Showing papers by "Alexander Peysakhovich published in 2022"
TL;DR: It is shown that even if an analyst cares only about the HTEs in one experiment for one metric, precision can be improved greatly by analyzing all of the data together to take advantage of cross-experiment and cross-outcome metric correlations.
Abstract: Learning heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) is an important problem across many fields. Most existing methods consider the setting with a single treatment arm and a single outcome metric. However, in many real world domains, experiments are run consistently for example, in internet companies, A/B tests are run every day to measure the impacts of potential changes across many different metrics of interest. We show that even if an analyst cares only about the HTEs in one experiment for one metric, precision can be improved greatly by analyzing all of the data together to take advantage of cross-experiment and cross-outcome metric correlations. We formalize this idea in a tensor factorization framework and propose a simple and scalable model which we refer to as the low rank or LR-learner. Experiments in both synthetic and real data suggest that the LR-learner can be much more precise than independent HTE estimation.
2 citations
TL;DR: The authors adapt various types of fairness constraints proposed in existing literature to the market case and show who benefits and who loses from these constraints, as well as the extent to which properties of markets including Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and incentive compatibility are preserved.
Abstract: Fisher markets are those where buyers with budgets compete for scarce items, a natural model for many real world markets including online advertising. We show how market designers can use taxes or subsidies in Fisher markets to ensure that market equilibrium outcomes fall within certain constraints. We adapt various types of fairness constraints proposed in existing literature to the market case and show who benefits and who loses from these constraints, as well as the extent to which properties of markets including Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and incentive compatibility are preserved. We find that several prior proposed constraints applied to markets can hurt the groups they are intended to help.
05 Oct 2022
TL;DR: The authors adapt various types of fairness constraints proposed in existing literature to the market case and show who benefits and who loses from these constraints, as well as the extent to which properties of markets including Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and incentive compatibility are preserved.
Abstract: Fisher markets are those where buyers with budgets compete for scarce items, a natural model for many real world markets including online advertising. A market equilibrium is a set of prices and allocations of items such that supply meets demand. We show how market designers can use taxes or subsidies in Fisher markets to ensure that market equilibrium outcomes fall within certain constraints. We show how these taxes and subsidies can be computed even in an online setting where the market designer does not have access to private valuations. We adapt various types of fairness constraints proposed in existing literature to the market case and show who benefits and who loses from these constraints, as well as the extent to which properties of markets including Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and incentive compatibility are preserved. We find that some prior discussed constraints have few guarantees in terms of who is made better or worse off by their imposition.