Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Inevitably, reading is one of the requirements to be undergone. To improve the performance and quality, someone needs to have something new every day. It will suggest you to have more inspirations, then. However, the needs of inspirations will make you searching for some sources. Even from the other people experience, internet, and many books. Books and internet are the recommended media to help you improving your quality and performance.

The Logic and Limits of Trust

There has been a lot of research and development in the field of computational trust in the past decade. Much of it has acknowledged or claimed that trust is a good thing. We think it's time to look at the other side of the coin and ask the questions why is it good, what alternatives are there, where do they fit, and is our assumption always correct?

We examine the need for an addressing of the concepts of Trust, Mistrust, and Distrust, how they interlink and how they affect what goes on around us and within the systems we create. Finally, we introduce the phenomenon of ‘Untrust,' which resides in the space between trusting and distrusting. We argue that the time is right, given the maturity and breadth of the field of research in trust, to consider how untrust, distrust and mistrust work, why they can be useful in and of themselves, and where they can shine.

Trust, untrust, distrust and mistrust – an exploration of the dark(er) side

In 1998, Ian Foster and Carl Kesselman, together with thirty distinguished experts in high-performance computing and networking, laid the foundations of a new computing model called GRID. Their vision was introduced in the book, The GRID: Blueprint for a New Computing Infrastructure (see review, SCPE Vol. 3, No. 3 ). The editors wrote: … A computational grid is a hardware and software infrastructure that provides dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-end computational capabilities… allowing new classes of applications to emerge… as yet, we have only a preliminary understanding of what these new applications will look like. Over the next five years, Grid computing became the hottest R&D field. Academia and national labs built experimental infrastructures, new startups were established to develop Grid technologies, and the HPC giant vendors joined the party. Each one pushed in a different direction based on what and how he believed Grid computing should look. It was only a matter of time until people started to ask what the Grid is all about. A survey of ten Grid experts produced ten different answers. The question remains without a clear answer, leaving many people confused. Ian Foster picked up the gloves. In his article, What is the GRID? A three point checklist (GRIDtoday, July 22, 2002: Vol. 1, No. 6), he redefines the Grid model to reflect the trades and changes in the field during the past five years. According to Foster, a Grid is a system that: Coordinates resources that are not subject to centralized control. Uses standard, open, general-purpose protocols and interfaces. Delivers a nontrivial quality of service. But Foster's new definition could not encompass all of the Grid's approaches. Moreover, Foster explained by example what the Grid is not: A cluster management system such as Sun's Sun Grid Engine, Platform's Load Sharing Facility, or Viridian's Portable Batch System can, when installed on a parallel computer or local area network, deliver quality of service guarantees and thus constitutes a powerful Grid resource. However, such a system is not a Grid itself, due to its centralized control of the hosts that it manages Within a week the responses started to come in. The first one was from Wolfgang Gentzsch, Director of Grid computing at Sun Microsystems (GRIDtoday, August 5, 2002: Vol. 1, No. 8). Gentzsch wrote: I very much like Ian's two earlier definitions. Combined, they may provide a very generic Grid definition. The new checklist, however, reduces the potential of a wide and rich variety of Grids, with different architectures, operational models, and applications, and may miss the chance to becoming widely accepted as a standard definition of the Grid. Why do we need a definition for the Grid? Can the Grid be defined? Is a definition is necessary to the Grid's development? The Grid is an open vision and thus cannot be defined. An attempt to define the Grid can only reach the foreseen technology horizon, and this horizon is only one to two years ahead. Grid computing is a paradigm in shift. New architectures and standards are changing the shape and direction of the Grid's development. In the past year one such prominent architecture was Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA). The OGSA is the first attempt to bridge the gap between two cyberspace worlds: the Internet and the Grid. The Internet and the Grid are two different computing models. There are people who believe that the Grid is the next generation of the Internet and the World Wide Web, saying that the Great Global Grid is still many years away. Others state that the Grid will complement, not replace, the Internet as we know it. In 1998, when the Grid blueprint was published, a new Internet language appeared called eXtensible Markup Language (XML). XML is a development tool for a new Internet computing model known as Web Services. At that time, nobody understood that there is a relationship between Web Services and the Grid. Three years past before Steve Tuecke from Argonne National Laboratory started to write a spec for Grid Services. Later, people from IBM joined the mission and together they created OGSA. The OGSA specification outlines interfaces to grid computing software that comply with Web Services standards. If adopted, Grid services such as job scheduling, authentication, failure-detection, staging of applications and data, and migration of applications and data, will all be accessed through standard Web Services architecture. OGSA is basically where Grid meets Web Services and maybe the first step towards full integration of the Internet and the Grid. The Internet appeared a decade ago. In the beginning, the Net offered primitive applications: a mailing system, ftp services, and a web of home pages. Nobody asked, What is the Internet? The years passed and new emerging Internet technologies were developed. Today we can talk on the phone over the Net, chat with friends, and video conference with colleagues on the other side of the world. New computing and business models were developed: e-commerce, e-learning, e-science, and e-you-name-it. And nobody asks what the Internet is. The Grid is a super-model, a bag of networking models associated with many types of architectures, software packages, applications, and standards. Today, when people talk about the Grid they mention Data Grids, Science Grids, and Campus Grids. And at the same time they mention Farm computing, Peer-to-peer computing, and Utility computing, among others. Ten years from now many of today's technologies will disappear and new ones will be developed. I don't know how Grid computing will look a decade from now, but I know that we will have g-commerce, g-learning, g-science, and g-chat. Nobody will ask what the Grid is. It will be obvious, just as the Internet is today. Ami Marowka The Computer Aided Design Laboratory School of Engineering and Computer Science Hebrew University of Jerusalem

What is the GRID

Social Trust and the Management of Risk

Recent developments in the pervasiveness and mobility of computer systems in open computer networks have invalidated traditional assumptions about trust in computer communications security. In a fundamentally decentralised and open network such as the Internet, the responsibility for answering the question of whether one can trust another entity on the network now lies with the individual agent, and not a priori a decision to be governed by a central authority. Online agents represent users' digital identities. Thus, we believe that it is reasonable to explore social models of trust for secure agent communication. The thesis of this work is that it is feasible to design and formalise a dynamic model of trust for secure communications based on the properties of social trust. In showing this, we divide this work into two phases. The aim of the first is to understand the properties and dynamics of social trust and its role in computer systems. To this end, a thorough review of trust, and its supporting concept, reputation, in the social sciences was carried out. We followed this by a rigorous analysis of current trust models, comparing their properties with those of social trust. We found that current models were designed in an ad-hoc basis, with regards to trust properties. The aim of the second phase is to build a framework for trust reasoning in distributed systems. Knowledge from the previous phase is used to design and formally specify, in Z, a computational trust model. A simple model for the communication of recommendations, the recommendation protocol, is also outlined to complement the model. Finally an analysis of possible threats to the model is carried out. Elements of this work have been incorporated into Sun's JXTA framework and Ericsson Research's prototype trust model.

Alfare Abdul-Rahman

Papers

A framework for decentralised trust reasoning.