From aphasics' self records, common experience, changes in signification of sentences according to a verbal or non-verbal context, animals and non speaking children performances, it seems possible to get some evidence that thought is distinct from language even though there is a permanent interaction between both in normal adult human beings. Some considerations on formalisation of language suggests that the more formalised it is, the less information it contains. If it is true, it is not reasonable to hope that a formalised language like that used by computers may be a model for thought. Finally, the lack of status of thought, as far as it is a subjective experience and the impossibility of giving it a definition as far as it exceeds language, make it clear that in spite of progress in scientific psychology, thought, per se, is not an object for science.

https://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/bn/1992/584264.pdf

Thought and language

Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

'Without symbolism the life of man would be like that of the prisoners in the cave of Plato's simile…confined within the limits of his biological needs and practical interests; it could find no access to the "ideal world" which is opened to him from different sides by religion, art, philosophy, science.' Ernst Cassirer 1 ABSTRACT I begin by outlining some of the positions that have been taken by those who have reflected upon the nature of language. In his early work Wittgenstein asserts that language becomes meaningful when we tacitly adhere to the rules of logic. In his later work he claims that lan- guages become meaningful when they are situated within forms of life. Polanyi describes language as a toolbox for deploying our tacit awareness. A meaning is generated when a point of view attends from a subsidiary to a focal awareness. Languages re-present these meanings. Although all languages rely upon rules, what it is to be a meaning is not reduc- ible to rules. Nor is there a universal grammar. Because it renders abstract reflection possi- ble, language renders minds possible. A mind is not the product of an innate language of thought; it is a consequence of indwelling within a natural language. Indwelling within languages enables us to access new realities. Languages however do not supply us with the boundaries of the world. Not only do we know more than we can say, we can also say more than we know. The ultimate context of our linguistic meanings is not our social practices; it is our embodied awareness of the world. A representationalist account is in accordance with the view that minds are Turing machines. But the symbols processed by a Turing ma- chine derive their meaning from the agents that use them to achieve their purposes. Only if the processing of symbolic representations is related to the tacit context within which they become meaningful, does a semantic engine becomes possible.

The Tacit Dimension

How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand and predict.These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. "The Intentional Stance" brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters - its first and the final three - appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection - an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind.Daniel C. Dennett is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor at Tufts University and the author of "Brainstorms" and "Elbow Room." "The Intentional Stance," along with these works, is a Bradford Book.

The Intentional Stance

IA. Cause and Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465 1.2. Prerequisites of Selforganization . . . . . . . 467 1.2.3. Evolut ion Must S ta r t f rom R andom Even ts 467 1.2.2. Ins t ruc t ion Requires In format ion . . . . 467 1.2.3. In format ion Originates or Gains Value by S e l e c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469 1.2.4. Selection Occurs wi th Special Substances under Special Conditions . . . . . . . . 470

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Selforganization of matter and the evolution of biological macromolecules

The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus first appeared in 1921 and was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme compression and brilliance, it immediately convinced many of its readers and captured the imagination of all. Its chief influence, at first, was on the Logical Positivists of the 1920s and 1930s, but many other philosophers were stimulated by its philosophy of language, finding attractive, even if ultimately unsatisfactory, its view that propositions were pictures of reality. Perhaps most of all, its own author, after his return to philosophy in the late 1920s, was fascinated by its vision of an inexpressible, crystalline world of logical relationships. C.K. Ogden's translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has a unique provenance. As revealed in Letters of C.K. Ogden (1973) and in correspondence in The Times Literary Supplement, Wittgenstein, Ramsey and Moore all worked with Ogden on the translation, which had Wittgenstein's complete approval. The very name Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was of Ogden's devising; and there is very strong feeling among philosophers that, among the differing translations of this work, Ogden's is the definitive text - and Wittgenstein's version of the English equivalent of his Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

The Blue and Brown Books

Philosophical investigations = Philosophische Untersuchungen

Culture and value are the essential concerns of these remarks, hitherto available only in German as "Vermischte Bemerkungen." Although the passages date from various periods of Wittgenstein's life, over half were written during his later years, and this edition adds material probably written in 1944. The German text is presented alongside the English translation by Peter Winch, and all entries are presented chronologically, with a subject index for reference.

Culture and Value

Wittgenstein's work remains, undeniably, now, that off one of those few philosophers who will be read by all future generations.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Papers

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

The Blue and Brown Books

Philosophical investigations = Philosophische Untersuchungen

Culture and Value

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics