https://www.sfu.ca/~wainwrig/Econ400/jensen-meckling.pdf

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

/pdf/the-iron-cage-revisited-institutional-isomorphism-and-xas5qn5nhy.pdf

The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields

Many formal organizational structures arise as reflections of rationalized institutional rules. The elaboration of such rules in modern states and societies accounts in part for the expansion and i...

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2778293.pdf

Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony

Relationship marketing—establishing, developing, and maintaining successful relational exchanges—constitutes a major shift in marketing theory and practice. After conceptualizing relationship marke...

The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing

Scholars in various disciplines have considered the causes, nature, and effects of trust. Prior approaches to studying trust are considered, including characteristics of the trustor, the trustee, and the role of risk. A definition of trust and a model of its antecedents and outcomes are presented, which integrate research from multiple disciplines and differentiate trust from similar constructs. Several research propositions based on the model are presented.

/pdf/an-integrative-model-of-organizational-trust-2xzw1trbi7.pdf

An Integrative Model Of Organizational Trust

Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.

Evaluating organizations according to an efficiency criterion would make it possible to predict the form organizations will take under certain conditions. Organization theory has not developed such a criterion because it has lacked a conceptual scheme capable of describing organizational efficiency in sufficiently microsopic terms. The transactions cost approach provides such a framework because it allows us to identify the conditions which give rise to the costs of mediating exchanges between individuals: goal incongruence and performance ambiguity. Different combinations of these causes distinguish three basic mechanisms of mediation or control: markets, which are efficient when performance ambiguity is low and goal incongruence is high; bureaucracies, which are efficient when both goal incongruence and performance ambiguity are moderately high; and clans, which are efficient when goal incongruence is low and performance ambiguity is high.

/pdf/markets-bureaucracies-and-clans-33mc78jd5t.pdf

Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans.

The problem of organization is the problem of obtaining cooperation among a collection of individuals or units who share only partially congruent objectives. When a team of individuals collectively produces a single output, there develops the problem of how to distribute the rewards emanating from that output in such a manner that each team member is equitably rewarded. If equitable rewards are not forthcoming, members will, in future cooperative ventures, adjust their efforts in such a manner that all will be somewhat worse off cf. Simon [Simon, H. A. 1964. On the concept of organizational goal. Admin. Sci. Quart.9 1, June 1--22.], Marschak [Marschak, Thomas A. 1965. Economic theories of organization. J. G. March, ed. Handbook of Organizations. Rand McNally, Chicago, Ill., 423--450.], Alchian and Demsetz [Alchian, Armen A., Harold Demsetz. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. Amer. Econom. Rev.62 777--795..

It is the objective of this paper to describe three fundamentally different mechanisms through which organizations can seek to cope with this problem of evaluation and control. The three will be referred to as markets, bureaucracies, and clans. In a fundamental sense, markets deal with the control problem through their ability to precisely measure and reward individual contributions; bureaucracies rely instead upon a mixture of close evaluation with a socialized acceptance of common objectives; and clans rely upon a relatively complete socialization process which effectively eliminates goal incongruence between individuals. This paper explores the organizational manifestations of these three approaches to the problem of control.

The paper begins with an example from a parts distribution division of a major company which serves to give some flesh to what might otherwise be overly-abstract arguments. Through the example, each of the three mechanisms is explicated briefly and discussed in terms of two prerequisite conditions, one social and the other informational. The more concrete organization design features of the three forms are considered, along with some consideration of the unique costs accompanying each form.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2630236.pdf

A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms

Proposes a new form of business management that focuses on long-range planning, strong corporate philosophy, and concensus decision-making to help American corporations meet the challenge of Japan.

William G. Ouchi

Papers

Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.

Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans.

A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms

Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge.

Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge