For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge — proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein’s results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth - as some logical empiricists do — to the ideal of’probable truth’1 or — as some sociologists of knowledge do — to ‘truth by [changing] consensus’.2

Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes

Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Truth and method

It comes as something ofa surprise to reflect that the New York Review ofBooks is now over twenty years old. Even people of my generation (that is, old enough to remember the revolutionary 196os but not young enough to have taken a very exciting part in them) think of the paper as eternally youthful. In fact, it has gone through years of relatively quiet life, yet, as always in a competitive journalistic market, it is the controversies that attract the interest of the reader and to which the history (especially an admittedly impressionistic survey that tries to include something of the intellectual context in which a journal has operated) must give some attention. Not all the attacks which the New York Review has attracted, both early in its career and more recently, are worth more than a brief summary. What do we now make, for example, of Richard Kostelanetz's forthright accusation that 'The New York Review was from its origins destined to publicize Random House's (and especially [Jason] Epstein's) books and writers'?1 Well, simply that, even if the statistics bear out the charge (and Kostelanetz provides some suggestive evidence to support it, at least with respect to some early issues), there is nothing surprising in a market economy about a publisher trying to push his books through the pages of a journal edited by his friends. True, the New York Review has not had room to review more than around fifteen books in each issue and there could be a bias in the selection of

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3507774.pdf

The New York Review of Books

What can computer simulation contribute to the social sciences? Which of the many approaches to simulation would be best for my social science project? How do I design, carry out and analyse the results from a computer simulation? This is a practical textbook on the techniques of building computer simulations to assist understanding of social and economic issues and problems. Interest in social simulation has been growing rapidly worldwide as a result of increasingly powerful hardware and software and also a rising interest in the application of ideas of complexity, evolution, adaptation and chaos in the social sciences. This authoritative book details all the common approaches to social simulation, to provide social scientists with an appreciation of the literature and allow those with some programming skills to create their own simulations.New for this edition is a chapter on how to use simulation as a tool. A new chapter on multi-agent systems has also been added to support the fact that multi-agent modelling has become the preferred approach to simulation. Social scientists in a wide range of fields will find this book an essential tool for research, particularly in sociology, economics, anthropology, geography, organizational theory, political science, social policy, cognitive psychology and cognitive science. It will also appeal to computer scientists interested in distributed artificial intelligence, multi-agent systems and agent technologies.

Simulation for the Social Scientist

The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique.

