This paper develops a new approach to the problem of testing the existence of a level relationship between a dependent variable and a set of regressors, when it is not known with certainty whether the underlying regressors are trend- or first-difference stationary. The proposed tests are based on standard F- and t-statistics used to test the significance of the lagged levels of the variables in a univariate equilibrium correction mechanism. The asymptotic distributions of these statistics are non-standard under the null hypothesis that there exists no level relationship, irrespective of whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1). Two sets of asymptotic critical values are provided: one when all regressors are purely I(1) and the other if they are all purely I(0). These two sets of critical values provide a band covering all possible classifications of the regressors into purely I(0), purely I(1) or mutually cointegrated. Accordingly, various bounds testing procedures are proposed. It is shown that the proposed tests are consistent, and their asymptotic distribution under the null and suitably defined local alternatives are derived. The empirical relevance of the bounds procedures is demonstrated by a re-examination of the earnings equation included in the UK Treasury macroeconometric model. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

/pdf/bounds-testing-approaches-to-the-analysis-of-level-un6p8czliu.pdf

Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level relationships

Part 1 Unemployment in the model of balanced growth: the labour market long-run equilibrium and balanced growth adjustment dynamics. Part 2 further ananlysis of the labour market: search intensity and job advertising.

Equilibrium Unemployment Theory

This paper surveys recent work in equilibrium models of labor markets characterized by search and recruitment frictions and by the need to reallocate workers across productive activities. The duration of unemployment and jobs and wage determination are treated as endogenous outcomes of job creation and job destruction decisions made by workers and firms. The solutions studied are dynamic stochastic equilibria in the sense that time and uncertainty are explicitly modeled, expectations are rational, private gains from trade are exploited and the actions taken by all agents are mutually consistent. A number of alternative wage determination mechanisms are explored, including the frequently studied non-cooperative wage bargaining and wage posting by firms. We use the framework to study the influence of alternative labor market institutions and policies on wages and unemployment.

New Developments in Models of Search in the Labour Market

Post‐World War II European welfare states experienced several decades of relatively low unemployment, followed by a plague of persistently high unemployment since the 1980s. We impute the higher unemployment to welfare states' diminished ability to cope with more turbulent economic times, such as the ongoing restructuring from manufacturing to the service industry, adoption of new information technologies, and a rapidly changing international economy. We use a general equilibrium search model in which workers accumulate skills on the job and lose skills during unemployment.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/250020

The European unemployment dilemma

This paper develops a simple model of macroeconomic behavior which incorporates the impact of financial market "imperfections," such as those generated by asymmetric information in financial markets. These information asymmetries may lead to breakdowns in markets, like that for equity, in which risks arm shared. In particular, we analyze firm behavior in the presence of equity rationing and imperfect futures markets, in which there are lags in production. Aft a consequence, firms act in a risk-averse manner. We trace out the macroeconomic consequences, and show that they are able to account for many of the widely observed aspects of actual business cycles.

Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles

This book provides an accessible, balanced account of the insider-outsider theory of labor market activity. It focuses on how "insiders" (incumbent employees whose jobs are protected by various labor turnover costs) get market power, what they do with that power, and how their activities affect the "outsiders" (who are either unemployed or work in the informal sector). The book examines the effects of insiders' activities on wages, employment, and unemployment; discusses the associated policy implications; and relates the insider-outsider theory to other theories of labor market activity.The central part of the book consists of a series of previously published articles that have been edited to convey a single coherent account of the insider-outsider theory. Chapters are preceded by overviews summarizing the main ideas and relating them to the book's underlying theme.Assar Lindbeck is Professor of International Economics and Director of the Institute of International Economics at the University of Stockholm. Dennis J. Snower is Professor of Economics, Birkbeck College, University of London.

David G. Blanchflower

Papers

The insider-outsider theory of employment and unemployment