American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

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Current index to legal periodicals

nakedness of being human and nothing but human.” Incorporating biopolitics, Agamben suggests that the pairing of enjoyment of human rights with citizenship status is not a fluke or mistake to be dislocated from the otherwise functioning state system; rather, this occurrence acts to shore up sovereign power. Then, following Schmitt, Agamben argues that in fact sovereign power resides in the decision to decide on who loses the right to have rights and, hence, becomes bare life existing in the state of exception. Agamben argues that the immigration detention centre is an important instance of the state of exception. For him, the state of exception constitutes law while simultaneously suspending it. It is a “zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of subjective right and juridical protection no longer make any sense.” The detention centre/state of exception signifies sovereign power through its determination of the reach of the law live in the state of exception means to experience both of these possibilities and yet, by always separating the two forces, ceaselessly try to interrupt the working of the machine that is leading the West toward global civil war. 175 Rancière (2004, p.300) explains that bare life “becomes the complicity of democracy, viewed as the mass individualistic concern with individual life, with technologies of power holding sway over biological life as such.” 176 Agamben, 1998: 170. 177 Agamben, 1998: 170.

The normative ethics of immigration detention in liberal states

In this book, James R. Maxeiner takes on the challenge of demonstrating that historically American law makers did consider a statutory methodology as part of formulating laws. In the nineteenth century, when the people wanted laws they could understand, lawyers inflicted judge-made, statute-destroying, common law on them. Maxeiner offers the cure for common law, in the form of sensible statute law. Building on this historical evidence, Maxeiner shows how rule-making in civil law jurisdictions in other countries makes for a far more equitable legal system. Sensible statute laws fit together: one statute governs, as opposed to several laws that even lawyers have trouble disentangling. In a statute law system, lawmakers make laws for the common good in sensible procedures, and judges apply sensible laws and do not make them. This book shows how such a system works in Germany and how it would be a solution for the American legal system as well.

Failures of American Methods of Lawmaking in Historical and Comparative Perspectives

One of the most persistent criticisms of international criminal tribunals has been that they cost too much and take too long. In response, this Article presents a new approach that utilizes two concepts: complexity and efficiency. The first half of this Article proposes a method for measuring the complexity of criminal trials and then uses that method to measure the complexity of the trials conducted at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”). The results are striking. Even the least complex ICTY trial is more complex than the average criminal trial in the United States, and the most complex ICTY trials are among the most complex trials that have ever taken place. This highlights why it is misleading to compare the cost and length of the ICTY’s trials to other trials, both domestic and international, without first accounting for their complexity. The second half of the Article explores the efficiency of international criminal trials. Efficiency is defined as the complexity of a trial divided by its cost, and the Article calculates the overall efficiency of the ICTY and then compares that to the efficiency of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and a sample of criminal trials in the United States. The results show that the ICTY is more efficient than the SCSL and approximately as efficient as complex murder trials in the United States. The ICTY is less efficient than a typical domestic murder trial, but this appears to be because efficiency decreases as complexity increases, making such cases poor comparators. Although the data is sparse, the ICTY appears to be much more efficient than its closest domestic comparator — mass atrocity trials. Ultimately, the ICTY has been more efficient than cases of comparable gravity and complexity tried in domestic courts or at the SCSL.

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Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts

In the current era of intensified immigration enforcement and heightened risks of deportation even for long-term lawful permanent residents, citizenship has taken on a new meaning and greater importance. There is also growing evidence that citizenship denials in their various forms have become inextricably linked to immigration enforcement. Who is denied citizenship, why, and under what circumstances? This chapter begins to address these questions by developing a typology of citizenship denials and providing an empirical overview of each type of citizenship denial. Taken together, the typology of citizenship denials and the accompanying empirical overview illustrate the close connection between immigration enforcement and citizenship rights in the United States.

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Denying Citizenship: Immigration Enforcement and Citizenship Rights in the United States

It is time to heed the calls for legal education reform. In our changing economy, new attorneys need to be properly trained in law school to be competent at providing effective legal services for their employers and clients. Law schools must remain open to and interested in legal reform; they must partner with practitioners to incorporate more practical skills into the law school curriculum. Updating how we teach legal research by making it accord more with how attorneys actually conduct and use legal research in practice will help accomplish this and will also more actively engage our Millennial students. There is no question that making some timely changes to legal research instruction would better prepare new attorneys to be competent practicing lawyers and would be a win-win for students, law schools and employers.

