We examine the determinants and implications of holdings of cash and marketable" securities by publicly traded U.S. firms in the 1971-1994 period. Firms with strong growth" opportunities and riskier cash flows hold relatively high ratios of cash to total assets. Firms" that have the greatest access to the capital markets (e.g. large firms and those with credit" ratings) tend to hold lower ratios of cash to total assets. These results are consistent with the" view that firms hold liquid assets to ensure that they will be able to keep investing when cash" flow is too low relative to planned investment and when outside funds are expensive. The" short run impact of excess cash on capital expenditures, acquisition spending and payouts to" shareholders is small. The main reason that firms experience large changes in excess cash is" the occurrence of operating losses. There is no evidence that risk management and cash" holdings are substitutes.

The Determinants and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings

The East Asian miracle: Economic growth and public policy: By the World Bank. (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1993. 389 pp. $19.95, paper.)

The theory of precautionary saving is shown in this paper to be isomorphic to the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion, making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving, and more generally, to the theory of optimal choice under risk In particular, a measure of the strength of precautionary saving motive analogous to the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving, and to give a new interpretation of the Oreze-Modigliani substitution effect

Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large

Few areas of monetary economics have been studied as extensively as the transmission mechanism. The literature on this topic has evolved substantially over the years, following the waxing and waning of conceptual frameworks and the changing characteristics of the financial system. In this paper, taking as a starting point a brief overview of the extant work on the interaction between capital regulation, the business cycle and the transmission mechanism, we offer some broader reflections on the characteristics of the transmission mechanism in light of the evolution of the financial system. We argue that insufficient attention has so far been paid to the link between monetary policy and the perception and pricing of risk by economic agents - what might be termed the "risk-taking channel" of monetary policy. We develop the concept, compare it with current views of the transmission mechanism, explore its mutually reinforcing link with "liquidity" and analyse its interaction with monetary policy reaction functions. We argue that changes in the financial system and prudential regulation may have increased the importance of the risk-taking channel and that prevailing macroeconomic paradigms and associated models are not well suited to capturing it, thereby also reducing their effectiveness as guides to monetary policy.

/pdf/capital-regulation-risk-taking-and-monetary-policy-a-missing-4virgvq8ix.pdf

Capital Regulation, Risk-Taking and Monetary Policy: A Missing Link in the Transmission Mechanism?

13 EADERS of Mr. Bertrand Russell's philosophical £v works know that one of his pupils before the outbreak of the war, an Austrian, Mr. Ludwig Wittgenstein, caused him to change his views in some important particulars. Curiosity can now be satisfied. The “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus “which Mr. Ogden has included in his new library of philosophy is a remarkable and strikingly original work. It is published in German and English in parallel pages. It is difficult to appreciate the reason for this, seeing that the author is evidently familiar with our language and has himself carefully revised the proofs of the translation. Also we should have liked to have the Tractatus without Mr. Russell's Introduction, not, we hasten to add, on account of any fault or shortcoming in that introduction, which is highly appreciative and in part a defence of himself, in part explanatory of the author, but for the reason that good wine needs no bush and that Mr. Russell's bush has the unfortunate effect of dulling the palate instead of whetting the appetite. In his penultimate sentence Mr. Russell says; “To have constructed a theory of logic which is not at any point obviously wrong is to have achieved a work of extraordinary difficulty and importance.” We agree, but how uninspiring when compared with Mr. Wittgenstein's own statement of aim: “What can be said at all can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.) Pp. 189. (London: Kegan Paul and Co., Ltd.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1922.) 10s. 6d. net.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Risk capital is the contribution of an exposure to the default risk of a financial institution. We investigate its relationship with required shareholder returns, showing that the use of return on risk capital (RAROC) as a risk-adjusted performance measure is inconsistent with the standard theory of financial valuation and that using this one measure to represent at the same time both contribution to default risk and required shareholder returns can lead to substantial loss of shareholder value. We propose an alternative performance measure distinguishing these two aspects of risk and applicable to the efficient allocation of risk capital.

Apples and Pears: The Comparison of Risk Capital and Required Return in Financial Institutions

Prior to the crisis the dominant paradigm in macroeconomic modeling was the micro-founded “New-Keynesian” DSGE model (described in many textbooks including the influential exposition of Woodford (2003)). In its most basic form this combines price-stickiness with forward looking decision making by both households and firms. This provides a tractable framework for capturing the response of output and inflation to both demand and supply shocks and explaining intuitively the transmission of monetary policy (with monetary policy characterized as a choice over rules for current and future interest rates).

/pdf/post-crisis-macrofinancial-modeling-continuous-time-588e3xr0po.pdf

Post-Crisis Macrofinancial Modeling: Continuous Time Approaches

Optimal regulation of deposit taking financial intermediaries: A correction

This is an updated version of the briefing note from our conference, held at Loughborough University in London, 9th December 2016, on 'International Trade Agreements After Brexit: Establishing The Facts', sponsored by the ESRC's UK in a Changing Europe Initiative

/pdf/a-briefing-on-the-uk-s-choice-of-trade-arrangements-outside-249igha6jd.pdf

A briefing on the UK's choice of trade arrangements outside of the EU

This book brings together senior macroeconomists from universities and the Bank of England to look at what policy-making lessons can be learned from looking at the period of expansion that preceded the financial crisis.

/pdf/an-old-fashioned-banking-crisis-credit-growth-and-loan-1w7f6aty94.pdf

Alistair Milne

Papers

Apples and Pears: The Comparison of Risk Capital and Required Return in Financial Institutions

Post-Crisis Macrofinancial Modeling: Continuous Time Approaches

Optimal regulation of deposit taking financial intermediaries: A correction

A briefing on the UK's choice of trade arrangements outside of the EU

An old fashioned banking crisis: credit growth and loan losses in the UK 1997-2012