This paper challenges the view that the wage structure in West Germany has remained stable throughout the 80s and 90s. Based on a 2% sample of social security records, we show that wage inequality has increased in the 1980s, but only at the top of the distribution. In the early 1990s, wage inequality started to rise also at the bottom of the distribution. Hence, while the US and Germany experienced similar changes at the top of the distribution throughout the 80s and 90s, the patterns at the bottom of the distribution are reversed. We show that changes in the education and age structure can explain a substantial part of the increase in inequality, in particular at the top of the distribution. We further argue that selection into unemployment cannot account for the stable wage structure at the bottom in the 80s. In contrast, about one third of the increase in lower tail inequality in the 90s can be related to de-unionization. Finally, fluctuations in relative supply play an important role in explaining trends in the skill premium. These findings are consistent with the view that technological change is responsible for the widening of the wage distribution at the top. The widening of the wage distribution at the bottom, however, may be better explained by episodic events, such as changes in labour market institutions and supply shocks.

Revisiting the German Wage Structure

We study the role of establishment-speci…c wage premiums in generating recent increases in West German wage inequality. Models with additive …xed eects for work- ers and establishments are …t in four sub-intervals spanning the period from 1985 to 2009. We show that these models provide a good approximation to the wage struc- ture and can explain nearly all of the dramatic rise in West German wage inequality. Our estimates suggest that the increasing variability of West German wages has arisen from a combination of rising heterogeneity between workers, rising variability in the wage premiums at dierent establishments, and increasing assortativeness in the as- signment of workers to plants. In contrast, the idiosyncratic job-match component of wage variation is small and stable over time. Decomposing changes in mean wages between dierent education groups, occupations, and industries, we …nd that increas- ing plant-level heterogeneity and rising assortativeness in the assignment of workers to establishments explain a large share of the rise in inequality along all three dimensions.

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Workplace Heterogeneity and the Rise of West German Wage Inequality

r 9HE purpose of this paper is to explore a hypothesis, based on acIcumulating evidence, regarding the character of inventions likely to issue from the research laboratories of the large industrial corporations. Simply put, this hypothesis may be stated as follows: with few exceptions, the large industrial laboratories are likely to be minor sources of major (radically new and commercially or militarily important) inventions; rather they are likely to be major sources of essentially "improvement" inventions. Put more precisely, the hypothesis states that the proportion of all minor inventions originating in the large industrial laboratories is likely to exceed the proportion of all major inventions originating in these laboratories. Note that the stress on the relative importance of these laboratories as sources of improvement inventions is not necessarily a denigration of the economic importance of this contribution. The cumulative effect of these improvement inventions may be, and often has been, of substantial importance over long periods of time for advancing technology, investment opportunities, and economic growth. The stress on improvement inventions as the principal product of the research laboratories of the large industrial corporations is meant simply to emphasize that, whatever the importance of their contributions, most of the latter is not likely to involve radically new inventive activity. I cannot claim originality for this hypothesis. After it suggested itself in the course of my investigations, I discovered that others, some of them in the most unlikely positions,2 had earlier said much the same thing. But, apart from occasional remarks, I can find no discussions attempting to explain or justify it. And because, if reasonably accurate, it has numerous ramifications, I have felt the need to set down an extended analysis of 1 I wish to thank members of the Seminar on Law and Technology, sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Law School under the auspices of the Ford Foundation, for their many helpful comments on this paper. Especially do I wish to thank Professors Jacob Schmookler, Robert Merrill, John Stedman, Harrison White, and John Heath. 2 See particularly the statement quoted below (p. 114) of D)r. Frank Jewett, former president of Bell Laboratories.

The journal of political economy

This paper shows that wage inequality in West Germany has increased over the past three decades, contrary to common perceptions. During the 1980s, the increase was concentrated at the top of the distribution; in the 1990s, it occurred at the bottom end as well. Our findings are consistent with the view that both in Germany and in the United States, technological change is responsible for the widening of the wage distribution at the top. At the bottom of the wage distribution, the increase in inequality is better explained by episodic events, such as supply shocks and changes in labor market institutions. These events happened a decade later in Germany than in the United States.

/pdf/revisiting-the-german-wage-structure-5ffi62hix7.pdf

This paper analyses the effect immigration has on wages of native workers. Unlike most previous work, we estimate wage effects along the distribution of wages. We derive a flexible empirical strategy that does not rely on pre-allocating immigrants to particular skill groups. In our empirical analysis, we demonstrate that immigrants downgrade considerably upon arrival. As for the effects on native wages, we find that immigration depresses wages below the 20th percentile of the wage distribution, but leads to slight wage increases in the upper part of the wage
distribution. The overall wage effect of immigration is slightly positive. The positive wage effects we find are, although modest, too large to be explained by an
immigration surplus. We suggest alternative explanations, based on the idea that immigrants are paid less than the value of what they contribute to production, generating therefore a surplus, and we assess the magnitude of these effects.

