In recent years, the food and beverage industry in the US has viewed children and adolescents as a major market force. As a result, children and adolescents are now the target of intense and specialized food marketing and advertising efforts. Food marketers are interested in youth as consumers because of their spending power, their purchasing influence, and as future adult consumers. Multiple techniques and channels are used to reach youth, beginning when they are toddlers, to foster brand-building and influence food product purchase behavior. These food marketing channels include television advertising, in-school marketing, product placements, kids clubs, the Internet, toys and products with brand logos, and youth-targeted promotions, such as cross-selling and tie-ins. Foods marketed to children are predominantly high in sugar and fat, and as such are inconsistent with national dietary recommendations. The purpose of this article is to examine the food advertising and marketing channels used to target children and adolescents in the US, the impact of food advertising on eating behavior, and current regulation and policies.

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Food Advertising and Marketing Directed at Children and Adolescents in the US

https://friedmanfellows.com/assets/pdfs/elibrary/ObesiTV_final.pdf

ObesiTV: How television is influencing the obesity epidemic

Contents: Preface. Part I: Theoretical Dimensions in Media Management and Economics. A.B. Albarran, Historical Trends and Patterns in Media Management Research. R.G. Picard, Historical Trends and Patterns in Media Economics. B.I. Mierzejewska, C.A. Hollifield, Theoretical Approaches in Media Management Research. S.S. Wildman, Paradigms and Analytical Frameworks in Modern Economics and Media Economics. B.A. Cherry, Regulatory and Political Influences on Media Management and Economics. Part II: Issues in Media Management and Economics. J.W. Redmond, Issues in Human Relations Management. R.J. Rizzuto, Issues in Financial Management. S.M. Chan-Olmsted, Issues in Strategic Management. A.A. Reca, Issues in Media Product Management. R.A. Gershon, Issues in Transnational Media Management. W.S. McDowell, Issues in Marketing and Branding. S.M. Chan-Olmsted, Issues in Media Management and Technology. P.M. Napoli, Issues in Media Management and Public Interest. D.A. Ferguson, Industry-Specific Management Issues. H. van Kranenburg, A. Hogenbirk, Issues in Market Structure. J. Dimmick, Media Competition and Levels of Analysis. T. Chambers, H.H. Howard, The Economics of Media Consolidation. D. Waterman, The Economics of Media Programming. B.J. Bates, K.S. Albright, Issues in Network/Distribution Economics. M.O. Wirth, Issues in Media Convergence. A. SAnchez-Tabernero, Issues in Media Globalization. P. Graham, Issues in Political Economy. Part III: Analytical Tools in Media Management and Economics. R.A. Beam, Quantitative Methods in Media Management and Economics. G. Doyle, S. Frith, Methodological Approaches in Media Management and Media Economics Research. C.A. Hollifield, A.J. Coffey, Qualitative Research in Media Management and Economics. G.W. Ozanich, Media Finance and Valuation. P.F. Phalen, Audience Research and Analysis. Part IV: Future Directions in Media Management and Economics. D. Shaver, M.A. Shaver, Directions for Media Management Research in the 21st Century. S. Lacy, J.M. Bauer, Future Directions for Media Economics Research. D.H. Goff, Global Media Management and Economics.

Handbook of Media Management and Economics

Alcohol in Europe: a public health persepctive. A report for the European Commission.

Masked marketing—one form of covert marketing—involves marketing communications that appear to be from independent third parties rather than from product marketers. This article presents a typology of masked marketing practices, illustrating whether they may be deceptive to consumers. To accomplish this, the authors apply the Federal Trade Commission's three-part definition of deception (i.e., misleadingness, reasonable consumer, and materiality) in the evaluation of such practices. The article concludes with policy recommendations including areas for further research.

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Covert Marketing Unmasked: A Legal and Regulatory Guide for Practices That Mask Marketing Messages

Self-regulation has been portrayed as superior to government regulation for addressing problems of new media such as digital television and the internet. This article reviews the literature on self-regulation to define what is meant by the term, to identify the purported advantages and disadvantages of self regulation and to identify the conditions needed for its success. It then analyzes the effectiveness of self-regulation by looking at the track record of self-regulation in other media. After describing and analyzing past uses of self-regulation in broadcasting, children's advertising, news, alcohol advertising, comics books movies, and video games, it concludes that self regulation rarely lives up to the claims made for it, although in some cases, it has been useful as a supplement to government regulation. It identifies five factors that may account for the success or failure of self-regulation. These include the industry incentives, the ability of government to regulate, the use of measurable standards, public participation and industry structure. Applying these five factors to digital television public interest responsibilities and privacy on the internet, it concludes that self regulation is not likely to be successful in these contexts.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2399305_code96617.pdf?abstractid=184279&mirid=3

