https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/gov2126/files/rock_bonnet_comp_corr_east_asia.pdf

The Comparative Politics of Corruption: Accounting for the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, Growth and Investment

Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia

Corruption, Manufacturing Plant Growth, and the Asian Paradox: Indonesian Evidence

Of all the different types of civil war, disputes over self-determination are the most likely to escalate into war and resist compromise settlement. Reputation and Civil War argues that this low rate of negotiation is the result of reputation building, in which governments refuse to negotiate with early challengers in order to discourage others from making more costly demands in the future. Jakarta's wars against East Timor and Aceh, for example, were not designed to maintain sovereignty but to signal to Indonesia's other minorities that secession would be costly. Employing data from three different sources - laboratory experiments on undergraduates, statistical analysis of data on self-determination movements, and qualitative analyses of recent history in Indonesia and the Philippines - Barbara F. Walter provides some of the first systematic evidence that reputation strongly influences behavior, particularly between governments and ethnic minorities fighting over territory.

Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent

We investigate whether large family groups in emerging economies can proactively change their environment. We use a coevolutionary approach, which accounts for the influence of context on the entrepreneur and for the freedom of the latter to modify it. We find that entrepreneurs can shape institutions to their advantage, illustrated by the Salim Group, which achieved growth by aligning with and influencing politicians, eventually ‘morphing into an institution’. We unravel unique coevolutionary patterns, which we use to extend existing theories. Our first contribution is to initiate a new line of inquiry in coevolution theory, focusing on individual companies coevolving with institutions. Secondly, we document factors that increase and decrease strategic choice for family groups in emerging economies. Thirdly, we find that the Salim Group became part of the crony Suharto regime. The group became both an institutional entrepreneur and an entrepreneurial institution, demonstrating that companies and institutions are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/joms_793.pdf?abstractid=1270881&mirid=3

Coevolution of Institutions and Corporations in Emerging Economies: How the Salim Group Morphed into an Institution of Suharto's Crony Regime

Adam Schwarz's highly acclaimed and best-selling "A Nation in Waiting" brings the story of contemporary Indonesia right up to date, covering the collapse of the economy, the fall of Suharto, the series of brief subsequent presidencies and the challenges facing the nation in the run-up to the 2004 elections. "A Naton in Waiting" lifts the veil on the Indonesia of the 1980s and 1990s and spans a wide variety of contemporary issues to offer a detailed and thought-provoking glimpse of one of the world's least-understood nations. Using a wealth of first-hand information, Adam Schwarz gives life to the heated debates on economic policy, corruption and the controversial role of ethnic Chinese Indonesians. He analyzes the political demands of Indonesia's Muslim community, the mishandled incorporation of East Timor, the debate on human rights and the dilemma facing the Indonesian military as it struggles to redefine its role.

Adam Schwarz

Papers

A Nation In Waiting : Indonesia's Search For Stability