The potential advantages of the market-value approach have long been appreciated; yet analytical results have been meager. What appears to be keeping this line of development from achieving its promise is largely the lack of an adequate theory of the effect of financial structure on market valuations, and of how these effects can be inferred from objective market data. It is with the development of such a theory and of its implications for the cost-of-capital problem that we shall be concerned in this paper. Our procedure will be to develop in Section I the basic theory itself and to give some brief account of its empirical relevance. In Section II we show how the theory can be used to answer the cost-of-capital questions and how it permits us to develop a theory of investment of the firm under conditions of uncertainty. Throughout these sections the approach is essentially a partial-equilibrium one focusing on the firm and "industry". Accordingly, the "prices" of certain income streams will be treated as constant and given from outside the model, just as in the standard Marshallian analysis of the firm and industry the prices of all inputs and of all other products are taken as given. We have chosen to focus at this level rather than on the economy as a whole because it is at firm and the industry that the interests of the various specialists concerned with the cost-of-capital problem come most closely together. Although the emphasis has thus been placed on partial-equilibrium analysis, the results obtained also provide the essential building block for a general equilibrium model which shows how those prices which are here taken as given, are themselves determined. For reasons of space, however, and because the material is of interest in its own right, the presentation of the general equilibrium model which rounds out the analysis must be deferred to a subsequent paper.

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The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment

Research in experimental psychology suggests that, in violation of Bayes' rule, most people tend to "overreact" to unexpected and dramatic news events. This study of market efficiency investigates whether such behavior affects stock prices. The empirical evidence, based on CRSP monthly return data, is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Substantial weak form market inefficiencies are discovered. The results also shed new light on the January returns earned by prior "winners" and "losers." Portfolios of losers experience exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after portfolio formation. As ECONOMISTS INTERESTED IN both market behavior and the psychology of individual decision making, we have been struck by the similarity of two sets of empirical findings. Both classes of behavior can be characterized as displaying overreaction. This study was undertaken to investigate the possibility that these phenomena are related by more than just appearance. We begin by describing briefly the individual and market behavior that piqued our interest. The term overreaction carries with it an implicit comparison to some degree of reaction that is considered to be appropriate. What is an appropriate reaction? One class,,of tasks which have a well-established norm are probability revision problems for which Bayes' rule prescribes the correct reaction to new information. It has now been well-established that Bayes' rule is not an apt characterization of how individuals actually respond to new data (Kahneman et al. [14]). In revising their beliefs, individuals tend to overweight recent information and underweight prior (or base rate) data. People seem to make predictions according to a simple matching rule: "The predicted value is selected so that the standing of the case in the distribution of outcomes matches its standing in the distribution of impressions" (Kahneman and Tversky [14, p. 416]). This rule-of-thumb, an instance of what Kahneman and Tversky call the representativeness heuristic, violates the basic statistical principal that the extremeness of predictions must be moderated by considerations of predictability. Grether [12] has replicated this finding under incentive compatible conditions. There is also considerable evidence that the actual expectations of professional security analysts and economic forecasters display the same overreaction bias (for a review, see De Bondt [7]). One of the earliest observations about overreaction in markets was made by J. M. Keynes:"... day-to-day fluctuations in the profits of existing investments,

/pdf/does-the-stock-market-overreact-3jczd3xcx2.pdf

Does the Stock Market Overreact

In the hope that it may help to overcome these obstacles to effective empirical testing, this paper will attempt to fill the existing gap in the theoretical literature on valuation. We shall begin, in Section I , by examining the effects the effects of differences in dividend policy on the current price of shares in an ideal economy characterized by perfect capital markets, rational behavior, and perfect certainty. Still within this convenient analytical framework we shall go on in Section II and III to consider certain closely related issues that appear to have been responsible for considerable misunderstanding of the role of dividend policy. In particular, Section II will focus on the longstanding debate about what investors "really" capitalize when they buy shares; and Section III on the much mooted relations between price, the rate of growth of profits, and the rate of dividends per share. Once these fundamentals have been established, we shall proceed in Section IV to drop the assumption of certainty and to see the extent to which the earlier conclusions about dividend policy must be modified. Finally, in Section V , we shall briefly examine the implications for the dividend policy problem of certain kinds of market imperfections.

/pdf/dividend-policy-growth-and-the-valuation-of-shares-3rg3wfs2am.pdf

Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares

THE THEORY OF investor behavior in a world of uncertainty has been set out by several writers including Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (Feb. 1965). A key assumption of the now standard capital asset model is what Sharpe calls homothetic expectations. All investors are assumed to have identical estimates of the expected return and probability distribution of return from all securities. However, it is implausible to assume that although the future is very uncertain, and forecasts are very difficult to make, that somehow everyone makes identical estimates of the return and risk from every security. In practice, the very concept of uncertainty implies that reasonable men may differ in their forecasts. This paper will explore some of the implications of a market with restricted short selling in which investors have differing estimates of the returns from investing in a risky security.' Explanations will be offered for the very low returns on the stocks in the highest risk classes, the poor long run results on new issues of stocks, the presence of discounts from net value for closed end investment companies, and the lower than predicted rates of return for stocks with high systematic risk.

http://www.efalken.com/LowVolClassics/MillerEd1977.pdf

Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion

Consider a common stock that pays dividends at a discrete sequence of future times: t = 1,2, Taking all other prices and the random process that determines future dividends as exogenously given, we can ask what will be the price ofthe stock? In a world with a complete set of contingency claims markets, in which every investor can buy and sell without restriction, the answer is given by arbitrage. Let dtixt) denote the dividend that will be paid at time t if contingency Xj prevails, and let Ptixt) denote the current {t = 0) price ofa one dollar claim payable at time t if contingency Xt prevails. Then the current stock price must be 2(2;t,i3t(x«)dt(xf). Furthermore, in such a world it makes no difference whether markets reopen after initial trading. If markets were to reopen, investors would be content to maintain the positions they obtained initially (cf. Arrow, 1968). The situation becomes more complicated if markets are imperfect or incomplete or both. Ownership ofthe stock implies not only ownership of a dividend stream but also the right to sell that dividend stream at a future date. Investors may be unable initially to achieve positions with which they will be forever content, and thus the current stock price may be affected by whether or not markets will reopen in the future. If they do reopen, a speculative phenomenon may appear. An investor may buy the stock now so as to sell it later for more than he thinks it is actually worth, thereby reaping capital gains. This possibility of speculative profits will then be reflected in the current price. Keynes (1931, Ch. 12) attributes primary importance to this phenomenon (and goes on to suggest that it might be better if markets never reopened).

https://ms.mcmaster.ca/~grasselli/HarrisonKreps78.pdf

John Burr Williams

Papers

The Theory of Investment Value.