The difficulty in defining a field for the so-called institutional economics is the uncertainty of meaning of an institution. Sometimes an institution seems to mean a framework of laws or natural rights within which individuals act like inmates. Sometimes it seems to mean the behavior of the inmates themselves. Sometimes anything additional to or critical of the classical or hedonic economics is deemed to be institutional. Sometimes anything that is "economic behavior" is institutional. Sometimes anything that is "dynamic" instead of "static," or a "process" instead of commodities, or activity instead of feelings, or mass action instead of individual action, or management instead of equilibrium, or control instead of laissez faire, seems to be institutional economics.

On Institutional Economics

dann zu seinem Gegenstand, der Selbstorganisation in der evolutorischen Ökonomik, zu gelangen (S. 256 ff.). Er vermutet, dass schon Adam Smith den Grundgedanken des Paradigmas „unsichtbaren Hand“ vorweggenommen habe (ebenda). Etwas verwirrend dürfte die Unterscheidung des Autors zwischen Mikround Makroebene sein (S. 257), wenn der Leser an die herkömmlichen Kategorien denkt. Gemeint sind vom Autor die einzelwirtschaftliche und die Ebene des Marktprozesses. Damit dürften die ungeplanten Ergebnisse auf der Marktprozessebene und die nicht intendierten Handlungsfolgen (wiederum bezogen auf die Marktebene) verständlicher werden. Später (S. 254) weist der Autor auf einen bedeutenden Unterschied zwischen der physikalischen und ökonomischen Selbstorganisation hin. Im ersten Fall sind die Systemelemente passiv, währen sie im zweiten Fall initiativ und mit Erwartungen sowie Absichten ausgestattet sind. Die beiden Fälle beschreiben das, was Hayek mit der Unterscheidung von geplanter und ungeplanter oder spontaner Ordnung meint. Für ihn dürfte die ungeplante Ordnung ein Phänomen der Selbstorganisation sein, während die geplante Ordnung ein Produkt der Fremdorganisation wäre. Abschließend kommt der Autor zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Übertragung des betrachteten Paradigmas auf die evolutorische Ökonomik sowohl nach Anwendungsbereich als auch nach Erkenntnisgewinn bescheiden bleibt (S. 260). Das dürfte, gemessen an der ebenfalls der klassischen Physik (Mechanik) entlehnten Neoklassik bescheiden sein. Es kann jedoch auch als Aufforderung angesehen werden, weiterzusuchen, ohne die zentralen Phänomene der Neuerung und Entwicklung aus dem Auge zu verlieren.

Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History

States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China.

Introduction: modernising sistema 1. What is sistema? 2. Putin's sistema: svoi on top 3. The inner workings of sistema: from blat to otkat 4. Sistema's material culture: from vertushka to Vertu 5. 'Telephone justice' in the global age: from commands to signals 6. 'Werewolves in epaulets': from doublethink to doubledeed 7. From dealership to leadership: sistema and informal governance Conclusion.

Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance

Research Question/Issue - Which forms of state control over corporations have emerged in countries that made a transition from centrally-planned to marked-based economies and what are their implications for corporate governance? We assess the literature on variation and evolution of state control in transition economies, focusing on corporate governance of state-controlled firms. We highlight emerging trends and identify future research avenues. Research Findings/Insights - Based on our analysis of more than 100 articles in leading management, finance, and economics journals since 1989, we demonstrate how research on state control evolved from a polarized approach of public–private equity ownership comparison to studying a variety of constellations of state capitalism. Theoretical/Academic Implications - We identify theoretical perspectives that help us better understand benefits and costs associated with various forms of state control over firms. We encourage future studies to examine how context-specific factors determine the effect of state control on corporate governance. Practitioner/Policy Implications - Investors and policymakers should consider under which conditions investing in state-affiliated firms generates superior returns.

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State Control and Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: 25 Years on from 1989

Preface INTRODUCTION Emergence of Russian Corporations: from the Soviet Enterprise to a Market Firm PART I: OWNERSHIP, INTERNAL CONTROL, AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Stock Ownership and Corporate Control Legal Form of Incorporation Structure of Corporate Boards Impacts of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance on Managerial Turnover Managerial Teams and Firm Restructuring PART II: BUSINESS INTEGRATION AND ITS IMPACT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Organizational Patterns of Corporate Control and Business Integration Corporate Governance and Decision-Making in Business Groups Impact of Business Integration on Corporate Restructuring and Performance PART III: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE The Banking Sector and Corporate Finance Business Associations: Incentives and Benefits from the Viewpoint Of Corporate Governance State-Business Relationship and Improvement of Corporate Governance CONCLUSIONS Appendix: Outline of the Joint Enterprise Survey

Organization and Development of Russian Business: A Firm-Level Analysis

Suitcase Trade Between Turkey and Russia: Microeconomics and Institutional Structure

Empirical analysis of suppliers’ non-performance risks in execution of public procurement contracts in Russia.

The recent uprisings in the Middle East have cast doubt on the degree to which existing theories of autocracy can correctly identify which groups threaten the autocrats rule at any given time. As a result, these theories are unable to predict fundamental upheavals in established autocracies. Who is the biggest threat to the autocrat, though, the elite or the populations as a whole? In this paper, we evaluate how autocrats respond to perceived threats from the population and elites. We advance the argument that elites with autonomous power resources – economic assets, connections to regional elite networks, etc. – and swing voters, who are easily co-opted to cause problems for the regime, are likely perceived as the greatest threats. We also argue that to the extent that economic growth generates support for the incumbent, in this case the autocrat, actors in areas with high growth will, all else equal, be perceived as posing less of a threat to the autocrat than those in slow growth areas. We assume autocrats put their money where their mouths are and test our argument using the combination of data on federal-regional transfers in the Russian federation between 2001 and 2008 and a novel dataset of regional executive level characteristics. We find limited support for our arguments. On the one hand, transfers do go to politically powerful governors, while growth diminishes the impact of measures of voters preferences on transfers. On the other hand, we find evidence that transfers were aimed towards core, not swing voters, and that powerful regional elites tended to get more transfers, not less, in fast growing regions.

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From Competition to Dominance: Political Determinations of Federal Transfers in Russian Federation

Understanding how Public Service Motivation (PSM) is tied to ethical or unethical behavior is critically important, given that civil servants and other public sector employees throughout the world have been shown to exhibit high PSM levels. However, empirical evidence about the relationship between PSM and ethical conduct remains limited, due in part to the challenges of observing illicit behaviors and overcoming social desirability bias in self-reported measures. The researchers address these challenges by employing incentivized experimental games to study the relationships between PSM and altruism, dishonesty, and propensity to engage in corruption. Based on data from approximately 1870 university students at three research sites in Russia and Ukraine, they find evidence of a robust positive association between PSM and altruistic behavior and negative association between PSM and willingness to engage in corruption. Results concerning dishonesty are more mixed. The researchers’ extension of the study of PSM to Russia and Ukraine, two countries that consistently rank poorly on international corruption indicators, additionally offers the opportunity to analyze the role of PSM in a context in which corruption and rule breaking are widespread.

A Yakovlev Andrei

Papers

Organization and Development of Russian Business: A Firm-Level Analysis

Suitcase Trade Between Turkey and Russia: Microeconomics and Institutional Structure

Empirical analysis of suppliers’ non-performance risks in execution of public procurement contracts in Russia.

From Competition to Dominance: Political Determinations of Federal Transfers in Russian Federation

Public Service Motivation as a Predictor of Altruism, Dishonesty, and Corruption