The article tries to prove that the famous formula ”epekeina tês ousias” (R.509b8) has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We hereby make three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, showing that self-predication of the form of the Good, or of any form, is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an “ens imaginarium” and a “chimaera” to Plato’s Idea of the Good. Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-116007 Published Version Originally published at: Ferber, Rafael; Damschen, Gregor (2015). Is the Idea of the Good Beyond Being? Plato’s ”epekeina tês ousias” revisited (Republic, 6, 509b8-10). In: Nails, Debra; Harold, Tarrant; Kajava, Mika; Salmenkivi, Eero. Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato. Espoo: Wellprint Oy, 197-203. Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum 132 2015 SECOND SAILING: Alternative Perspectives on Plato Edited by Debra Nails and Harold Tarrant in Collaboration with Mika Kajava and Eero Salmenkivi Societas Scientiarum Fennica The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters Commentationes Humanarun Litterarum is part of the publishing cooperation between the Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters and the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters ISSN 0069-6587 ISBN 978-951-653-409-4 Copyright © 2015 by Societas Scientiarum Fennica Layout by Maija Holappa Printed by Wellprint Oy, Espoo 2015

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Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato

The Stoics on Virtue and Happiness

This dissertation is a study of appetite in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus. In recent research is it often suggested that Plato considers appetite (i) to pertain to the essential needs of the body, (ii) to relate to a distinct set of objects, e.g. food or drink, and (iii) to cause behaviour aiming at sensory pleasure. Exploring how the notion of appetite, directly and indirectly, connects with Plato’s other purposes in these dialogues, this dissertation sets out to evaluate these ideas. By asking, and answering, three philosophically and interpretatively crucial questions, individually linked to the arguments of the dialogues, this thesis aims to show (i) that the relationship between appetite and the body is not a matter of survival, and that appetite is better understood in terms of excess; (ii) that appetite is multiform and cannot be defined in terms of a distinct set of objects; and (iii) that appetite, in Plato, can also pertain to non-sensory objects, such as articulated discourse.Chapter one asks what the universe can teach us about embodied life. It argues that Plato, in the Timaeus, works with an important link between the universe and the soul, and that the account of disorder, irrationality and multiformity identifying a pre-cosmic condition of the universe provides a key to understanding the excessive behaviour and condition of a soul dominated by appetite.Chapter two asks why the philosophers of the Republic’s Kallipolis return to the cave, and suggests that Plato’s notion of the noble lie provides a reasonable account of this. By exploring the Republic’s ideas of education, poetry and tradition, it argues that appetite – a multiform and appearance oriented source of motivation – is an essential part of this account.Chapter three asks why Socrates characterizes the speeches of the Phaedrus as deceptive games. It proposes that this question should be understood in the light of two distinctions: one between playful and serious discourse and one between simple and multiform. It argues that the speeches of the Phaedrus are multiform games, and suggests that appetite is the primary source of motivation of the soul addressed, personified by Phaedrus.

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A Multiform Desire A Study of Appetite in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus

Plotinus is the first Greek philosopher to hold a systematic theory of consciousness. The key feature of his theory is that it involves multiple layers of experience: different layers of consciousness occur in different levels of self. This layering of higher modes of consciousness on lower ones provides human beings with a rich experiential world, and enables human beings to draw on their own experience to investigate their true self and the nature of reality. This involves a robust notion of subjectivity. However, it is a notion of subjectivity that is unique to Plotinus, and remarkably different from the Post-Cartesian tradition. Behind the plurality of terms Plotinus uses to express consciousness, and behind the plurality of entities to which Plotinus attributes consciousness (such as the divine souls and the hypostases), lies a theory of human consciousness. It is a Platonist theory shaped by engagement with rival schools of ancient thought.

Plotinus on Consciousness

in the tripartite psychology of the Republic, Plato characterizes the “spirited” part of the soul as the “ally of reason”: like the auxiliaries of the just city, whose distinctive job is to support the policies and judgments passed down by the rulers, spirit’s distinctive “job” in the soul is to support and defend the practical decisions and commands of the reasoning part. This is to include not only defense against external enemies who might interfere with those commands, but also, and most importantly, defense against unruly appetites within the individual’s own soul. 1 Spirit, according to this picture, is by nature reason’s faithful auxiliary in the soul, while appetite is always a potential enemy to be watched over and guarded against. i n the Timaeus, the spirited part of the soul—or “the part which shares in courage and spirited anger,” as Timaeus refers to it—is once again depicted as having a supportive relationship with the reasoning part. Timaeus describes it as being “naturally superior” to the appetitive part, and he explains that the gods placed it in the chest, near the head (the bodily location of the reasoning part), so that it would be able to “hear” the reports and commands issued by the reasoning part, and so that it might help reason restrain the appetitive part if the latter should become unruly (69e–70b). There are two noteworthy features of Timaeus’s characterization. First, it is clear that some sort of intra-psychic “communication” takes place between the reasoning and spirited parts of the soul. i n order to respond to the reports and commands of reason, spirit must first in some sense understand them (‘understand’ here carrying no specific theoretical weight yet). Through what psychological mechanism does this communication occur, however? While recent commentators have provided some illuminating discussions of intra-psychic communication in the Timaeus, those discussions have focused overwhelmingly on the question how reason communicates with appetite (a topic that the dialogue itself treats in somewhat

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The Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato's Timaeus

The contributions to this volume focus on various forms of revival of Platonism in ancient philosophy. Particular attention is paid to the topics of unity and beauty, intellect and knowledge, soul and body, virtue and happiness as well as to political and religious dimensions of Plato's legacy. The book testifies to the extraordinary capacity of the basic tenets of Platonism for renewal and transformation.

Plato revived : essays on ancient Platonism in honour of Dominic J. O'Meara

What the Mortal Parts of the Soul Really Are

En critiquant les gnostiques, Plotin s’est indigne de l’idee que l’univers sensible puisse etre un produit issu d’une deliberation et d’une action artisanale. C’est un fait pourtant que Platon, dans le Timee, presente le demiurge – «  fabriquant et pere de cet univers» – comme un dieu qui delibere et qui procede a la formation de son œuvre en veritable artisan. Un acte de raisonnement precede constamment son activite de fabrication. Dans une formulation remarquable, Timee dit que c’est le rai...

Filip Karfík

Papers

Plato revived : essays on ancient Platonism in honour of Dominic J. O'Meara

What the Mortal Parts of the Soul Really Are

Que fait et qui est le démiurge dans le Timée

Plato's Phaedo : proceedings of the Second Symposium Platonicum Pragense

Plato's Protagoras : proceedings of the Third Symposium Platonicum Pragense