Self-Regulation and the Media

I. INTRODUCTION Calls for self-regulation of electronic media have recently been heard in Washington, D.C. In December 1998, a Presidential Advisory Committee recommended that digital television broadcasters adopt a voluntary Code of Conduct highlighting their public interest commitments.(1) The Advisory Committee Report even included a "Model Voluntary Code" drafted by a subcommittee headed by Professor Cass Sunstein.(2) Similarly, President Clinton has called for industry self-regulation to address consumer privacy concerns on the Internet.(3) This theme has been echoed by the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)(4) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).(5) However, the FTC released a report in June 1998, finding that self-regulation had not been successful thus far in protecting consumer privacy.(6) It recommended congressional action specifically to address the issue of children's privacy online, while giving more time to industry to prove it can regulate itself before calling for general privacy legislation.(7) In the last few days of the 1998 session, Congress in fact passed legislation designed to protect the privacy of children online. Yet, the regulatory scheme established by this legislation contains specific incentives for industry to self-regulate.(8) Why are the Advisory Committee, the Clinton Administration, and the FTC all calling for self-regulation? It is most likely that they see self-regulation as superior to (or at least more politically acceptable than) government regulation. Many scholars have also touted the benefits of self-regulation, but self-regulation is not without its critics. Part II of this Article reviews the literature on self-regulation to define what is meant by the term, to identify the purported advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation, and to identify the conditions needed for its success. Part III examines situations involving media where self-regulation has been utilized to determine why it was undertaken and whether is has been successful.(9) Based on these examples, Part IV suggests some tentative conclusions about the circumstances under which self-regulation works. Finally, it applies these findings to recent proposals to utilize self-regulation in connection with digital television and privacy on the Internet. II. SELF-REGULATION A. The Definition of Self-Regulation The term self-regulation means different things to different people. In introducing a collection of papers analyzing the prospects of self-regulation for protecting privacy on the Internet, Assistant Secretary of Commerce Larry Irving observed: Most basically, we need to define what we mean, as the term "self-regulation" itself has a range of definitions. At one end of the spectrum, the term is used quite narrowly, to refer only to those instances where the government has formally delegated the power to regulate, as in the delegation of securities industry oversight to the stock exchanges. At the other end of the spectrum, the term is used when the private sector perceives the need to regulate itself for whatever reason--to respond to consumer demand, to carry out its ethical beliefs, to enhance industry reputation, or to level the market playing field--and does so.(10) To devise a definition for purposes of this Article, it is useful to break apart the term "self-regulation." The word "self' refers to the actor. It could mean a single company. More commonly, however, and for purposes of this Article, it is used to refer to a group of companies acting collectively, for example, through a trade association.(11) The word "regulation" refers to what the actor is doing. Regulation has three components: (1) legislation, that is, defining appropriate rules; (2) enforcement, such as initiating actions against violators; and (3) adjudication, that is, deciding whether a violation has taken place and imposing an appropriate sanction. …

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This Article argues that certain marketing practices — specifically product placements and the use of popular characters to promote products — are deceptive when used to market to children. It argues that such practices should therefore be prohibited by federal law and further, that such a law is consistent with the First Amendment.

Restricting the Marketing of Junk Food to Children by Product Placement and Character Selling

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This article describes major changes in how video content and advertising is delivered to consumers. Digital technologies such as broadband allow consumers to stream or download programming. Smart phones and tablets allow consumers to view screen content virtually anywhere at any time. Advertising has become personalized and integrated with other content. 
Despite these major changes in the media markets, the framework for regulating advertising to children has not changed very much since the 1990s. This article argues that the existing regulatory framework must be reinvented to protect children in the digital age. It uses Google’s recently introduced YouTube Kids app (“YTK”), which is designed for use by children aged 5 and under, to illustrate a range of unfair or deceptive marketing practices – such as unboxing videos, brand channels, and influencer videos. Many of the videos available on the YTK app, would violate the FCC’s children’s television rules if they were shown on broadcast or cable television. 
The article describes the relative roles and effectiveness of the FCC and FTC in preventing advertising that takes advantage of children, who because their cognitive abilities are still developing, do not distinguish advertising from other content or understand the purpose of advertising. It identifies the traditional rationales for limiting advertising to children and finds that the same or greater concerns exist today. Finally, it discusses the prospects for updating protections for children in the digital age.

Angela J. Campbell

Papers

Self-Regulation and the Media

Self-Regulation and the Media

Restricting the Marketing of Junk Food to Children by Product Placement and Character Selling

Restricting the Marketing of Junk Food to Children by Product Placement and Character Selling

Rethinking Children's Advertising Policies for the Digital Age