Zones of state failure are assumed to be anarchic. In reality, communities facing the absence of an effective state authority forge systems of governance to provide modest levels of security and rule of law. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in Somalia, where an array of local and regional governance arrangements have emerged since the 1991 collapse of the state. The Somalia case can be used both to document the rise of governance without government in a zone of state collapse and to assess the changing interests of local actors seeking to survive and prosper in a context of state failure. The interests of key actors can and do shift over time as they accrue resources and investments; the shift “from warlord to landlord” gives some actors greater interests in governance and security, but not necessarily in state revival; risk aversion infuses decisionmaking in areas of state failure; and state-building initiatives generally fail to account for the existence of local governance arrangements. The...

Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping

The terms "vulnerable" and "vulnerability" have been turning up more and more frequently beginning in the 1980s in writing about disasters. Overman (1989) identifies literally dozens of authors using the term and related ones such as resilience, marginality, susceptibility, adaptability, fragility, and risk. This development is to be welcomed. It shows that an increasing number of people recognize the importance of distinguishing physical hazards from the disasters that sometimes follow. As Maskrey puts it (1989, P. 1):

Disaster vulnerability: Scale, power and daily life

* Acknowledgments * Introduction * 1. What if the Postmetropolis is Lusaka? * 2. Postcolonial Cities * 3. (I)n(f)ormal Cities * 4. Governing Africa's Cities * 5. Wounded City * 6. Cosmopolitan Cities * Conclusion * References * Index

African Cities: Alternative Visions of Urban Theory and Practice

One of the most vexing issues that has faced the international community since the end of the Cold War has been the use of force by the United Nations peacekeeping forces. UN intervention in civil wars, as in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, has thrown into stark relief the difficulty of peacekeepers operating in situations where consent to their presence and activities is fragile or incomplete and where there is little peace to keep. Complex questions arise in these circumstances. When and how should peacekeepers use force to protect themselves, to protect their mission, or, most troublingly, to ensure compliance by recalcitrant parties with peace accords? Is a peace enforcement role for peacekeepers possible or is this simply war by another name? Is there a grey zone between peacekeeping and peace enforcement? Trevor Findlay reveals the history of the use of force by UN peacekeepers from Sinai in the 1950s to Haiti in the 1990s. He untangles the arguments about the use of force in peace operations and sets these within the broader context of military doctrine and practice. Drawing on these insights the author examines proposals for future conduct of UN operations, including the formulation of UN peacekeeping doctrine and the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force.

The use of force in UN peace operations

Somalia's protracted crisis of complete state collapse is unprecedented and has defied easy explanation. Disaggregating the Somali debacle into three distinct crises – collapse of central government, protracted armed conflict, and lawlessness – helps to produce more nuanced analysis. Significant changes have occurred in the nature and intensity of conflict and lawlessness in Somalia since the early 1990s, with conflicts becoming more localized and less bloody, and criminality more constrained by customary law and private security forces. These trends are linked to changing interests on the part of the political and economic elite, who now profit less from war and banditry and more from commerce and service business that require a predictable operating environment. The prolonged collapse of Somalia's central government cannot be explained as a reflection of local interests. The country's elite would profit greatly from the revival of a recognized but ineffective ‘paper’ state. The inability of Somalia's le...

State collapse in Somalia: second thoughts

The multilateral military intervention in Somalia was one of the international community's first major attempts to respond to a dangerous new challenge in the post-cold war erathe problem of state collapse and social disintegration. Catastrophes such as Somalia reach public attention as humanitarian emergencies, but the underlying causes are the disintegration of political institutions and the resulting chaos and insecurity. Given the challenges inherent in such political crises, can the international community respond effectively to encourage political reconciliation and the rehabilitation of governing institutions?This book suggests that the international community ignored clear warning signs in Somalia and missed several opportunities to use diplomacy to prevent state collapse. As a result, the destruction of the state became more complete and the difficulties in rebuilding a viable system more demanding. When the United States and the United Nations finally intervened militarily in 1992, they focused on the humanitarian aspects of the emergency, thereby limiting their ability to act on the core political and security dimensions.This book shows how lessons learned in Somalia will shape international responses in future cases. It details the deep- rooted social, political, and economic processes that led to the decomposition of the state in the early 1990s; analyzes the attempts by the international community to encourage political reconciliation; and offers guidelines for policymakers. "

Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction

Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality

Afrikadan is-wada daafacdee dabka noolaysay, Dib baa looga joogsaday markay dibinta ruugeene, Laga durug dorraad galab kuwuu dacasku saarnaaye, Dirqi bey xornimada heshey laguma deeqayne, Ninkii aan u doog-dhaban biyaha, looma soo daro e’, Daayeerna laas waa qoota doox haddu tago e’, Dudduntaan halkii lagu ogaa doorsen weligeede, Daaimo carruurena wey is daba gurguurtaane, Dakan wada dallacey dowladahan dahabka shiilaaya, Dadeenay ahaayeen kuwaa loo dabbaal degaye, Doqonniimo Sooomaali waa loogu dawgalaye. — Cabdillahi Sultan ( Timacadde).

Ahmed Ismail Samatar

Papers

Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction

Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality

Bereft of Trust: Reflections on the Causes of the Somali Catastrophe