In this provocative book, Barwise and Perry tackle the slippery subject of \"meaning, \" a subject that has long vexed linguists, language philosophers, and logicians.

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Situations and Attitudes.

1. Introduction 2. A Preliminary Case for Conventional Implicatures 3. A Logic for Conventional Implicatures 4. Supplements 5. Expressive Content 6. The Supplement Relation: A Syntactic Analysis 7. A Look Outside Grice's Definition Appendix Bibliography

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The logic of conventional implicatures

Relevance Communication And Cognition

The handbook of pragmatics , The handbook of pragmatics , کتابخانه دیجیتال جندی شاپور اهواز

Handbook of Pragmatics

Are Generalised Scalar Implicatures Generated by Default? An On-Line Investigation into the Role of Context in Generating Pragmatic Inferences.

It has long been recognised that there are referential uses of definite descriptions. It is not as widely recognised that there are attributive uses of indexicals and other such paradigmatically singular terms. I offer an account of the referential/attributive distinction which is intended to give a unified treatment of both sorts of cases. I argue that the best way to account for the referential/attributive distinction is to treat it as semantically underdetermined which sort of proposition is expressed in a context. In certain contexts the proposition expressed will be a descriptive one, and in others it will be an object-dependent one. I appeal to Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) idea that the recovery of the content of an utterance involves pragmatic processes of enrichment of a representation of the logical form of the utterance. According to the account I offer, the first-level descriptive meaning associated with an expression (whether this is an indexical or a definite description) is pragmatically enriched and then used either to track an individual in the context, or is taken to lay down a condition of satisfaction for an individual. The proposition that the listener takes the speaker to have expressed is recovered on the basis of considerations of relevance and contextually available information about the speaker’s directive intentions. Although my account has affinities with those of Recanati (1993) and Nunberg (1993), it also differs from theirs in crucial ways. Each of these authors sees asymmetries where I see none. I give reasons for preferring my symmetrical account.

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Pragmatics, semantic undetermination and the referential/attributive distinction

PART I: INCOMPLETE DESCRIPTIONS PART II: THE REFERENTIAL/ATTRIBUTIVE DISTINCTION PART III: PRESUPPOSITION AND TRUTH-VALUE GAPS PART IV: REPRESENTATION OF DEFINITES AND INDEFINITES IN SEMANTIC THEORY PART V: ANAPHORIC PRONOUNS AND DESCRIPTIONS, INDEFINITES AND DYNAMIC SEMANTICS/SYNTAX PART VI: NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS

Descriptions and Beyond

L'A. defend une approche contextualiste de la semantique selon laquelle la signification d'une phrase ne se reduit pas aux intuitions du locuteur concernant les conditions de verite ou le contenu de l'assertion. Examinant les positions de F. Recanati, C. Travis et J. M. Moravcsick, l'A. montre que le contenu de verite depend d'un ensemble de presupposes implicites concernant les conditions particulieres de l'interaction humaine.

Truth–Conditional Pragmatics

1 Metaphor and What is Said: A Defense of a Direct Expression View of Metaphor Anne Bezuidenhout

Anne Bezuidenhout

Papers

Pragmatics, semantic undetermination and the referential/attributive distinction

Descriptions and Beyond

Truth–Conditional Pragmatics

Metaphor and What Is Said: A Defense of a Direct Expression View of Metaphor

Literal meaning, minimal propositions, and pragmatic processing