/pdf/the-effect-of-immigration-along-the-distribution-of-wages-4jajx21pek.pdf

The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages

A central concern about immigration is the integration into the labour market, not only of the first generation but also of subsequent generations. Little comparative work exists for Europe’s largest economies. France, Germany and the UK have all become, perhaps unwittingly, countries with large immigrant populations albeit with very different ethnic compositions. Today, the descendants of these immigrants live and work in their parents destination countries. This article presents and discusses comparative evidence on the performance of first and second-generation immigrants in these countries in terms of education, earnings and employment. It is widely believed that many European countries have a serious problem with the integration of immigrants and their children (LEED, 2006). Many Northern European countries have accumulated sizeable populations of immigrants but the lack of longterm strategies and policies to integrate these into societal structures and the labour market is often cited as one reason for social and economic exclusion of the children of these immigrants. In the past decade, Southern European countries such as Spain and Italy have experienced similar, if not larger, immigrations than the large Northern European economies France, Germany and the UK in the late 1950s to early 1970s. Again, it seems that there is little thought devoted to long-term strategies for immigrants and their descendants. The experience of those countries that had large-scale immigration in the last half of the twentieth century should be of importance for devising future immigration and integration policies. However, there is rather little hard evidence in the literature about the relative position of immigrants and their descendants in these countries, in a manner that allows comparisons to be made. In this article, we aim to provide a comparative study of a number of outcomes (education, earnings and employment) of both first and second-generation immigrants of different origins in the three largest European economies: France, Germany and the UK.

/pdf/the-economic-situation-of-first-and-second-generation-34cz9pn3n6.pdf

The Economic Situation of First and Second‐Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom*

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, ethnic Germans living in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were given the opportunity to migrate to Germany. Within 15 years, 2.8 million individuals had done so. Upon arrival, these immigrants were exogenously allocated to different regions to ensure an even distribution across the country. Their inflow can therefore be seen as a quasi-experiment of immigration. I analyze the effect of these inflows on skill-specific employment rates and wages. The results indicate a displacement effect of 3.1 unemployed workers for every 10 immigrants that find a job, but no effect on relative wages.

/pdf/the-labor-market-impact-of-immigration-a-quasi-experiment-45jc8yglt4.pdf

The Labor Market Impact of Immigration: A Quasi-Experiment Exploiting Immigrant Location Rules in Germany

In the first part of this paper, we present a stylized model of the labour market impact of immigra- tion. We then discuss mechanisms through which an economy can adjust to immigration: changes in factor prices, output mix, and production technology. In the second part, we explain the problems of empirically estimating how immigration affects labour market outcomes of the resident population and review some strategies to address these. We then summarize some recent empirical studies for the UK and other countries. We conclude with an outlook on what we believe are important avenues for future research.

/pdf/the-labour-market-impact-of-immigration-a5xh6hc69v.pdf

The labour market impact of immigration

In this paper, we analyse differences in the cyclical pattern of employment and wages of immigrants and natives for two large immigrant receiving countries, Germany and the UK. We show that, despite large differences in their immigrant populations, there are similar and significant differences in cyclical responses between immigrants and natives in both countries, even conditional on education, age, and location. We decompose changes in outcomes into a secular trend and a business cycle component. We find significantly larger unemployment responses to economic shocks for low-skilled workers relative to high-skilled workers and for immigrants relative to natives within the same skill group. There is little evidence for differential wage responses to economic shocks. We offer three explanations for these findings: An equilibrium search model, where immigrants experience higher job separation rates, a model of dual labour markets, and differences in the complementarity of immigrants and natives to capital.

Employment, Wages, and the Economic Cycle: Differences between Immigrants and Natives

Sjaastad (1962) viewed migration in the same way as education: as an investment in the human agent. Migration and education are decisions that are indeed intertwined in many dimensions. Education and skill acquisition play an important role at many stages of an individual's migration. Differential returns to skills in origin and destination country are a main driver of migration. The economic success of the immigrant in the destination country is to a large extent determined by his or her educational background, how transferable these skills are to the host country labor market and how much he or she invests in further skills after arrival. The desire to acquire skills in the host country that have a high return in the country of origin may be another important reason for a migration. From an intertemporal point of view, the possibility of a later migration may affect educational decisions in the home country long before a migration is realized. In addition, the decisions of migrants regarding their own educational investment and their expectations about future migration plans may affect the educational attainment of their children. But migration and education are not only related for those who migrate or their descendants. Migrations of some individuals may have consequences for educational decisions of those who do not migrate, both in the home and in the host country. By easing credit constraints through remittances, migration of some may help others to go to school. By changing the skill base of the receiving country, migration may change incentives to invest in certain types of human capital. In addition, migrants and their children may create externalities that influence educational outcomes of nonmigrants in the destination country. This chapter will discuss some of the key areas that connect migration and education.

/pdf/migration-and-education-ksmtc8g7xg.pdf

Albrecht Glitz

Papers

The Economic Situation of First and Second‐Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom*

The Labor Market Impact of Immigration: A Quasi-Experiment Exploiting Immigrant Location Rules in Germany

The labour market impact of immigration

Employment, Wages, and the Economic Cycle: Differences between Immigrants and Natives

Migration and Education