Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

This article provides an overview of empirical models of strategic interaction among governments. To clarify the theoretical roots of such studies, the discussion shows how the empirical frameworks fit into two broad categories: spillover models and resource-flow models. Both types of models generate jurisdictional reaction functions, and the empirical task is to estimate such functions. When the estimated reaction-function slope is nonzero, the presence of strategic interaction is confirmed. The second part of the article reviews three econometric issues relevant to this estimation problem.

Strategic Interaction Among Governments: An Overview of Empirical Studies:

If informed voters receive favorable policies, then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not. These ideas are developed in a voting model. The model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major New Deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio. The main empirical finding is that U. S. counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds. More funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment, but controlling for these and other variables, the effects of radio are large and highly significant.

Radio's Impact on Public Spending

Será que a desigualdade de rendimentos aumentou durante os últimos tempos? Quem ganhou e quem perdeu neste processo? Este processo afectou todos os países da OCDE uniformemente? Em que medida é que maiores desigualdades de rendimentos são a consequência de maiores diferenças nos rendimentos dos trabalhadores e até que ponto são afectados por outros factores? Finalmente, como é que a redistribuição governamental através do sistema de benefícios fiscais afecta estas tendências?

Book Review: OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries:

The revision of the Rating Outlook to Stable from Negative reflects Fitch’s belief that the city may be required by the EPA to move to secondary treatment at its two largest treatment plants at some time in the future. However, the timing and costs associated with this upgrade could be long term, near or beyond the final year of the current large capital plan (2019). Furthermore, negotiations and the final agreement regarding the timing of such regulatory upgrades may not occur quickly. The Stable Rating Outlook reflects Fitch’s expectation that the third rate package will be adopted and become effective in fiscal 2012 as anticipated and that a change in political administrations or New Issues Wastewater System Revenue Bonds (First Bond Resolution), Senior Series 2009A, 2009B, and 2009C Wastewater System Revenue Bonds (Second Bond Resolution), Junior Series 2009A

“公共财政”和“Public Finance”辨析

https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/2332698.pdf

Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: Evidence from the US

This paper is an empirical study of what motivates net contributors to support redis- tributive policies. While studies in the area have tended to consider broad measures of inequality and support for redistribution, we focus on a single, salient relationship between local unemployment rates and demand for spending on unemployment benefits. Using a particularity of the Spanish labour market we estimate how workers? stated preferences for unemployment benefits spending respond to changes in the local unemployment rate. We then decompose this response into the part explained by risk aversion, and thus demand for insurance, and the part explained by the public good nature of the redistribution. Our results suggest that increases in local unemployment rates lead to increased demand by workers for unemployment benefits spending. Moreover, our results are consistent with an insurance motive driving this relationship but provide little support for any public good component. Our results suggest that studies of the relationship between inequality and demand for redistribution might benefit from considering both the source and measure of the inequality and the instrument of redistribution.

/pdf/is-income-redistribution-a-form-of-insurance-a-public-good-18zl57sgab.pdf

Is income redistribution a form of insurance, a public good or both?

In a decentralised tax system, the effects of tax policies enacted by one government are not confined to its own jurisdiction. First, if both the regional and the federal levels of government co-occupy the same fields of taxation, tax rate increases by one layer of government will reduce taxes collected by the other. Second, if the tax base is mobile, tax rate increases by one regional government will raise the amount of taxes collected by other regional governments. These sources of fiscal interdependence are called in the literature vertical and horizontal tax externalities, respectively. Third, as Smart (1998) shows, if equalisation transfers are present, an increase in the standard equalisation tax rate provides incentives to raise taxes to the receiving provinces. A way to check the empirical relevance of these hypotheses is to test for the existence of interactions between the regional tax rate, on the one hand, and the federal tax rate, the tax rate set by competing regions, and the standard equalisation tax rate, on the other hand. Following this approach, this paper estimates provincial tax setting functions with data on Canadian personal income taxation for the period 1982–1996. We find a significant positive response of provincial tax rates to changes in the federal income tax rate, the tax rates of competing provinces, and the standard equalisation rate (only for receiving provinces). We also find that the reaction to horizontal competition is stronger in the provinces that do not receive equalisation transfers.

/pdf/tax-setting-in-a-federal-system-the-case-of-personal-income-4pmd2e4u24.pdf

Tax Setting in a Federal System: the Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada

Quality of governance is a key for political accountability, hence, the importance of identifying its determinants. Here, we focus on one dimension of quality of governance: fiscal transparency. Drawing on a sample of 691 Catalan municipalities (2001–7), we estimate the factors determining levels of budgetary transparency. Political competition and decentralization are the most important determinants of fiscal transparency. By contrast, budgetary variables do not appear to play any role.

Fiscal Transparency: (Why) does your local government respond?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power at the regional level. Firstly, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an “income effect” which disincentivises the efforts of the regional tax administration. Secondly, these efforts tend to be lower in those electoral districts where vote turnout is high, the margin to lose a parliamentary seat is narrow and their parliamentary representation is high, although the importance of these disincentives decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent. Finally, leftist governments, through the tax administration, tend to exert a greater effort in ensuring tax compliance.

/pdf/is-there-a-connection-between-the-tax-administration-and-the-2ejt7wc68l.pdf

Alejandro Esteller-Moré

Papers

Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: Evidence from the US

Is income redistribution a form of insurance, a public good or both?

Tax Setting in a Federal System: the Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada

Fiscal Transparency: (Why) does your local government respond?

Is There a Connection Between the Tax Administration and the Political Power