I. Philosophical Problems of the Metric of Space and Time.- 1. Spatial and Temporal Congruence in Physics: A Critical Comparison of the Conceptions of Newton, Riemann, Poincare, Eddington, Bridgman, Russell, and Whitehead.- A. Newton.- B. Riemann.- C. Poincare.- D. Eddington.- E. Bridgman.- F. Russell.- G. Whitehead.- 2. The Significance of Alternative Time Metrizations in Newtonian Mechanics and in the General Theory of Relativity.- A. Newtonian Mechanics.- B. The General Theory of Relativity.- 3. Critique of Reichenbach's and Carnap's Philosophy of Geometry.- A. The Status of "Universal Forces".- B. The "Relativity of Geometry".- 4. Critique of Einstein's Philosophy of Geometry.- A. An Appraisal of Duhem's Account of the Falsifiability of Isolated Empirical Hypotheses in Its Bearing on Einstein's Conception of the Interdependence of Geometry and Physics.- I. The Trivial Validity of the D-Thesis.- II. The Untenability of the Non-Trivial D-Thesis.- B. The Interdependence of Geometry and Physics in Poincare's Conventionalism.- C. Critical Evaluation of Einstein's Conception of the Interdependence of Geometry and Physics: Physical Geometry as a Counter-Example to the Non-Trivial D-Thesis.- 5. Empiricism and the Geometry of Visual Space.- 6. The Resolution of Zeno's Metrical Paradox of Extension for the Mathematical Continua of Space and Time.- II. Philosophical Problems of the Topology of Time and Space.- 7. The Causal Theory of Time.- A. Closed Time.- B. Open Time.- 8. The Anisotropy of Time.- A. Is There a Thermodynamic Basis for the Anisotropy of Time?.- I. The Entropy Law of Classical Thermodynamics.- II. The Statistical Analogue of the Entropy Law.- B. Are There Non-Thermodynamic Foundations for the Anisotropy of Time?.- 9. The Asymmetry of Retrodictability and Predictability, the Compossibility of Explanation of the Past and Prediction of the Future, and Mechanism vs. Teleology.- A. The Conditions of Retrodictability and Non-Predictability.- B. The Physical Basis for the Anisotropy of Psychological Time.- C. The Bearing of Retrodictability and Non-Predict-ability on the Compossibility of Explainability and Predictability.- I. Evolutionary Theory.- II. The Paresis Case.- III. The Barometer Case.- D. The Controversy Between Mechanism and Teleology.- 10. Is There a "Flow" of Time or Temporal "Becoming"?.- 11. Empiricism and the Three-Dimensionality of Space.- III. Philosophical Issues in the Theory of Relativity.- 12. Philosophical Foundations of the Special Theory of Relativity, and Their Bearing on Its History.- A. Introduction.- B. Einstein's Conception of Simultaneity, Its Prevalent Misrepresentations, and Its History.- C. History of Einstein's Enunciation of the Limiting Character of the Velocity of Light in vacuo.- D. The Principle of the Constancy of the Speed of Light, and the Falsity of the Aether-Theoretic Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis.- E. The Experimental Confirmation of the Kinematics of the STR.- F. The Philosophical Issue Between Einstein and His Aether-Theoretic Precursors, and Its Bearing on E. T. Whittaker's History of the STR.- 13. Philosophical Appraisal of E. A. Milne's Alternative to Einstein's STR.- 14. Has the General Theory of Relativity Repudiated Absolute Space?.- 15. Philosophical Critique of Whitehead's Theory of Relativity.- Bibliography for the First Edition.- IV. Supplementary Studies 1964-1973.- 1. Supplement to Part I.- 16. Space, Time and Falsifiability (First Installment).- Abstract.- Criteria for Intrinsicness vs. Extrinsicness of Metrics and of Relations on Manifolds: Contents.- 1. Singly and Multiply Extended Manifolds.- 2. Intrinsicness vs. Extrinsicness of Metrics, Metrical Equalities, and Congruences.- 3. What are the Logical Connections, if any, between Alternative Metrizability, Intrinsic Metric Amorphousness, and the Convention-ladenness of Metrical Comparisons?.- 4. Intrinsicness and Extrinsicness of a Relation on a Manifold.- 17. Can We Ascertain the Falsity of a Scientific Hypothesis?.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Purported Disproofs of Hypotheses in Biology and Astronomy.- 3. Is it NEVER Possible to Falsify a Hypothesis Irrevocably?.- 18. Can an Infinitude of Operations Be Performed in a Finite Time?.- 2. Supplement to Part II.- 19. Is the Coarse-Grained Entropy of Classical Statistical Mechanics an Anthropomorphism?.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Entropy Change and Arbitrariness of the Partitioning of Phase Space.- 3. What is the Physical Significance of the Triple Role of the Entropy for the Entropy Statistics in the Class U?.- 4. Do the Roles of Human Decision and Ignorance Impugn the Physical Significance of the Entropy Statistics for the Class U?.- 3. Supplement to Part III.- 20. Simultaneity by Slow Clock Transport in the Special Theory of Relativity.- (co-authored with Wesley C. Salmon).- 1. Summary.- 2. Examination of Ellis and Bowman's Account of Nonstandard Signal Synchronizations.- 3. The Philosophical Status of Simultaneity by Slow Clock Transport in the Special Theory of Relativity.- 21. The Bearing of Philosophy on the History of the Special Theory of Relativity.- 1. History and Pedagogy of the Light Principle.- 2. Contraction and Time-Dilation Hypotheses.- 3. Summary.- Chppter 22. General Relativity, Geometrodynamics and Ontology.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Philosophical Status of the Metric of Space-Time in the General Theory of Relativity.- 3. The Ontology of Empty Curved Metric Space in the Geometrodynamics of Clifford and Wheeler.- 4. The Time-Orientability of Space-Time and the 'Arrow' of Time.- Index of Personal Names - Compiled by Mr. Theodore C. Falk.- Index of Subjects - Compiled by Mr. Theodore C. Falk.

Philosophical Problems of Space and Time

This study is a philosophical critique of the foundations of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis. As such, it also takes cognizance of his claim that psychoanalysis has the credentials of a natural science. It shows that the reasoning on which Freud rested the major hypotheses of his edifice was fundamentally flawed, even if the probity of the clinical observations he adduced were not in question. Moreover, far from deserving to be taken at face value, clinical data from the psychoanalytic treatment setting are themselves epistemically quite suspect.

The foundations of psychoanalysis : a philosophical critique

The Foundations of Psychoanalysis

The standard technical vocabulary used to define placebo therapies and experimental placebo controls in medicine and psychiatry is both confusing and obscure. To achieve conceptual clarity in the theory of placebogenic phenomena, this paper offers a rigorous articulation of the placebo notion, a lucid new terminology that obviates the defects intrinsic to the traditional locutions employed in the placebo literature, and a substantial revamping of A. K. Shapiro's influential prior definition of 'placebo'. This paper supersedes an earlier version (Grunbaum, 1981).

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0033291700002506

Adolf Grünbaum

Papers

The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique.

Philosophical Problems of Space and Time

The foundations of psychoanalysis : a philosophical critique

The Foundations of Psychoanalysis

The placebo concept in medicine and psychiatry.