Preface to the Princeton Landmarks in Biology Edition vii Preface xi Symbols Used xiii 1. The Importance of Islands 3 2. Area and Number of Speicies 8 3. Further Explanations of the Area-Diversity Pattern 19 4. The Strategy of Colonization 68 5. Invasibility and the Variable Niche 94 6. Stepping Stones and Biotic Exchange 123 7. Evolutionary Changes Following Colonization 145 8. Prospect 181 Glossary 185 References 193 Index 201

The Theory of Island Biogeography

The author systematically examines one of the important issues of information — establishing the market price. He introduces the concept of «search» — where a buyer wanting to get a better price, is forced to question sellers. The article deals with various aspects of finding the necessary information.

Economics of Information

Climate Change 1995 is a scientific assessment that was generated by more than 1 000 contributors from over 50 nations. It was jointly co-ordinated through two international agencies; the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme. The assessment was completed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) with a primary aim of reviewing the current state of knowledge concerning the impacts of climate change on physical and ecological systems, human health, and socioeconomic factors. The second aim was to review the available information on the technical and economic feasibility of the potential mitigation and adaptation strategies.

Climate Change 1995

Preface 1. Introduction: the problem of collective action 2. The prisoners' dilemma, chicken and other games in the provision of public goods 3. The two-person prisoners' dilemma supergame 4. The N-person prisoners' dilemma supergame 5. Altruism and superiority 6. The state 7. Epilogue: cooperation, the state and anarchy Annex Notes Bibliography Index.

The possibility of cooperation

Safely achieving the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement requires a worldwide transformation to carbon-neutral societies within the next 30 y. Accelerated technological progress and policy implementations are required to deliver emissions reductions at rates sufficiently fast to avoid crossing dangerous tipping points in the Earth's climate system. Here, we discuss and evaluate the potential of social tipping interventions (STIs) that can activate contagious processes of rapidly spreading technologies, behaviors, social norms, and structural reorganization within their functional domains that we refer to as social tipping elements (STEs). STEs are subdomains of the planetary socioeconomic system where the required disruptive change may take place and lead to a sufficiently fast reduction in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The results are based on online expert elicitation, a subsequent expert workshop, and a literature review. The STIs that could trigger the tipping of STE subsystems include 1) removing fossil-fuel subsidies and incentivizing decentralized energy generation (STE1, energy production and storage systems), 2) building carbon-neutral cities (STE2, human settlements), 3) divesting from assets linked to fossil fuels (STE3, financial markets), 4) revealing the moral implications of fossil fuels (STE4, norms and value systems), 5) strengthening climate education and engagement (STE5, education system), and 6) disclosing information on greenhouse gas emissions (STE6, information feedbacks). Our research reveals important areas of focus for larger-scale empirical and modeling efforts to better understand the potentials of harnessing social tipping dynamics for climate change mitigation.

https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/117/5/2354.full.pdf

Social tipping dynamics for stabilizing Earth's climate by 2050.

Part I. The Internalization of Externalities as Central Theme of Environmental Policy: 1. Foundations 2. Implications of making the concept of internalization programmatic in environment policy Part II. Strategies for Internalizing Externalities: 3. Negotiations 4. Environmental liability law 5. Pigovian tax Part III. Standard-Oriented Instruments of Environmental Policy: 6. Introduction 7. Types of environmental policy instruments 8. Assessment of environmental policy instruments Part IV. Extensions of the Basic Environmental-Economics Model: 9. Environmental policy with pollutant interactions 10. Environmental policy with imperfect competition 11. Internalization negotiations with asymmetrical information 12. The 'double dividend' of the green tax 13. The induction of advances in environmental technology through environment policy Part V. International Environmental Problems: 14. Introduction 15. International environmental agreements 16. Instruments of international environmental policy - the example of the EU's emissions trading 17. Epilogue: the vision of a federal US emission trading system Part VI. Natural Resources and Sustainable Development: 18. Resource exhaustion - the end of mankind? 19. Renewable resources 20. Sustainable development Epilogue: three types of externality and the increasing difficulty of internalizing them.

Environmental Economics: Theory and Policy

The development of care technology under liability law

Negotiating a climate convention: The role of prices and quantities

Economists have persistently argued that market-based instruments are better suited than command and control instruments (CAC) to achieve pollution abatement targets cost-effectively. However, this advice has not yet fallen on fertile soil. CAC is the predominant instrument in practical environmental policy. The paper attempts to give an explanation for this observation by analyzing two countries negotiating emission reductions in a world with “typical” institutional restrictions. Negotiations are assumed to be either on a uniform emission reduction quota or a uniform emission tax. Counterintuitively, it turns out that in such a second-best world an agreement under a cost-inefficient quota regime may be superior to an efficient tax agreement with respect to ecological and welfare criteria. Moreover, in contrast to a quota agreement, a tax agreement may not be feasible and stable if countries exhibit asymmetric cost-benefit structures.

Quotas may beat taxes in a global emission game

The economic principle is presented as the strategy best suited to deal with the problem of scarcity. Acting in accordance with this principle yields efficient results, such that there is no waste of resources. Consumers and firms are assumed to be agents who act economically. The structure of interaction between consumers and firms is outlined as a circular flow. A positive, i.e., merely observing and describing, analysis of this interactive structure is distinguished from a normative one, which evaluates the outcomes of interaction according to the criteria of efficiency, justice, and stability. (Efficiency is in the centre of mainstream economic analysis. This is so because the impetus for acting efficiently follows directly from the fundamental economic problem of scarcity. Therefore, this criterion receives particular attention in our discussion.) From any violation of these criteria, a justification of governmental action may be deduced. As two fields of governmental action, the choice of economic system and interventions in the economic process are discussed.

Alfred Endres

Papers

Environmental Economics: Theory and Policy

The development of care technology under liability law

Negotiating a climate convention: The role of prices and quantities

Quotas may beat taxes in a global emission game

The Economic Approach