International human rights law may serve as a language through which lawyers and others describe the harms resulting from corruption, but this approach has significant limitations as a legal framework. Despite a growing emphasis among scholars and practitioners on a human rights approach to the problem of corruption, this body of law does not provide a strong basis for addressing such conduct. International human rights treaties make no mention of corruption, and human rights treaty bodies have not brought conceptual clarity to the question of how corruption violates or undermines human rights. Given that human rights law binds States alone, it is also ill-suited to a phenomenon that typically occurs at the intersection of the public and private sectors. Even as a language for describing how corruption harms social and economic rights, human rights law has its limitations, some of which come into relief when compared with the field of development economics.

The Limitations of a Human Rights Approach to Corruption

Flexible Institution Building in the International Anti-Corruption Regime: Proposing a Transnational Asset Recovery Mechanism

Article 51 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption sets forth the return of assets diverted through corruption as a fundamental principle of the Convention. This raises the question of whether the State where the stolen assets are located is entitled to refuse their repatriation or subject it to certain conditions. This article analyses the Convention and the policy considerations behind it and argues that such a State has a wider discretion over the return of stolen assets than is often thought. Furthermore, the article argues that the rule of law may be better served if States take vigorous action to confiscate the proceeds of corruption regardless of whether they are ultimately repatriated.

Anton Moiseienko

Papers

The ownership of confiscated proceeds of corruption under the un convention against corruption