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Adam Doupé

Researcher at Arizona State University

Publications -  80
Citations -  2414

Adam Doupé is an academic researcher from Arizona State University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Web application & Computer science. The author has an hindex of 20, co-authored 68 publications receiving 1670 citations. Previous affiliations of Adam Doupé include University of California, Santa Barbara & Arizona's Public Universities.

Papers
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Proceedings ArticleDOI

Deep Android Malware Detection

TL;DR: A novel android malware detection system that uses a deep convolutional neural network (CNN) to perform static analysis of the raw opcode sequence from a disassembled program, removing the need for hand-engineered malware features.
Book ChapterDOI

Why Johnny can't pentest: an analysis of black-box web vulnerability scanners

TL;DR: The results of the evaluation show that crawling is a task that is as critical and challenging to the overall ability to detect vulnerabilities as the vulnerability detection techniques themselves, and that many classes of vulnerabilities are completely overlooked by these tools, and thus research is required to improve the automated detection of these flaws.
Proceedings Article

Enemy of the state: a state-aware black-box web vulnerability scanner

TL;DR: It is shown that the state-aware black-box web vulnerability scanner is able to not only exercise more code of the web application, but also discover vulnerabilities that other vulnerability scanners miss.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Behind closed doors: measurement and analysis of CryptoLocker ransoms in Bitcoin

TL;DR: This study performs a measurement analysis of CryptoLocker, a family of ransomware that encrypts a victim's files until a ransom is paid, within the Bitcoin ecosystem from September 5, 2013 through January 31, 2014 and finds evidence that suggests connections to popular Bitcoin services, and subtle links to other cybercrimes surrounding Bitcoin.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Going Native: Using a Large-Scale Analysis of Android Apps to Create a Practical Native-Code Sandboxing Policy

TL;DR: An extensive analysis of the native code usage in 1.2 million Android apps demonstrates that sandboxing native code with no permissions is not ideal, as apps’ native code components perform activities that require Android permissions, and provides very encouraging insights that make us believe that sandboxed native code can be feasible and useful in practice.