Showing papers by "Alexander W. Butler published in 2012"
TL;DR: This paper found that when local media report news about local companies, they use fewer negative words compared to the same media reporting about nonlocal companies, and that one reason for this positive slant is the firms' local media advertising expenditures.
Abstract: When local media report news about local companies, they use fewer negative words compared to the same media reporting about nonlocal companies We document that one reason for this positive slant is the firms' local media advertising expenditures Abnormal positive local media slant strongly relates to firm equity values The effect is stronger for small firms; firms held predominantly by individual investors; and firms with illiquid or highly volatile stock, low analyst following, or high dispersion of analyst forecasts These findings show that news content varies systematically with the characteristics and conflicts of interest of the source
321 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors found that managers in the same educational network as the firm's CEO are more likely to vote against shareholder-initiated proposals to limit executive compensation than out-of-network funds.
Abstract: Mutual funds whose managers are in the same educational network as the firm’s CEO are more likely to vote against shareholder-initiated proposals to limit executive compensation than out-of-network funds. This voting propensity is stronger when voting among the funds in a family is not unanimous. Furthermore, CEOs of firms with relatively high levels of educationally connected mutual fund ownership have higher levels of compensation than their unconnected counterparts. This aspect of executive compensation is related to both the abnormal trading performance of the connected investors in the firm and the perceived quality of firm management by the connected investors.
115 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that shareholders in the same educational network as the firm's CEO are more likely to vote against shareholder-initiated proposals to limit executive compensation than out-of-network funds.
Abstract: Mutual funds whose managers are in the same educational network as the firm's CEO are more likely to vote against shareholder-initiated proposals to limit executive compensation than out-of-network funds are. This voting propensity is stronger when voting among the funds in a family is not unanimous. Furthermore, CEOs of firms who have relatively high levels of educationally connected mutual fund ownership have higher levels of compensation than their unconnected counterparts. This aspect of executive compensation is related to both the abnormal trading performance of the connected investors in the firm and the perceived quality of firm management by the connected investors. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.
60 citations
TL;DR: The authors examine the production of soft versus hard information by nonbank intermediaries by studying the fees they charge firms they rate and find that when agencies charge higher fees, they rely less on publicly available hard information.
Abstract: The level of interaction between bond rating agencies and firms they rate varies substantially cross-sectionally. For instance, many bond ratings are solicited by bond issuers, resulting in a relationship between the firm and the rating agencies they hire. But other bond ratings are unsolicited, whereby there is generally no interchange of information between firm and agency, other than that which is already public. We examine the production of soft versus hard information by these non-bank intermediaries by studying the fees they charge firms they rate. We employ rating fees as a proxy for the effort exerted by credit analysts and find that when agencies charge higher fees, they rely less on publicly available hard information. We thus infer that these more costly ratings reflect an assessment of soft information about bond issuers. Our results are less consistent with fee variation due to extortion or rating shopping.
28 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an updated guide for newly minted PhDs entering the academic finance job market for the first time and describe the institutional details of how this labor market works and what rookies need to know to improve their chances of getting the right job.
Abstract: This paper is an updated guide for newly minted PhDs entering the academic finance job market for the first time. We describe the institutional details of how this labor market works and what rookies need to know to improve their chances of getting the right job. We give advice for application materials, conferences, interviews, and fly-outs. We discuss job offers and what to do if a job seeker does not get one. Our advice complements strategy discussions between students and their advisors and empowers students to ask better questions of their advisors.
2 citations