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Showing papers by "Alison M. Jaggar published in 1974"


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jul 1974-Ethics
TL;DR: A more conventional, though not more apt, definition of a feminist is one who believes that justice requires equality between women and men as mentioned in this paper, which is at least a necessary one.
Abstract: A more conventional, though not more apt, definition of a feminist is one who believes that justice requires equality between women and men. Not that equality is a sufficient condition of human or of women's liberation, but it is at least a necessary one. For this reason, and since the concept of equality is already notoriously elusive, it seems worthwhile to spend a little time reflecting on what it would mean for the sexes to be equal. Equality, in the sense with which social philosophers are concerned, is a social ideal. Therefore, sexual equality does not mean that individuals of different sexes should be physically indistinguishable from each other (as misogynists sometimes pretend is the goal of women's liberation). It means rather that those of one sex, in virtue of their sex, should not be in a socially advantageous position vis-a'-vis those of the other sex. A society in which this condition obtained would be a nonsexist society. Although all feminists, by definition, agree that sexism should be eliminated, disagreement arises among us over how this should be done and how our common goal of sexual equality should be achieved.

18 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Searle's first attack on this distinction was made in 1964 in his now classic article, "How to derive 'ought' from 'is" as discussed by the authors, which presented what he claimed to be a counter-example to the thesis that statements of fact may not entail statements of value.
Abstract: In this paper, I want to discuss the recent attempts by Professor John R. Searle to cast doubt on the traditional empiricist distinction between fact and value. Searle's first attack on this distinction was made in 1964 in his now classic article, "How to derive 'ought' from 'is'."1 In that paper, he presented what he claimed to be a counter-example to the thesis that statements of fact may not entail statements of value. Searle's argument aroused much controversy and inspired many attempted refutations, but Searle apparently found none of these convincing, for a few years later he published a revised version of his paper as the last chapter of his book, Speech Acts.2 The new version includes his replies to many of the objections which had been made to his thesis up to that time. It also includes, in the main body of the book, a theory of language which is supposed to provide the theoretical underpinning explaining why his original paper presents a genuine counter-example to the position he is attacking. It is the Speech Acts version of Searle's thesis which I want to consider here.

3 citations