Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Inada (1969) and Sen and Pattanaik (1969) have characterized the sets of preference orders which ensure the transitivity of the strict majority rule, no matter how each voter selects his own order in the set. But a problem remains untouched: which domains of orders guarantee the existence of a majority winner without necessarily ensuring the transitivity of the strict majority rule. We provide in this paper domains, called sets of single-peaked linear orders on a tree, which enjoy such a property. They appear as a generalization of the well-known sets of single-peaked linear orders.

Single-peaked orders on a tree

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura

/pdf/strategy-proof-social-choice-8yatxf0684.pdf

Strategy-proof Social Choice

This chapter surveys the literature on strategy proofness from a historical perspective While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models

/pdf/chapter-twenty-five-strategyproof-social-choice-541kjgj0kh.pdf

Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice

BioCCS is a technology gaining support as a possible emissions reduction policy option to address climate change The process entails the capture, transport and storage of carbon dioxide produced during energy production from biomass Globally, the most optimistic energy efficiency scenarios cannot avoid an average temperature increase of +2 °C without bioCCS Although very much at the commencement stage, bioCCS demonstration projects can provide opportunity to garner knowledge, achieve consensus and build support around the technology’s properties Yet many challenges face the bioCCS industry, including no guarantee biomass will always be from sustainable sources or potentially result in carbon stock losses The operating environment also has no or limited policies, regulations and legal frameworks, and risk and safety concerns abound Some state the key problem for bioCCS is cultural, lacking in a ‘community of support’, awareness and credibility amongst its own key stakeholders and the wider public Therefore, the industry can benefit from the growing social science literature, drawing upon other energy and resource based industries with regard to social choice for future energy options To this end, the following scoping review was conducted in order to ascertain gaps in existing public perception and acceptance research focusing on bioCCS

https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/8/5/4024/pdf

Social Science Insights for the BioCCS Industry

1. Basic Concepts.- 1.1 Preferences.- 1.2 Social Choice Correspondences.- 1.3 Monotone Social Choice Correspondences.- 1.4 Social Choice Mechanisms.- 1.5 Effectivity Functions and Blockings.- 1.A1 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.- 1.A2 Non-manipulable SCFs.- 1.A3 Minimal Monotone SCCs.- Bibliographic Comments.- 2. Nash-consistent Mechanisms.- 2.1 Definitions and Examples.- 2.2 Blockings Generated by Consistent Mechanisms.- 2.3 Strongly Monotone Social Choice Correspondences.- 2.4 Nash-implementable Correspondences.- 2.5 Implementation: the Case of Two Participants.- 2.6 Acceptable Mechanisms.- 2.A A Simple Mechanism for the Implementation of Walrasian Equilibria.- Bibliographic Comments.- 3. Strategy-proof Mechanisms.- 3.1 Dominant Strategies. The Revelation Principle.- 3.2 Single-Peaked Environment.- 3.3 Linear Environment.- 3.4 The Transferable Environment. Groves Mechanisms.- 3.5 Further Properties of Groves Mechanisms.- 3.A1 The Simple Transferable Environment Case.- 3.A2 Acceptable Mechanisms in Transferable Environment.- Bibliographic Comments.- 4. Cores and Stable Blockings.- 4.1 Stable Outcomes.- 4.2 Additive Blockings.- 4.3 Convex Blockings.- 4.4 Almost Additive Blockings.- 4.5 Necessary Stability Conditions.- 4.6 Veto as a Decision-making Procedure.- 4.A1 Balanced Blockings.- 4.A2 Blockings with Infinite Number of Alternatives.- 4.A3 The Harems Lemma.- Bibliographic Comments.- 5. Strongly Consistent Mechanisms.- 5.1 Definitions and Examples.- 5.2 A Tokens Mechanism (or Veto-mechanism).- 5.3 Blockings Generated by SC-mechanisms.- 5.4 Direct Core Mechanisms.- 5.5 Laminable Blockings.- 5.6 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Laminability.- 5.7 Neutral Laminable Blockings.- 5.A Implementation via Strong Equilibria.- Bibliographic Comments.- References.

Social Choice Mechanisms

Vetoing in social choice with blockings

This chapter is devoted to Nash-consistent mechanisms, that is mechanisms possessing Nash equilibria at every preference profile. In Section 2.1, we examine a few examples, then proceed to investigate blockings generated by Nash-consistent mechanisms (Section 2.2). In Section 2.3, we show that the correspondence of equilibrium outcomes exhibit a somewhat stronger property than monotonicity, which is called strong monotonicity. In Section 2.4, we describe Nash-implementable SCCs. In the more-than-two-agents case, the class of Nash-implementable SCCs coincides with the class of strongly monotone SCCs. The case of two agents is considered in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, we discuss acceptable mechanisms, that is consistent mechanisms whose outcomes are Pareto optimal.

Nash-consistent Mechanisms

In this chapter we examine strategy-proof mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that endow every agent with the best (called dominant) strategy for each permissible preference profile. Based on the revelation principle, we construct, for every strategy-proof mechanism, an equivalent direct non-manipulable mechanism. The key characteristic of such a mechanism is the agent’s effective region in the set of outcomes. From this point of view, we study the structure of non-manipulable mechanisms in both the universal and the single-peaked environments (Sections 3.1 and 3.2). The convex structure of the outcome set yields an affine environment and allows us to mix strategy-proof mechanisms. In Section 3.3 we conjecture that any non-manipulable mechanism (within an affine environment) is a probability mixture of duplet and unilateral non-manipulable mechanisms. In the following two sections, we study the properties of Groves mechanisms in transferable environments, in particular, the issue of efficiency. We present some efficiency evaluations and efficiency criteria for Groves mechanisms.

Alexander I. Sotskov

Papers

Social Choice Mechanisms

Vetoing in social choice with blockings

Nash-consistent Mechanisms

Strategy-proof Mechanisms

Social choice mechanisms : with 8 figures and 2 tables