Think [And Practice] Like a Lawyer: Legal Research for the New Millennials

In November 2011, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber declared a moratorium on the Oregon death penalty, calling it a system that is “compromised and inequitable” and “fails to meet basic standards of justice.” With Governor Kitzhaber’s refusal to allow any further executions under his watch, Oregon became one of the most recent states to withdraw from the death penalty. Indeed, Governor Kitzhaber’s statement recognized the practical and financial difficulties with, and ultimately the unjustness of, Oregon’s death-penalty system and, as such, called on Oregonians to discover a better alternative. In this Article, Professor Kaplan examines Oregon’s lengthy and dysfunctional death-penalty system and the practical realities that make it so problematic. The discussion analyzes the history of Oregon’s death penalty; the serious and prevalent issue of wrongful convictions across the country (including Oregon); the extraordinary taxpayer costs associated with maintaining the death penalty in Oregon, where only two people — both of whom were volunteers — have been executed; and the changes in state law and death penalty jurisprudence that have slowed the administration of Oregon’s death penalty to render it ineffective. Professor Kaplan argues that, given these practical concerns, the Oregon death penalty, as it currently stands, is in serious need of examination from a public policy standpoint to ensure that cost, effectiveness, and time, are given proper consideration. To do this, she recommends that Governor Kitzhaber designate a non-partisan committee to study Oregon’s death penalty as it currently stands and report its findings. Professor Kaplan concludes that a comprehensive committee report on Oregon’s death penalty will ultimately allow Oregonians to decide whether to maintain or abolish the death penalty.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2141502_code1940442.pdf?abstractid=2141502&mirid=1

Oregon's Death Penalty: The Practical Reality

In May 2011, in Matter of M-A-M, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for the first time examined the issue of mentally disabled aliens and their vulnerability in immigration proceedings. To assist Immigration Judges (IJs), the BIA created a framework to analyze cases where issues of mental competency are raised. While this decision appears to recognize the unjust plight of mentally disabled respondents in removal proceedings, it is wholly insufficient in providing meaningful due process protection to aliens with mental disabilities. Given the complexities of immigration law and the profound impact that legal representation can have on an alien, those with mental disabilities cannot be expected to properly defend themselves against removal without legal representation.

Disabled and Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally Disabled Aliens in Removal Proceedings

Despite the recent advances in assessing the reliability of eyewitness identifications, the focus to date has largely been identifications made pretrial. Little has been written about identifications made for the first time in the courtroom. While in-court identifications have an extraordinarily powerful effect on juries, all such identifications are potentially vulnerable to post-event memory distortion and decay. Absent an identification procedure that effectively tests the witness’s memory, it is impossible to know if the witness’s identification of the defendant is a product of his or her original memory or a product of the extraordinarily suggestive circumstances created by the in-court identification procedure. In this article, the authors discuss the science related to memory and perception and how the courts have historically addressed claims of suggestiveness in the context of eyewitness identifications and, specifically, how they have handled first time in-court identifications. They analyze the issue of first time, in-court identifications under the new legal frameworks established by the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Lawson (2012) and the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Henderson (2011), which both recognize 30 years of science proving that memories are malleable and easily influenced by outside forces. They argue that, in all states, first time, in-court identifications should be inadmissible, forcing the state to conduct a reliable out-of-court identification, whether pretrial or with leave during trial.

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Who Could it be Now? Challenging the Reliability of First Time In-Court Identifications After State v. Henderson and State v. Lawson

An introduction to the symposium edition of articles on wrongful conviction that were presented at the Innocence Network Conference in San Antonio, Texas, in April 2016.

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Aliza B. Kaplan

Papers

Think [And Practice] Like a Lawyer: Legal Research for the New Millennials

Oregon's Death Penalty: The Practical Reality

Disabled and Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally Disabled Aliens in Removal Proceedings

Who Could it be Now? Challenging the Reliability of First Time In-Court Identifications After State v. Henderson and State v. Lawson

Contemporary Perspectives on Wrongful Conviction: An Introduction to the 2016 Innocence Network Conference, San Antonio, Texas