计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

This paper studies the determinants of income smoothing by management of loan-loss provisions in banks around the world. Using a panel database of 3221 bank-year observations from 40 countries and controlling for unobservable bank effects and for the endogeneity of explanatory variables, we find that bank income smoothing depends on investor protection, disclosure, regulation and supervision, financial structure, and financial development. Results suggest there is less bank income smoothing not only with the strength of investor protection, but also with the extent of accounting disclosure, restrictions on bank activities, and official and private supervision, while there is more income smoothing with market orientation and development of a country's financial system.

Cross-country determinants of bank income smoothing by managing loan loss provisions

Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists

This research has been partially supported by grants from the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (#U1811462, #71874023, #71771037, #71725001, and #71433001).

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Machine learning methods for systemic risk analysis in financial sectors

The subprime crisis highlights how little we know about the governance of banks. This paper addresses a long-standing gap in the literature by analyzing board governance using a sample of banking firm data that spans forty years. We examine the relationship between board structure (size and composition) and bank performance, as well as some determinants of board structure. We document that mergers and acquisitions activity influences bank board composition, and we provide new evidence that organizational structure is significantly related to bank board size. We argue that these factors may explain why banking firms with larger boards do not underperform their peers in terms of Tobin's Q. Our findings suggest caution in applying regulations motivated by research on the governance of nonfinancial firms to banking firms. Since organizational structure is not specific to banks, our results suggest that it may be an important determinant for the boards of nonfinancial firms with complex organizational structures such as business groups.

Corporate performance, board structure, and their determinants in the banking industry

Risk governance and Asian bank performance: An empirical investigation over the financial crisis

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Strong boards, ownership concentration and EU banks’ systemic risk-taking: Evidence from the financial crisis

Securitization and systemic risk: An empirical investigation on Italian banks over the financial crisis

Gender diversity and bank misconduct

We examine the discretionary use of loan loss provisions during the recent financial crisis, when Euro Area banks experienced not only a negative effect on the quality of their loans and a reduction in their profitability, but were also subject to a new form of stricter supervision, namely the EBA 2010 and 2011 stress test exercises. Overall, we find support for the only income smoothing hypothesis and we do not observe any difference in listed banks’ behavior when compared to unlisted banks. Banks subject to EBA stress tests had higher incentives to smooth income only for the 2011 EBA exercise, when a larger and more detailed set of information was released. This may suggest an unwilled side effect that accounting setters and banking regulators and supervisors should account for.

Angela Gallo

Papers

Risk governance and Asian bank performance: An empirical investigation over the financial crisis

Strong boards, ownership concentration and EU banks’ systemic risk-taking: Evidence from the financial crisis

Securitization and systemic risk: An empirical investigation on Italian banks over the financial crisis

Gender diversity and bank misconduct

Financial crisis and international supervision: new evidence on the discretionary use of loan loss provisions at Euro Area commercial banks