Preparing words in speech production is normally a fast and accurate process. We generate them two or three per second in fluent conversation; and overtly naming a clear picture of an object can easily be initiated within 600 msec after picture onset. The underlying process, however, is exceedingly complex. The theory reviewed in this target article analyzes this process as staged and feed-forward. After a first stage of conceptual preparation, word generation proceeds through lexical selection, morphological and phonological encoding, phonetic encoding, and articulation itself. In addition, the speaker exerts some degree of output control, by monitoring of self-produced internal and overt speech. The core of the theory, ranging from lexical selection to the initiation of phonetic encoding, is captured in a computational model, called WEAVER++. Both the theory and the computational model have been developed in interaction with reaction time experiments, particularly in picture naming or related word production paradigms, with the aim of accounting for the real-time processing in normal word production. A comprehensive review of theory, model, and experiments is presented. The model can handle some of the main observations in the domain of speech errors (the major empirical domain for most other theories of lexical access), and the theory opens new ways of approaching the cerebral organization of speech production by way of high-temporal-resolution imaging.

/pdf/a-theory-of-lexical-access-in-speech-production-4daokag4lw.pdf

A theory of lexical access in speech production.

https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/5/110/206.full.pdf

The american psychological association.

People often have trouble performing 2 relatively simple tasks concurrently. The causes of this interference and its implications for the nature of attentional limitations have been controversial for 40 years, but recent experimental findings are beginning to provide some answers. Studies of the psychological refractory period effect indicate a stubborn bottleneck encompassing the process of choosing actions and probably memory retrieval generally, together with certain other cognitive operations. Other limitations associated with task preparation, sensory-perceptual processes, and timing can generate additional and distinct forms of interference. These conclusions challenge widely accepted ideas about attentional resources and probe reaction time methodologies. They also suggest new ways of thinking about continuous dual-task performance, effects of extraneous stimulation (e.g., stop signals), and automaticity. Implications for higher mental processes are discussed.

https://psycnet.apa.org/journals/bul/116/2/220.pdf

Dual-task interference in simple tasks: Data and theory.

Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes – cognitive structures we call event codes We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X01000103

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): a framework for perception and action planning.

Adaptive control of thought–rational (ACT–R; J. R. Anderson & C. Lebiere, 1998) has evolved into a theory that consists of multiple modules but also explains how these modules are integrated to produce coherent cognition. The perceptual-motor modules, the goal module, and the declarative memory module are presented as examples of specialized systems in ACT–R. These modules are associated with distinct cortical regions. These modules place chunks in buffers where they can be detected by a production system that responds to patterns of information in the buffers. At any point in time, a single production rule is selected to respond to the current pattern. Subsymbolic processes serve to guide the selection of rules to fire as well as the internal operations of some modules. Much of learning involves tuning of these subsymbolic processes. A number of simple and complex empirical examples are described to illustrate how these modules function singly and in concert.

/pdf/an-integrated-theory-of-the-mind-5crf0wt8go.pdf

An Integrated Theory of the Mind.

Quantitative theories with free parameters often gain credence when they closely fit data. This is a mistake. A good fit reveals nothing about the flexibility of the theory (how much it cannot fit), the variability of the data (how firmly the data rule out what the theory cannot fit), or the likelihood of other outcomes (perhaps the theory could have fit any plausible result), and a reader needs all 3 pieces of information to decide how much the fit should increase belief in the theory. The use of good fits as evidence is not supported by philosophers of science nor by the history of psychology; there seem to be no examples of a theory supported mainly by good fits that has led to demonstrable progress. A better way to test a theory with free parameters is to determine how the theory constrains possible outcomes (i.e., what it predicts), assess how firmly actual outcomes agree with those constraints, and determine if plausible alternative outcomes would have been inconsistent with the theory, allowing for the variability of the data.

/pdf/how-persuasive-is-a-good-fit-a-comment-on-theory-testing-1j5orwswq6.pdf

How persuasive is a good fit? A comment on theory testing.

Isolation of an internal clock.

Three experiments were conducted to determine the effect of methamphetamine on the performance of rats in two timing tasks. When food sometimes followed the first response after T sec of a signal, the response rate increased to a peak near T sec and then declined. Methamphetamine decreased the time of the peak (Experiments 1 and 2). When one response (called a "short response") was reinforced following a short signal and a different response (a "long response") was reinforced following a long signal (where the short and long signals were 1 and 4, 2 and 8, or 4 and 16 sec), the probability of a long response increased as a function of signal duration. The point of indifference (50% long response) occurred near the geometric mean of the extreme durations, and methamphetamine decreased the point of indifference by about 10%. These results suggest that methamphetamine increases the speed of an internal clock used by rats in time discrimination tasks.

Seth Roberts

Papers

How persuasive is a good fit? A comment on theory testing.

Isolation of an internal clock.

Methamphetamine and time estimation.

Control of an internal clock.

The meaning of additive reaction-time effects: tests of three alternatives