https://www.sfu.ca/~wainwrig/Econ400/jensen-meckling.pdf

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

/pdf/the-iron-cage-revisited-institutional-isomorphism-and-xas5qn5nhy.pdf

The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields

Scholars in various disciplines have considered the causes, nature, and effects of trust. Prior approaches to studying trust are considered, including characteristics of the trustor, the trustee, and the role of risk. A definition of trust and a model of its antecedents and outcomes are presented, which integrate research from multiple disciplines and differentiate trust from similar constructs. Several research propositions based on the model are presented.

/pdf/an-integrative-model-of-organizational-trust-2xzw1trbi7.pdf

An Integrative Model Of Organizational Trust

This paper considers the relation between the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties in organizational learning. It examines some complications in allocating resources between the two, particularly those introduced by the distribution of costs and benefits across time and space, and the effects of ecological interaction. Two general situations involving the development and use of knowledge in organizations are modeled. The first is the case of mutual learning between members of an organization and an organizational code. The second is the case of learning and competitive advantage in competition for primacy. The paper develops an argument that adaptive processes, by refining exploitation more rapidly than exploration, are likely to become effective in the short run but self-destructive in the long run. The possibility that certain common organizational practices ameliorate that tendency is assessed.

http://strategy.sjsu.edu/www.stable/pdf/March,%20J.%20G.%20%281991%29.%20Organization%20Science%202%281%29%2071-87.pdf

Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning

This article synthesizes the large but diverse literature on organizational legitimacy, highlighting similarities and disparities among the leading strategic and institutional approaches. The analysis identifies three primary forms of legitimacy: pragmatic, based on audience self-interest; moral, based on normative approval: and cognitive, based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness. The article then examines strategies for gaining, maintaining, and repairing legitimacy of each type, suggesting both the promises and the pitfalls of such instrumental manipulations.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/258788.pdf

Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches

List of Tables and Figures. Acknowledgements. Preface to Second Edition. 1. Introduction. 2. Antecedents of the Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 3. Organizational Goals. 4. Organizational Expectations. 5. Organizational Choice. 6. A Specific Price and Output Model. 7. A Summary of Basic Concepts in the Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 8. Some Implications. 9. An Epilogue. Index.

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.

Provides a theory of decision making within business organizations. Contrary to the economic theory of the firm, which sees firms as profit-maximizing entities, the authors advocate a theory based on empirical observation of actual firm decision-making. Various features of firm decision-making are identified. First, firms are coalitions of participants whose individual goals may and often do conflict. How this conflict is resolved is determined by the firm's bargaining process. This process is constrained by past behavior and decisions. Second, the authors reject the notion that firms are one-dimensional profit-maximizers in favor of a view of firms as entities with many different objectives that will accept suboptimal outcomes if they are above a minimum level. Congruent with this, a firm's search activity occurs in response to a perceived problem and is limited in scope. The effect is that firm policies will change only incrementally. Also impeding radical policy change is the fact that firms react to uncertainty using standardized decision rules. Using this theory, two computer models of business decision-making are presented and compared with actual results. These models are shown to have especially good predictive power. (CAR)

Theory of the Firm

The approach in this paper is the development of models that describe the process by which rational expectations may be developed within a market. The concept of Bayesian learning is introduced. Consistent and rational expectations are introduced in models where the firms cannot immediately move to equilibrium. Three different models are developed which demonstrate the interaction of Bayesian learning and expectations in achieving a market equilibrium. These models are dynamic and describe the transition process toward equilibrium. Two of the models involve unknown parameters about which the firms learn. The third is a control theory model explicitly involving adjustment costs.

Richard M. Cyert

Papers

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm

Theory of the Firm

Rational Expectations and Bayesian Analysis