机构投资者作为证券市场中的重要力量,越来越受到理论界和实务界的关注。论文对宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院会计学教授布赖恩-布希（Brian Bushee）的论文＂The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior＂（机构投资者对企业短视研发投资行为的影响,以下简称Bushee（1998））进行评价并提出相关的建议和研究方向。

《The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior》述评

Historically, management theory has ignored the constraints imposed by the biophysical (natural) environment. Building upon resource-based theory, this article attempts to fill this void by proposing a natural-resource-based view of the firm—a theory of competitive advantage based upon the firm's relationship to the natural environment. It is composed of three interconnected strategies: pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable development. Propositions are advanced for each of these strategies regarding key resource requirements and their contributions to sustained competitive advantage.

A natural resource-based view of the firm

A central and contentious debate in many literatures concerns the relationship between financial and social performance. We advance this debate by measuring the financial-social performance link within mutual funds that practice socially responsible investing (SRI). SRI fund managers have an array of social screening strategies from which to choose. Prior studies have not addressed this heterogeneity within SRI funds. Combining modern portfolio and stakeholder theories, we hypothesize that the financial loss borne by an SRI fund due to poor diversification is offset as social screening intensifies because better managed and more stable firms are selected into its portfolio. We find support for this hypothesis through an empirical test on a panel of 61 SRI funds from 1972-2000. The results show that as the number of social screens used by an SRI fund increases, financial returns decline at first, but then rebound as the number of screens reaches a maximum. That is, we find a curvilinear relationship, suggesting that two long-competing viewpoints may be complementary. Furthermore, we find that financial performance varies with the types of social screens used. Community relations screening increased financial performance, but environmental and labor relations screening decreased financial performance. Based on our results, we suggest that literatures addressing the link between financial and social performance move toward in-depth examination of the merits of different social screening strategies, and away from the continuing debate on the financial merits of either being socially responsible or not.

Beyond dichotomy: the curvilinear relationship between social responsibility and financial performance

ESG performance and firm value: The moderating role of disclosure

http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/labeling/lrm/ individual chapters of the Pesticide Label Review Manual, 3rd Edition Pesticide Label Review Manual, 3rd Edition. Utilized by the EPA Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) to improve the quality and consistency of pesticide labels. This document provides guidance on how the US EPA interprets the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and its specific requirements for label language and format. Chapters include: • Precautionary labeling (including Signal Word, Personal Protective Equipment, and First Aid Statements) • Physical or Chemical Hazards • Worker Protection Labeling • Directions for Use • Labeling Claims • Storage and Disposal • Identification numbers (including EPA registration number)

Appendix A: informational sources on pesticides and health.

Using newly-available materiality classifications of sustainability topics, we develop a novel dataset by hand-mapping sustainability investments classified as material for each industry into firm-specific sustainability ratings. This allows us to present new evidence on the value implications of sustainability investments. Using both calendar-time portfolio stock return regressions and firm-level panel regressions we find that firms with good ratings on material sustainability issues significantly outperform firms with poor ratings on these issues. In contrast, firms with good ratings on immaterial sustainability issues do not significantly outperform firms with poor ratings on the same issues. These results are confirmed when we analyze future changes in accounting performance. The results have implications for asset managers who have committed to the integration of sustainability factors in their capital allocation decisions.

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Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality

Using newly available materiality classifications of sustainability topics, we develop a novel dataset by hand-mapping sustainability investments classified as material for each industry ...

/pdf/corporate-sustainability-first-evidence-on-materiality-22p5nkn78b.pdf

Shareholder activism on sustainability issues has become increasingly prevalent over the years, with the number of proposals filed doubling from 1999 to 2013. We use recent innovations in accounting standard setting to classify 2,665 shareholder proposals that address environmental and social issues as financially material or immaterial, and we analyze how proposals on material versus immaterial issues are related to firms’ subsequent environmental or social performance and market valuation. We find that 42 percent of the shareholder proposals in our sample are filed on financially material issues. We document that filing shareholder proposals are related to subsequent improvements in the performance of the company on the focal environmental or social issue, even though such proposals nearly never received majority support. Improvements occur across both material and immaterial issues. Proposals on immaterial issues are associated with subsequent declines in firm valuation while proposals on material issues are associated with subsequent increases in firm value. We show that managers increase performance on immaterial issues in companies with agency problems, low awareness of the materiality of sustainability issues, and poor performance on material issues.

/pdf/shareholder-activism-on-sustainability-issues-4to5r799ix.pdf

Shareholder Activism on Sustainability Issues

The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) is the largest global environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiative in the asset-management industry to date. We analyze what happens after active U.S. mutual funds sign the PRI to assess whether they exhibit ESG implementation. We find that PRI signatories attract a large fund inflow, but we do not observe improvements in fund-level ESG scores or fund returns. We consider a battery of ways to proxy for funds’ ESG incorporation (e.g., entry/exit, screening, engagement, voting for pro-ESG proposals), but fail to observe evidence of meaningful on average follow-through. Next, we explore cross-sectional fund characteristics and find that only quant funds exhibit small improvements in ESG performance versus other funds, mainly through buying high-ESG-performing stocks. Furthermore, we note that signatories are not superior performers in ESG issues prior to joining the PRI relative to non-PRI funds, but PRI affiliation tends to be widely advertised on company websites, marketing materials, and fund documents. Overall, a reasonable reader may perceive our findings as consistent with PRI funds’ greenwashing. We note, however, that what we uncover is based only on outcome-based measures and may miss some actual efforts of signatories. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.

Analyzing Active Fund Managers' Commitment to ESG: Evidence from the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment

The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) is the largest global ESG initiative in the asset management industry to date. We analyze what happens after active US mutual funds sign the PRI, to assess whether they exhibit ESG implementation. We find that PRI signatories attract a large fund inflow but we do not observe improvements in fund-level ESG scores or fund returns. We consider a battery of ways to proxy for funds’ ESG incorporation (e.g., entry/exit, screening, engagement, voting for pro-ESG proposals), but fail to observe evidence of meaningful follow-through, on average. Next, we explore cross-sectional fund characteristics and find that only quant-funds exhibit small improvement in ESG performance versus other funds, mainly through buying high-ESG-performing stocks. Furthermore, we note that PRI signatories are not superior performers in ESG issues prior to signing, relative to non-PRI funds, but PRI affiliation tends to be widely advertised on company websites, marketing materials, and fund documents. Overall, a reasonable reader may perceive our findings as consistent with PRI funds’ greenwashing. We note, however, that what we uncover is based only on outcome-based measures and may miss some actual efforts of signatories.

Aaron Yoon

Papers

Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality

Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality

Shareholder Activism on Sustainability Issues

Analyzing Active Fund Managers' Commitment to ESG: Evidence from the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment

Analyzing Active Managers' Commitment to ESG: Evidence from United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment