Showing papers by "Alfred Endres published in 1978"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors point out that a polluting monopolist assumed to produce optimal output will realize the optimal level of pollution only if outputreduction is the sole means to reduce the externality.
Abstract: Compared with the Pareto-optimal situation a polluting monopolist will produce too little as a monopolist and too much as a polluter. These two failures may-in principle-cancel each other and lead to a Pareto-optimal situation. This note is to point out that a polluting monopolist assumed to produce optimal output will realize the optimal level of pollution only if outputreduction is the sole means to reduce the-externality. When other efficient measures are possible, monopoly-power can-even theoretically-never correct the allocative failure of an external diseconomy because the monopolist will not use the efficient input mix. To obtain the Pareto-condition let us consider a perfectly competitive polluting firm A and a perfectly competitive damaged firm B. x andy are the respective outputs, QA and QB the respective profits of the two firms. Paretooptimum is achieved when the joint profit Qj is maximal. Given output reduction as the sole means of pollution control this leads to
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TL;DR: In this paper, fraudulence is explicitly introduced in the Demsetz model, and it is shown that fraudulent consumers do no harm to the optimality of supplying public goods privately, under certain conditions private firms can supply public goods efficiently.
Abstract: H. Demsetz claimed that under certain conditions private firms can supply public goods efficiently. Recently, it was argued that the optimality of the Demsetz equilibrium is destroyed when consumers engage in fraudulent behavior. In this paper, fraudulence is explicitly introduced in the Demsetz model. It ig shown that fraudulent consumers do no harm to the optimality of supplying public goods privately, within the framework of the Demsetz model.