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Araceli Mora

Researcher at University of Valencia

Publications -  35
Citations -  2298

Araceli Mora is an academic researcher from University of Valencia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Earnings management & Earnings. The author has an hindex of 16, co-authored 34 publications receiving 2082 citations.

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The Early Adoption of Consolidated Accounting in Spain

TL;DR: In this article, the authors found that firms that adopted consolidated accounting early reported a significantly better change in reported performance at the time of adoption than those firms which only consolidated when required to do so.
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Evidence of income-decreasing earnings management before labour negotiations within the firms

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used the Jones (1991) model and its extensions to analyse total and discretionary accruals around the time of labour negotiations and found that managers depress earnings prior to negotiations.
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Understanding the Consequences of Accounting Standards in Europe: The Role of EFRAG

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse the potential role of academic research in the standard-setter's analysis of effects, and argue that there is a significant role for academic research to play in that process and that intermediaries such as European Financial Reporting Advisory Group can serve to bring research to the standard setting process.
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Strategic Accounting Choice Around Firm-Level Labor Negotiations

TL;DR: The authors argue that managers make opportunistic income-decreasing accounting choices to limit the concessions made to trade unions, but empirical research to date presents mixed evades of this argument.
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Strategic Accounting Choice Around Firm-Level Labor Negotiations

TL;DR: This article found evidence consistent with strategic timing of the negotiation and with increased conditional conservatism in the year when the agreement is signed, suggesting that managers take both real and accounting actions, but that these choices are informative rather than opportunistic.