This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.

A Survey of Corporate Governance

This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEALS WITH the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. But this does not imply that they have solved the corporate governance problem perfectly, or that the corporate governance mechanisms cannot be improved. In fact, the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical impor

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There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequality aversion the puzzles can be resolved.

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A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets (JEL C78, C90, D63, D64, H41)

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ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition

This paper reviews the literature on gender differences in economic experiments. In the three main sections, we identify robust differences in risk preferences, social (other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences. We also speculate on the source of these differences, as well as on their implications. Our hope is that this article will serve as a resource for those seeking to understand gender differences and to use as a starting point to illuminate the debate on gender-specific outcomes in the labor and goods markets.

/pdf/gender-differences-in-preferences-1wffy691ko.pdf

Gender Differences in Preferences

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitivemarkets butnot inbilateral bargainingsituations. Thereisalsostrong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior.

/pdf/a-theory-of-fairness-competition-and-cooperation-20ykvpovfq.pdf

A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation

are imperfectly competitive, Leibenstein (1966) claims that there may be a substantial amount of "X-inefficiency", where X-inefficiency measures the degree to which actual profits depart from the maximum of profits that could be obtained if all operations in the firm were carried out at minimal costs. He offers empirical evidence from case studies showing that the welfare loss due to organizational slack is of an order of magnitude bigger than the welfare loss due to monopolistic price distortions on imperfectly competitive markets.' These results support the common presumption that increasing competition reduces organizational and in particular managerial slack. However, this early literature does not offer a theoretical explanation for the link between competition and managerial incentives. In particular, it ignores the fact that managerial incentives can be affected by the design of an incentive scheme. In this paper I derive the optimal incentive scheme for a manager as a function of the competitiveness of the environment in which his firm operates. The basic impact of increased competition is that it reduces the profits of a firm. This has two effects in the model. First, if a firm has high costs, then the reduction of profits may be sufficient to render the firm unprofitable, so the probability that it has to be liquidated goes up. This unambiguously induces the manager of the firm to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and to keep his job. Second, the reduction in profits may affect

Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that material self-interest exclusively motivates all people. Experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence in recent years, however, that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis, suggesting that concerns for altruism, fairness, and reciprocity strongly motivate many people. Moreover, several theoretical papers demonstrate that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories then induced a first wave of experimental research which offered exciting insights into both the nature of preferences and the relative performance of competing fairness theories. The purpose of this chapter is to review these developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research. We also discuss recent neuroeconomic evidence that is consistent with the view that many people have a taste for mutual cooperation and the punishment of norm violators. We further illustrate the powerful impact of fairness concerns on cooperation, competition, incentives, and contract design.

https://www.et.econ.uni-muenchen.de/personen/professor/schmidt/publikationen/papers/reciprocalt.pdf

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories.

The paper shows that an increase in competition has two effects on managerial incentives: it increases the probability of liquidation, which has a positive effect on managerial effort, but it also reduces the firm’s profits, which may make it less attractive to induce high effort. Thus, the total effect is ambiguous. The paper identifies natural circumstances where increased competition unambiguously reduces managerial slack. In general, however, this relation need not be monotonic. A simple example demonstrates that – starting from a monopoly – managerial effort may increase as additional competitors enter the market, but will eventually decrease when competition becomes too intense.

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research.

http://web.mit.edu/14.193/www/WorldCongress-IEW-Version6Oct03.pdf

Klaus M. Schmidt

Papers

A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation

Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories.

Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications