A survey on security control and attack detection for industrial cyber-physical systems

The smart grid is arguably one of the most complex cyber-physical systems (CPS). Complex security challenges have been revealed in both the physical and the cyber parts of the smart grid, and an integrative analysis on the cyber-physical (CP) security is emerging. This paper provides a comprehensive and systematic review of the critical attack threats and defence strategies in the smart grid. We start this survey with an overview of the smart grid security from the CP perspective, and then focuses on prominent CP attack schemes with significant impact on the smart grid operation and corresponding defense solutions. With an in-depth review of the attacks and defences, we then discuss the opportunities and challenges along the smart grid CP security. We hope this paper raises awareness of the CP attack threats and defence strategies in complex CPS-based infrastructures such as the smart grid and inspires research effort toward the development of secure and resilient CP infrastructures.

Cyber-physical attacks and defences in the smart grid: a survey

Conventionally, community energy management system (CEMS) is provided with the information of surplus and shortage amounts only at each time interval. This limited information may lead to an increase in the operational cost of the multimicrogrid (MMG) systems. This paper suggests informing the CEMS about the adjustable power also, in addition to the surplus and shortage information. This additional information will result in a variety of options for the CEMS to fulfill the load demands of its network. CEMS will choose among various available options, which include trading with the power grid, buying from a controllable distributed generation plant, buying from a community battery energy storage system (CBESS), or controlling the adjustable power: increasing or decreasing the generation of controllable units. CBESS can either be controlled by CEMS or can act as an autonomous entity. The effects of both the operational options have been analyzed and economically efficient mode is suggested for MMG systems. Demand response (DR) is also considered in the proposed model. The incorporation of DR will ensure the supply reliability of the MMG system in addition to the reduction in operational cost. In contrast to the conventional single or two-step multimicrogrid optimization algorithms, a multistep hierarchical optimization algorithm based on a multiagent system is proposed in this paper. Easy to implement and computationally inexpensive mixed integer linear programming models are developed for each step.

A Multiagent-Based Hierarchical Energy Management Strategy for Multi-Microgrids Considering Adjustable Power and Demand Response

This paper is concerned with the input-to-state stabilizing control problem for cyber-physical systems (CPSs) with multiple transmission channels under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Under the data update policy with bounded update interval, a new control scheme that discards the outdated information is proposed, and the stability analysis of CPSs under DoS attacks is transformed into analyzing the stability of the system under a switched controller with the help of a class of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). Then, inspired by the techniques for switched systems, sufficient conditions on the duration and frequency of the DoS attacks, under which the stability of the closed-loop systems is still guaranteed, are proposed. Compared with the existing method for the single-channel case, the considered multiple-channel case is more challenging, and the proposed LMI-based method is more flexible.

Input-to-State Stabilizing Control for Cyber-Physical Systems With Multiple Transmission Channels Under Denial of Service

As the deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) is experiencing an exponential growth, it is no surprise that many recent cyber attacks are IoT-enabled : the attacker initially exploits some vulnerable IoT technology as a first step toward compromising a critical system that is connected, in some way, with the IoT. For some sectors, like industry, smart grids, transportation, and medical services, the significance of such attacks is obvious, since IoT technologies are part of critical back-end systems. However, in sectors where IoT is usually at the end-user side, like smart homes, such attacks can be underestimated, since not all possible attack paths are examined. In this paper, we survey IoT-enabled cyber attacks, found in all application domains since 2010. For each sector, we emphasize on the latest, verified IoT-enabled attacks, based on known real-world incidents and published proof-of-concept attacks. We methodologically analyze representative attacks that demonstrate direct, indirect, and subliminal attack paths against critical targets. Our goal is threefold: 1) to assess IoT-enabled cyber attacks in a risk-like approach, in order to demonstrate their current threat landscape; 2) to identify hidden and subliminal IoT-enabled attack paths against critical infrastructures and services; and 3) to examine mitigation strategies for all application domains.

A Survey of IoT-Enabled Cyberattacks: Assessing Attack Paths to Critical Infrastructures and Services

Denial of service attacks and communication latency pose challenges for the operation of control systems within power systems. Specifically, excessive delay between sensors and controllers can substantially worsen the performance of distributed control schemes. In this paper, we propose a framework for delay-resilient cyber-physical control of smart grid systems for transient stability applications. The proposed control scheme adapts its structure depending on the value of the latency. As an example, we consider a parametric feedback linearization (PFL) control paradigm and make it “cyber-aware.” A delay-adaptive design that capitalizes on the features of PFL control is presented to enhance the time-delay tolerance of the power system. Depending on the information latency present in the smart grid, the parameters and the structure of the PFL controller are adapted accordingly to optimize performance. The improved resilience is demonstrated by applying the PFL controller to the New England 39-bus and WECC 9-bus test power systems following the occurrence of physical and cyber disturbances. Numerical results show that the proposed cyber-physical controller can tolerate substantial delays without noticeable performance degradation.

A Cyber-Physical Control Framework for Transient Stability in Smart Grids

We propose a framework for the analysis of cyber switching attacks and control-based mitigation in cyber-enabled power systems. Our model of the switching attack is simple, only requiring knowledge of the sign of the local relative rotor speed, which may be estimated. The controller is modeled to be resource constrained, choosing to act only during select intervals of time. We make use of an iterated game-theoretic formulation to describe the interactions of the parties and its effect on system stability. Analytic results indicate the potential of the constrained controller to achieve transient stabilization over time using zero-determinant strategies. Numerical results of the New England 39-bus power system demonstrate the potential for such a controller to increase system resilience during cyber-attacks.

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Switching Attacks and Mitigation in Smart Grid Systems

A parametric controller is proposed for transient stability of synchronous generators after the occurrence of a disturbance in the power grid. The proposed controller based on feedback linearization control theory relies on receiving timely phasor measurement unit (PMU) information from selected parts of the power grid to employ fast acting flywheels that are situated near synchronous generators. The local storage devices aim to balance a swing equation model of the synchronous generator to drive the associated rotor speed to stability. The advantages of the proposed controller include that it is tunable and integrates well with existing governor controls in contrast to other forms of PMU-based control. Further, a comparison is drawn between the proposed controller and recently proposed nonlinear controllers for transient stabilization. Numerical results show the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed controller when applied to the 39-bus 10-generator New England power system.

A Cyber-Enabled Stabilizing Control Scheme for Resilient Smart Grid Systems

In this paper, we consider a distributed energy storage system (ESS)-based control paradigm for transient stability of power systems. Utilizing a multi-agent control framework, we propose an effective virtual inertia measure for cyber-physical agents that includes both traditional synchronous generators and actuated ESSs. We derive the effective virtual inertia analytically for the case of general ESS-based control. We further consider the case of parametric feedback linearization control (PFL) as an application and investigate the proposed inertia measures after applying the PFL control. The utility of the proposed inertia measures is studied using the IEEE 68-bus test power system. Numerical results demonstrate the impact of storage limits, control scheme aggressiveness, and delay on the proposed inertia measures during a disturbance in the power system.

On Effective Virtual Inertia of Storage-Based Distributed Control for Transient Stability

Security of smart power systems is a sound concern as more cyber elements are added to the power grid. In this paper, we focus on cyber attacks that target data integrity in smart grid systems. We specifically investigate the impact of false data injection (FDI) attacks on distributed transient stability control schemes. As an example, we focus on the parametric feedback linearization (PFL) controller, and we derive closed-form expressions for the errors in rotors’ speed and angle as a result of cyber attacks on data integrity. Furthermore, we investigate adaptive control strategies to eliminate or minimize the impact of FDI attacks on system dynamics. The IEEE 68-bus test power system is used to numerically evaluate the impact of example attacks and to draw valuable insights.

Abdallah Farraj

Papers

A Cyber-Physical Control Framework for Transient Stability in Smart Grids

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Switching Attacks and Mitigation in Smart Grid Systems

A Cyber-Enabled Stabilizing Control Scheme for Resilient Smart Grid Systems

On Effective Virtual Inertia of Storage-Based Distributed Control for Transient Stability

On the Impact of Cyber Attacks on Data Integrity in Storage-Based Transient Stability Control