty of recognition Part III. Recognition of Belligerency and of Insurgency: 12. The principles of recognition of belligerency 13. The right of the insurgents and of the lawful government to recognition of belligerency Appendix to chapters 12 and 13 14. Recognition of belligerency and the principles of international law 15. Problems of recognition of belligerency Appendix to chapters 14 and 15 16. Recognition of insurgency 17. Recognition of insurgents as a government 18. Insurgency and piracy Appendix to chapter 18 Part IV. Problems of Recognition: 19. De facto recognition, withdrawal of recognition and conditional recognition Appendix to chapter 19 20. Implied recognition 21. The principle of non recognition Index.

Recognition in international law

Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts

Unofficial Channels: Letters Between Alister McIntosh and Foss Shanahan, George Laking and Frank Corner 1946–1966

In 1965 New Zealand was an active member of alliances designed to contain the People’s Republic of China in South East Asia. Late the previous year, the Defence Council had warned Cabinet that New Zealand could be at war with China and/or Indonesia in six months. Less than seven years later New Zealand recognised China, as Britain and the US military presences were exiting from South East Asia. These events bookend a radical reshaping of New Zealand’s defence policies and its attitude towards China.  The existing scholarship on New Zealand’s Cold War defence policies has underemphasised the role of China in New Zealand’s grand strategy and the scholarship on Sino-New Zealand relations has also largely ignored defence policy. This thesis uses recently released files from the Ministry of Defence to provide new insight into the construction of China as a threat during the mid-1960s and the challenges faced in meeting that perceived threat. New Zealand’s Forward Defence policy was one designed to contain China and Beijing-supported revolutionary groups in South East Asia. This strategy was predicated on active British or American support for containment. SEATO and ANZAM provided the basis of New Zealand war planning and day-to-day operations in Asia respectively. With the British decision to withdraw from South East Asia and the American quagmire in Vietnam, New Zealand had to reassess its position in South East Asia as containment of China was no longer thought possible.  The need for a containment strategy was based upon a conceptualisation of China as a growing and hostile power. This view saw China as eventually developing the means to dominate South East Asia and threaten Australasia directly as Japan had done in 1942. This perception of China changed with the emergence of the Cultural Revolution. New Zealand officials watched from Hong Kong as violence and mass political disorder challenged established sources of authority. They took the view that Mao was in direct command of the revolution and was placing limits on it. The revolution destroyed the notion that China was a growing power bent on external expansion. As Mao moved to dampen the revolution, Beijing moved to re-establish its foreign policy and improve its links with the outside world.  Both the means and ends of New Zealand’s grand strategy changed at the same time. New Zealand and its great power allies abandoned the containment project just as views on China shifted. From the end of the 1960s, New Zealand’s Forward Defence efforts ceased to be focused on the containment of China and moved to achieving much more limited goals. New security arrangements were developed to replace the AMDA, ANZAM, and SEATO pacts. The Five Power Defence Arrangements would provide the basis of New Zealand’s defence commitment to South East Asia with only limited assistance from Britain and without China as a significant threat.  It is in this context that New Zealand made the decision to recognise China. New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake long maintained the view that the PRC should enter the United Nations and be recognised by New Zealand, provided the position of Taiwan was preserved. Once the effort to keep Taiwan in the UN was lost, New Zealand moved slowly toward recognition. However, it would take the election of the Third Labour Government for recognition to occur. This move was part of an international trend towards official relations with Beijing, but for New Zealand, the shift was greater as Wellington had moved from seeing China as a growing military threat to a state with which New Zealand could have an official dialogue.

David Belgrave

Papers

Actually or Potentially Within Reach: The Place of China in New Zealand’s Grand Strategy 1965-1972